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Abstract 
This thesis examines the influence of local and regional governments in investment growth 
and productivity in Mexico. A combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis is used 
with the aim of assessing their influence and tools. Mexican municipalities and states have 
gained major participation in policy making, investment fostering and infrastructure 
building. The decentralised resources to meet these goals have increased considerably; as a 
consequence, it becomes imperative to measure the actual effects of such resources as well 
as to identify the opportunity areas to develop.  
The first part of the empirical analysis, attempts to measure the influence of local 
governments’ expenditures on private investment growth, as well as to identify the most 
important investment drivers. Likewise, given the increasing foreign investments landing 
in Mexico, there is a potential regional competition between cities, this is also evaluated. A 
panel data analysis consistent with cross section dependence is carried out for 63 
Metropolitan Areas (MA)/cities for the period 1993-2008. The econometric analysis shows 
that, municipal governments’ expenditures have had a substantial effect on private capital. 
In addition, competition strategies matters. More importantly, public infrastructure stock is 
revealed as a central determinant for investment, especially for manufacturing firms. 
The second empirical chapter evaluates whether municipal and state expenditures in 
economic policies have boosted productivity of firms. Firms and regional features are also 
included in the estimation models. Panel data analysis consistent to cross section 
dependence is used, for 63 MA/cities and 29 states. The results showed that the policies 
implemented in municipalities have had little or even negative effects over firms’ 
productivity. Meanwhile, the policies implemented by states have had larger influence on 
productivity increases.  
In order to dig deeper into the role of local and regional governments in economic policies, 
two case studies –Hermosillo and Mexicali- are presented in the last part. Empirical 
models cannot tell about the local processes, as the data used is only expenditures. The 
fieldwork undertaken helped to identify the most significant policies followed in each city, 
as well as the leadership and organisation of stakeholders. The main finding suggests that 
local participation and overcoming political cycle is essential for the long-term success; 
and easing doing business for firms, rather than incentives, is more effective to spur private 
investment. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1. Decentralisation and political changes towards bottom-up policies 
implementation in Mexico. 
It has been widely acknowledge that in the last four decades there has been a leading trend 
to intensify fiscal and political decentralisation in favour of local and regional governments 
expecting to induce reductions in regional income disparities within countries (Im, 2010, 
Treasury, 2004) . This process has been even intensified in the last 25 years, given the 
failure of national policies, or the so call top-down approach (Tomaney et al., 2010). The 
analysis of regions and cities has led to reveal that one fit all policies are not helpful 
enough when attending local needs. Especially, decentralisation might improve the 
management efficiency and quality of services delivered to citizens (Oates and Schwab, 
1988, Giugale and Webb, 2000).    
Increasing the participation of local governments as well as other key actors in promoting 
local economic development has been especially remarked by the Local Economic 
Development (LED) literature, which had been widely advised to Latin American 
countries (Ruiz D., 2000, Enríquez Villacorta, 2006). Competitiveness literature, and more 
particularly, the systemic competitiveness approach, claim that collective actions will build 
up a more solid competitiveness with larger effects in the long term (Esser et al., 1996).   
Decentralisation efforts started in Mexico in the 70´s and have been intensified throughout 
the years, especially during the 90´s. In addition, during the 1980 and 1990 decades, 
Mexico started the widely known economic liberalisation, which maximum expression was 
the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Together 
with different programs to increase participation of local citizens in planning and policies 
implementation , during the 90’s decade the fiscal decentralisation was largely intensified, 
endowing local and especially state governments with pecuniary resources and channels to 
manage regional planning, services delivering, economic fostering activities, and public 
infrastructure building. There were agreements to allow states to set taxes, but in practice, 
there used to be a high centralisation of tax and oils revenues (Courchene and Díaz-
Cayeros, 2000). In the case of municipalities, the modification to the constitution 
undertaken in1983 granted them the responsibility of delivering local services. It also 
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endowed them to freely spend their resources and increase local revenues. But similarly to 
the states, they continued without the resources to take charge on their new responsibilities.  
During the term in office of the national President Ernesto Zedillo 1994-2000, there was 
introduced a significant change, that is, the decentralisation of two main tasks: education 
and health services. It brought an increase of almost 10 times of conditional transfers to 
states, from 1993-2011. In addition, the unconditional transfers have also increased about 
40% for the same period. The fiscal decentralisation has allowed state governments to 
increase their total incomes up to 2 times from 1993 to 2011, and up to 1.5 for 
municipalities. More importantly, compared to the state administrations budgets, in 1993 
municipalities’ total incomes represented about 26% of the states income. By 2011, this 
proportion grew up to 45%. This came as a result of the federal transfer system which 
demands states to distribute to municipalities at least 20% of their total unconditional 
transfers received (Peña-Ahumada, 2011).    
It is essential to also remark the changes of the political geography in the last 25 years. 
Despite that Mexican political system is a democracy, the leading party had remained in 
power during 60 years in all government levels, and over 70 years in the national 
presidency. It was in 1989 when for the first time the opposite party, PAN won elections at 
municipal level. By 1995, 7% of the states and 45% of municipalities were governed by 
other parties (Costa-I-Font et al., 2003). It was until 2000 when the national president came 
from a party different to PRI. It entails that, during that period of 11 years 1989-2000, the 
political geography was dramatically transformed.  
As a result, on the one side, there was more than ever the chance to incur in Pork-Barrel 
politics, especially considering that politicians were not used to work with a different party 
along the government structures. Governors, municipalities, deputies, and senates had to 
bargain and seek consensual decisions, which was not necessary before, when the president 
had the power to control most decisions and almost everyone used to agree due to the so 
called presidentialism lived in Mexico and other Latin American countries in the twentieth 
century, see Mainwaring and Shugart (1997).  
On the other side, given the divergence in parties and the occurrence of Pork-Barrel 
politics, it became mandatory to institutionalise mechanisms to endow state and 
municipalities with major pecuniary resources and political powers to act on their behalf. 
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In consequence, the criteria in the distribution of federal transfers were reformed to reduce 
discretional favouritism prevalent before (Giugale and Webb, 2000). Gradual 
modifications occurred, the most significant reforms to the formula happened in 2003 and 
2007. The latter introduced incentives to states that have improved their management tasks 
in the previous period (Peña-Ahumada, 2011). The new formula rewards with major 
resources state which achieve better economic growth, under the assumption that it is a 
result of actively promotion of regional growth. Better education indicators, as well as 
greater total tax collection and tax collection growth, are also awarded. In parallel, there 
are 10% of the total funds to be distributed to those in worse position according to the 
mentioned criteria, with a compensation aim.     
Together with the provision of funds, the federal government has fostered to sates and 
municipalities, particularly the latter, to improve planning tasks.  As a result, there has 
been encouraged the creation of local and regional departments to formulate and 
implement economic policies, support domestic and foreign firms, participate in marketing 
fairs, as well as any other task regarding to economic policies.  
Urban planning formulated on behalf of the municipalities have been also fostered by the 
creation of IMPLAN’s (Municipal Institute for Planning; Instituto Municipal de 
Planeacion). The offices created are linked through different associations to also coordinate 
the municipal and state planning offices for tourism, economics and urban planning.  
Methods to assess and foster such practices have also emerged. Namely, from the 
academic sector, there is a yearly award running from 2000, organised by the association 
of various non- governmental institutions, mostly universities. The prize is given to local 
governments which implement reforms in management that significantly improve their 
administration. Also, the Doing Business project from the World Bank has encouraged 
local governments to change laws in order to ease the paperwork for firms.  
From the federal government, INEGI has created the Government Censuses (Censos de 
Gobierno) from 2011 onwards to register the extent to which local and state governments 
undertake planning activities in view the evaluation of their territory. The census also 
attempts to find out whether governments evaluate the results obtained at the end of the 
year compared to the objectives established on their plans. In other words, the aim of this 
work is to assess the planning and management work in states and municipalities, seeking 
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to improve efficiency is policies making, implementation and evaluation. In addition, the 
registers of local and state expenditures in INEGI data base have been improved to let 
major disaggregation degree, which in the future may permit to assess the effects of 
particular expenditure items in the economic growth and wellbeing.  
The actual effects of such policies is believed to improve at least the services delivered to 
communities, since municipalities can build basic infrastructure that is better planned in 
the municipal institutes, rather than in the federal offices. Yet, it is really hard to isolate the 
effect of decentralisation in the context of economic liberalisation.  
Research works using a set of countries -developed and developing- found that 
decentralisation fosters inequalities in developing countries (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2010, Im, 2010). In spite of that, research works in Mexico have found that 
decentralisation has had good effects, although its specific influence over regional 
inequalities have not been tested yet. Moreno (2013), and Gonzalez-Rivas (2014) have 
investigated the consequences of decentralisation in rural areas. Moreno (2013) found that 
decentralisation in Mexico can be related to higher accountability and entrepreneurship 
behaviour in rural governments. While Gonzalez-Rivas (2013), using a case study in 
Oaxaca, found that decentralisation may allow local communities to obtain more efficient 
water services, given the higher engagement of local citizens. However, as regards with the 
expenditures surplus following fiscal decentralisation, there are no works testing the total 
effect. This is where the present work finds opportunity to contribute.  
2. Raise of competition: competing regions, competing governments 
The economic liberalisation process has virtually changed all latitudes around the globe. 
The development of transport and communications technologies has let increasing 
interactions among countries, leading to a highly integrated global market whereby the 
distances have become a less significant issue. With ‘weaker’ barriers among countries due 
to the market deregulation, firms, cities and regions have been exposed to an intense 
competition, which Savitch and Kantor (2002) call ‘the market commonplace’.  
The liberalisation of capital together with the raising of cities and regions pursuing 
economic growth by attracting firms and human capital to their regions have created the 
possibility for competition at the regional level, additionally to the intensified competition 
in the productive and labour markets (Camagni, 2002) .  
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The tools and resources to compete are different depending on the competitor. For instance 
enterprises must compete through high productivity levels and differentiation in their 
products; cities and regions have to compete by means of the provision of urban 
externalities, specialised services to suppliers, and all the facilities that impact the 
enterprises competitiveness, in order to retain and attract the mobile resources, namely, 
capital investments and labour force. Countries as a whole have a bigger bunch of 
instruments to compete, since apart of providing specific infrastructure for the production 
and well-founded institutions, some countries still have the option to use the currency as 
instrument to compete. Labour force, find their self into a highly competitive market in 
which the bunch of skills required have also incremented, not only in the knowledge-based 
activities, but in general terms (Storper, 1997, OECD, 2001).  
The results of the competence could be crude, few participants win while others lose, or 
stay stagnant. The competition faced by regions has been acknowledged by different 
scholars, while it has been also highly criticised by others who claim that firms are the only 
entities facing competition when they face the market (Krugman, 1994, Porter, 1990). 
Nevertheless, the competition and competitiveness at the city level have become essential 
task within the policy makers’ agenda. It has been recognised that territories actually 
influence competitiveness of firms (Kresl, 1992, Storper, 1997, Boshma, 2004, Budd, 
1998), which thus affects firms’ locational decision.  
As the wealth generators in economic life, firms’ settlement, investment decisions and 
productivity levels determine regional income. In view of this, public officers, in name of a 
region or city, seek to influence on firms’ location and investment decisions (Thomas, 
2000, Markusen, 2007, Cheshire and Gordon, 1998). In addition, given that urban 
economies yield their wealth creation on human capital to a great extent, cities might also 
pursue to influence on people inflows.  
The ways to influence on such decisions from individuals and firms are diverse given their 
needs. Firms might be highly interested in domestic markets, transport costs, energy 
supply, as well as the institutional framework (Kresl and Gappert, 1995, Turok, 2004). 
While citizens look for urban amenities, especially those highly qualified (Poot, 2000, 
Castells and Borja, 2000). At this regard, it has been widely discussed that cities with 
better urban amenities are more likely to attract highly skilled labour force, who might be 
also risk takers and may have more innovation capacity (Florida, 2003, Capello and 
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Camagni, 2005). This will enhance an environment in which productivity could be 
considerably improved, governments hence should take into account that improving urban 
amenities might bring about larger wealth creation without directly fostering firms.  
In consequence, local governments and policy-makers should pursue to improve the 
production and living conditions to become sticky places, that is, cities/regions capable to 
retain and attract new mobile resources (Cheshire and Magrini, 2009a). Yet, these 
strategies are effective only in the mid and long terms, which makes them difficult to 
implement when terms in office are short, and governments seek for fast results, especially 
in terms of job creation (Mäding, 2006, Savitch and Kantor, 2002).  
Given the economic liberalisation, multinational firms have a wider set of possible place to 
locate. It causes that firms might find similar cities around the globe; they will thus bargain 
their settlement when possible. This has triggered competition by using other means apart 
of competitiveness improvement. This is, bidding wars, tax lowering or exemptions, land 
provision, financing of labour force training and diverse packages that involves monetary 
incentives to achieve the settlement of firms. This may usually happen between cities with 
similar urban endowments and labour force availability in which their additional advantage 
has to come out of cash incentives (Greenstone et al., 2010).  
However, it also happens that firms may invest in less efficient places, given the important 
incentives received (Thomas, 2003b, Blonigen and Kolpin, 2007). Certainly there is an 
important discussion about the implications of incentives-based competition policies. In 
the case of developing countries it is expected that they try to compensate the lack of good 
infrastructure, institutional framework, human capital, and the existence of corruption or 
high crime levels. Nonetheless, within developed countries the competence has also 
occurred, especially in the US given the high degree of independence of the states 
(Markusen, 2007).   
In such cases, the problem lies upon the income disparities that could be enhanced. 
Namely, rich states would be able to offer larger incentives; therefore, the incentives do not 
longer have a compensation aim, but they constitute a mean to reinforce uneven economic 
performance. This types of policies have also generated a race to the bottom, in which the 
only benefited are the firms, but not the cities, given the large amounts of money spent in 
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the bid. Also, some claim that offering incentives might also enhance inefficiency within 
the firm, which for sure is in detriment of the productivity. 
In sum, when addressing regional competition, it can be assumed that local actors and 
stakeholders may act on behalf of a region in order to influence the location decisions of 
firms and individuals. The competition strategies can be either based upon competitiveness 
improvement policies, which are long-term strategies; or in incentives-based policies. 
Indeed, both can be complemented, but governments should seek more vigorously the 
former to abandon the need to offering cash incentives (Romer, 1993, Cheshire and 
Gordon, 1998). According to the literature, regional competition mostly arises upon 
geographical location and economic specialisation (Johansson, 2000). A third field is the 
competition for urbanisation economies (Budd, 1998). High technology industry and firms 
producing high value added, especially in the services sectors, or the headquarters seek to 
be established in cities with high quality of life, and urban amenities.  
In this way, with the emergence of local and regional governments as key actors to 
promote economic development in partnership with upper levels government offices 
during the last 25 years, competing governments and fields of competition have also arisen 
in Mexico. Consequently, this has also motivated the present research project.    
3. Aim of this work 
In view of the considerable increase of economic resources in municipal and state 
government, and given that during 1993-2011, about 30% and 45% of those resources at 
municipal and state levels, respectively, have been exerted in tasks related directly or 
indirectly regarding to fostering economic growth; studying the outcomes of such policies 
has enlarged in importance.  
The main kinds of policies implemented could be grouped in three. First, support to firms 
intending to have a direct effect on their productivity. Among these activities are 
encountered granting loans; giving administrative consultancy; helping to design a brand 
and find commercial channels for their products; assisting with advice and financing to 
commit sanitary or any other type of certification; and mostly ease the paperwork to start a 
business. Second, provision of pecuniary incentives, grants, land and tax exemptions. It 
depends on the state or the municipality in question, the economic activity of the firm, and 
the nature of the investment; whether it is domestic or foreign. At the state level, when it is 
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a foreign firm, it is also likely to draw upon federal resources that can actually be 
meaningful for foreign investors, especially in the automotive and the aerospace. Third, 
improvement of public infrastructure stock, and investment in marketing departments to 
attract new investors, especially foreign when possible.   
A clear example of the fostering competitiveness policies implemented is the generalised 
creation of local and state economic departments that used to be inexistent 20 years ago. In 
many places, the offices undertake marketing and promotion by targeting particular firms 
and offering them attractive package of incentives.    
Despite of all the depicted changes, both politically and economically, there is general 
belief that local and regional governments have very limited capacity to pursue economic 
growth and foster investment, especially in municipalities. Indeed, federal investment has 
remained as a significant driver for regional growth in the past (Rodríguez Oreggia y 
Román, 2003), and in the third chapter this has been confirmed when estimating state level 
models.  
However, if the claim is true, and only federal government can effectively promote 
economic growth, then fiscal and political decentralisation have been in vain. It would 
entail that about 30% and 45% of public resources in municipalities and states, respectively 
have been wasted during 1993-2011, while federal resources are being transferred to 
support inefficient local administrations (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012, Correa 
Gomes et al., 2013). However, larger engagement of local governments have been found 
positive for Mexican municipalities; in works such as Moreno (2013) and Gonzalez-Rivas 
(2014) mentioned before. Rodríguez-Pose and Palavicini-Corona (2013) found that human 
development grew faster in municipalities engaging LED during 1990-2005. In other 
words, the higher engagement of local stakeholders mattered for human development 
increases. 
Among the aims of the municipal and state offices for economic development are the 
enhancement of private investment and productivity of firms. Testing the actual effects 
municipal and state policies over these two variables is the main task of this work. The 
policies are assessed quantitatively, rather than qualitatively, hence, the expenditures 
exerted by municipal and state government on such policies are used as the main interest 
variables.  
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Besides, cities can be seen as a common place where flows of people, firms and 
information interact, which success is highly determined by those existing interactions and 
the institutional framework that serves as a boundary (Castells, 1999). The econometrical 
models allow gathering information in average expenditures, but differences in specific 
policies implemented cannot be scrutinised. The registers are not disaggregated, and 
getting to know the type of offices functioning, whether local departments participate in 
marketing fairs, or the extent to which stakeholders participate in designing public policies, 
by  carrying on documental research is simply impossible, because local organisation 
differs all around the country. 
Given the institutional organisation, it is also important getting to know the way in which 
the three partnership scheme shapes the actions at local and regional levels in Mexico. That 
is, what is the actual path of actions when implementing policies to foster investment as 
well as the extent to which differences in local institutes might change the policies 
outcomes. Additionally, in view of different cases of study in which it has been proved that 
local actors engagement in public matters leads to better policies outcomes, frequently 
based on internal resources (Lorens et al., 2002, Ruiz D., 2000). In a context of 
competition policies based on internal and external resources, a deeper understanding 
about the policies followed and role of local key actors for policies implementation is also 
essential.  
Particularly, there were identified very divergent paths among the cities studied. Fieldwork 
to benchmark local specific features in two cities has been carried out. Namely, types the 
strategies followed, the role of planning, means used to support domestic and foreign firms 
in particular; as well as the bargaining occurred between local/regional public officers and 
firms representatives.   
The ideal would be to have two equal regional entities and assess the differences in 
outcomes, related to different policies and local features. This is not possible, however, 
therefore, two cities with similar economic specialisation, economic structure, population-
size, political status –state capitals- and geographic location are used for the benchmark.  
4. Contribution of this research  
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The contributions of this research work undertaken are manifold. The specific results 
obtained with the empirical models are listed in the outline of the thesis. Here are 
highlighted what in my opinion are the central findings.  
This research project underlies its importance in the need of revealing whether local and 
state administrations in Mexico are capable of fostering better economic performance and 
development. Meanwhile, the federal government remains as the leader given the 
institutional framework, better planning and pecuniary resources. Hence, it becomes 
essential to examine the extent to which municipalities and states serve as promoters as 
well, and the possible mechanisms to increase their influence.  
There have been identified specific tools that municipal and state governments employ to 
foster economic growth in Mexico. The results exposed that indeed the higher amount of 
decentralised funds has endowed municipal and state governments to foster economic 
growth, even if municipalities have fewer incidence on productivity enhancement.  
Nonetheless, by means of the econometric models it was confirmed that even after the 
reforms undertaken, the investment exerted by the federal government has had greater 
effects on productivity than the investments on behalf of municipalities and states. 
Additionally, through the fieldwork carried out, it was found that in the case of Mexicali 
and Hermosillo, top-down policies accompanied by financial resources may trigger much 
higher economic growth than ground-founded policies, with a bottom-up approach.  
These findings, cast doubts on the effectiveness of the proposed development model in 
which participation of local actors –public or private- is essential, while federal policies 
work as main drivers for productivity and investment growth enhancement. It suggests that 
higher decentralisation should be encouraged, given all the potential benefits of it for 
Mexican municipalities.  
The chapter two and three contributes by providing information about incentives given to 
firms, and subsidies revenues in both, domestic and foreign-own/joint venture firms. It 
helped to reduce the lack of information on incentives-based policies, and subsidies 
revenues for firms in developing countries.  
Additional to the existing empirical evidence, this thesis provides evidence on the effects 
of local, regional and federal investments over firms’ productivity and their investments 
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decisions. It was confirmed that the hard road competitive strategies should be followed at 
the regional and local level, since larger effects have been revealed compared to the soft 
road competitive strategies. That is, policies aimed to improve the determinants of regional 
and firms’ competitiveness showed larger influence than Policies to promote investments 
and provide all kind of incentives for firms, generally to a great discretionarily. 
Particularly, the case studies analysed confirmed that the engagement from state and 
municipal administrations could lead to significant transformations in the mid and long-
terms. Even if state/federal supported policies might cause grater economic growth, it is 
also clear that municipal policies with a long-term vision helped to develop more efficient 
strategies.  
5. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is organised in the form of three separated journal articles, plus the introduction 
and conclusions chapters. In consequence, there is no a chapter to discuss the related 
literature to this thesis, since each chapter has its own theoretical framework section, which 
is interrelated to each other.  
It is important to mention that given the availability of information and the aim of each 
chapter different disaggregation levels are used. In the second chapter, the models are 
estimated for municipalities. Given that the dependent variable is the new private 
investment per employee, it was not possible to get this or a similar variable for states, 
which is only available for the country or for municipalities in the Economic Censuses. It 
could have been somehow aggregated, yet, this chapter also attempts to identify 
competition, and thus city level analysis was considered more appropriated.  
In the third chapter the analysis is carried out for cities and states. Given that this time the 
dependent variable is a measure of productivity, it was considered appropriate to 
incorporate the role of federal investment in physical assets, which cannot be 
disaggregated at municipal level, thus state level models were estimated. Perhaps it would 
have been better to have the expenditures from the three administration levels in each 
model, but this is not always possible. The whole thesis is organised as follows. 
The first chapter, which you are reading on, presents an overview of the whole thesis 
project, in order to provide a logic explanation about the general aim this research, and set 
ground for the three articles presented. This chapter delivers a synthesis of the changes 
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occurred in Mexico that motivated the present research work, and highlights the main 
contributions. 
The second chapter presents a specific study about the effects of public expenditures 
exerted by the government of the most important cities in the country on private 
investment increments. The effects of decentralisation and some other empirical papers are 
discussed. Promptly an econometric model is proposed. The interest variables do not 
include total expenditures, but those registering the expenses incurred while fostering 
economic activities by different means, as well as when investing to improve productions 
conditions.  
The chapter highlights that in the context of larger capabilities from local governments to 
pursue economic development by promoting investment, improving public infrastructure 
stock, improving institutions; governments can be to immerse in regional competition. 
Such competition is more likely to happen between cities located nearby, and those with 
similar economic specialisation. Therefore, two variables are added in the models to 
identify whether investing more than the close competitors have been beneficial. Namely, 
if spending larger quantities of resources than other cities have increased the investment 
levels in the cities in question.  
The models are differently estimated for domestic and foreign firms, as well as for total 
and manufacturing firms. The findings showed that municipal governments have induced 
private investment growth in the period of study. The effects are larger in manufacturing 
firms. More importantly, the effects are positive for foreign firms, while negative for 
national firms. As for foreign firms, proximity to border region and the US market 
potential are very influential.  
The third chapter goes beyond to analyse if some public policies have helped to increase 
productivity. The literature about the governments interventions states that frequently the 
type of support offered to firms does not help them to improve their efficiency, quite the 
opposite, they tend to stimulate inefficiencies inside the firms (Thomas, 2000). Related 
literature and empirical works are discussed here, and then an econometrical model is 
proposed.  
In this chapter, the analysis is extended to the state and federal levels, because states and 
federal governments have major capabilities to undertake planning and to carry on bigger 
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projects that may impact productivity of firms to a greater extent. The empirical analysis is 
carried out by estimating econometrical models at cities and states levels.   
The results showed that municipalities/cities have limited capacity to foster the 
productivity of firms, while state and especially federal governments are key drivers. In 
view of that, it was concluded that, even if there has been important advances in 
decentralisation, central government can still lead the economic performance of regions to 
a great extent, as it has been remarked by other researchers (Topal, 2013, Chiquiar and 
Ramos-Francia, 2009) and shown by Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose (2004). 
Particularly, the expenditures on infrastructure showed a negative sign, which could 
indicate corruption and/or mismanagement of the projects undergoing, which should be 
tackled.  
The fourth chapter reports the findings of the fieldwork undertaken. During the fieldwork 
sixteen interviews were carried out to get first-hand information about the policies 
implemented at the local level and the informal institutions existing, this is the actual 
relationship with other government levels as well as with the private sector, particularly 
with manufacturing firms. This exercise revealed that the actions held in local levels, can 
influence economic performance to a great extent, nevertheless, the financial and political 
support and leadership from state and federal instances could be even more influential. 
There were identified different political organisations, as well as differences in support to 
domestic and foreign firms, which could not be identified with the empirical models.   
The chapter starts by discussing related literature, and empirical studies in Mexico in 
which the influence of key local actors has been essential to trigger economic development 
increases. The chapter addresses the economic and social profile of the cities included in 
the study. The institutional organisation from the cities are discussed, and there are also 
described the type of policies to foster investment. Finally a benchmark between the two 
cities is presented. The conclusions reports that, local actions in Mexicali has led to a 
greater transformation of the city compared to 1993, even if its economic growth has been 
less dynamic than Hermosillo in the last 10 years. On its side, Hermosillo has become one 
of the most successful cities in the country, yet the initiative did not come from the local 
government, but from the state level, with the support of the federal government. Mexicali 
showed major engagement with LED strategies, this is, a bottom-up approach in which the 
leadership comes from local actors which are not precisely policymakers but local 
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stakeholdes. Meanwhile, Hermosillo exhibited policies more in line with the traditional 
development policies focused on the development of one economic sector, in this case the 
automotive. In other words, Hermosillo’ policies follow the top-down approach, while 
showing strong support to local firms as recommended by LED literature.  
This case casts dubs about the model to be followed, because although the federal 
administration fosters participation at local levels, it is clear that economic success is faster 
when there is the support from the federal level. Therefore it constitutes an incentive to 
engage in the race for getting political support from upper government levels, which could 
magnify the costs of political cycles and the opportunities for Pork-Barrel politics.   
The fifth and final chapter presents the general conclusions of the work and ponders its 
limitations.  Possible further researches that may deepen the results of this research project 
are also discussed.  
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Chapter 2 
Effects of decentralisation and regional competition on 
private investment growth: Evidence from Mexican cities 
Abstract 
The increasing mobility of capital raises competition between territories in order to attract 
it within their jurisdiction. Since 1994, the decentralisation process in Mexico has been 
accelerated by providing municipalities with more expenditure capabilities. In parallel, 
Mexican municipalities have participated more actively in formulating economic policies. 
Fiscal decentralisation and major engagement of local government in economic 
development may allow regions to enhance competitive advantages and increase their 
attractiveness. In spite of the increasing resources and local participation in policymaking, 
their effects on investment increments have not been tested yet. In addition, there could be 
regional competition ongoing; even when municipal governments cannot offer significant 
amounts of money to firms they use different competition means. This hypothesis has not 
been tested either. In consequence, this work is aimed to find out to what extent the money 
exerted at the local level has induced private investment growth, and to test the effects of 
regional competition, if there exists. A panel data analysis is carried out using data from 
INEGI for 63 Metropolitan Areas/cities for the period 1993-2008. The models are divided 
into firms with solely domestic investment and those with foreign investment. The 
econometric analysis shows that, two major spending items, namely Economic fostering 
and subsidies, and Public infrastructure investment, have a substantial effect on private 
capital, but the effects vary depending on the group of firms assessed. In addition, 
competition strategies matters; the results suggest that municipalities spending more 
money than their direct competitors have a higher private investment growth. More 
importantly, public infrastructure stock has been revealed as a central determinant for 
investment, especially for manufacturing firms. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is well known that some cities are more successful than others. Some are in decay while 
others in boom. The first ones are not highly attractive for new FDI flows and human 
capital, and they could be incapable to retain the established investment and inhabitants. 
Successful cities are attractive for firms and people and can be also sticky places given 
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their business and living conditions (Cheshire and Magrini, 2009). Within competitiveness 
literature, cities can be called winners or losers given their economic performance (Capello 
and Camagni, 2005). When the patterns in economic performance remain in the mid and 
long terms, gains tend to concentrate in few cities. This is especially true for developing 
countries where urban cities tend to be highly uneven (Storper, 2013).  
Mexico has experienced an important process of economic liberalisation bringing about 
economic growth and increments of the income levels. The effects have been dissimilar 
and regional income inequalities have been increasing after 1980, when the economic 
liberalisation started (Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2005). At the same time, a decentralisation 
process has been undertaken, and local governments have more responsibilities to 
participate in economic planning, and provision of public infrastructure, education and 
health.  Local governments in Mexico foster investment by means of better economic 
planning, support to national and foreign firms to ease the paperwork and obtain fiscal 
benefits, loans and incentives. They may also promote their regions and sign diverse 
agreements. Besides, municipal government invest on infrastructure. All these actions 
depend not only on the resources spent, but on the ability and actions of local key actors. 
The fiscal and political decentralisation in Mexico has had the aim to allow and encourage 
the participation from local and regional government to attend their specific needs (Peña-
Ahumada, 2011). In other words, federal government seeks to boost the bottom-up 
approach, given the possible benefits of decreasing regional disparities pointed by various 
scholars and international organisations such as OECD and CEPAL (Lorens et al., 2002, 
Enríquez Villacorta, 2006). On the other side, higher decentralisation could also increase 
jurisdictional competition for resources and reinforce regional inequalities (Sorens, 2012, 
Chien and Gordon, 2008), especially in developing countries (Im, 2010). Thus, increasing 
local policies may also lead to regional competition.   
In spite of the increasing efforts and pecuniary resources spent by local and regional 
governments to boost investment, the effects have not been tested yet. The contribution of 
this chapter is to find whether the expenditures from municipal governments aimed to 
foster economic growth have influenced the private investment increments. This chapter 
also helps to fill the lack of information about regional competition strategies in 
developing countries, as well as about the subsidies revenues for private firms. It is hard to 
get all the subsidies or incentives granted yet some concrete data is presented here.  
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In addition, this chapter contributes to the empirical literature of regional competition with 
a variable to measure the importance of competition policies, relative to close competitors. 
The literature suggests that regional competition yield upon geographical proximity, 
economic specialisation, urban amenities and agglomeration economies (Johansson, 2000, 
Budd and Hirmis, 2004). In view of that, governments should strive to offer better 
conditions than their closer competitors. Two variables are added to test competition by 
economic specialisation and geographic location.  
Using panel data analysis for 63 cities from 1993 to 2008 it was found that municipal 
expenditures constitute a significant driver for private investment. With different results, 
domestic firms tend to benefit more from expenditures on investment fostering, while 
foreign firms benefit from public infrastructure investment. Competing with infrastructure 
investment is definitively more important than competition with incentives, regardless the 
type of competitors assessed. This is geographic or economic competitors.  
Given that the expenditure from local governments proved to be significantly enhancing 
private investment growth, it can be said that decentralisation has endowed local 
governments to actually pursue economic growth to a good extent. Additionally, their 
investment showed larger effects over foreign firms, which entails potential opportunities 
for municipal administrations.  
The chapter is organised as follows. The second section discusses about the emergence of 
competition given the increasing mobile resources in the world, as well as due to the 
enlarged powers of regions and cities to pursue economic growth and development. The 
third section presents empirical studies about decentralisation and competition policies 
effects over private investment. The fourth section tells about the particular policies 
undertaken in Mexican local administrations and provides information on the total 
subsidies revenues received by private firms from 1998 to 2008. The fifth section describes 
the data used for the models, and presents the variables and methodology to be employed. 
The sixth section presents the models results. And the seventh section brings concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Emergence of competition for investments 
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2.1 Decentralisation leading to regional competition 
Political and fiscal decentralisation has been a leading trend in last three decades given its 
possible positive effects on regional growth, especially in the OECD countries (Treasury, 
2004, Giugale and Webb, 2000). The rising of sub national authorities making bottom-up 
policies could be a better approach to tackle local matters (Oates and Schwab, 1988). 
Nevertheless, the effects of decentralisation have been tested and they do not seem positive 
all times. Different empirical works suggest that fiscal decentralisation is related with the 
decrease of regional inequalities in developed countries, but not in developing countries 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010a, Lessmann, 2009, Im, 2010).  
It could be due to difference in the in the institutional framework, lack of administrative 
capacity at local levels, or corruption increments in local administrations given their major 
freedom (Im, 2010). Other reason might be losses in aggregate efficiency (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Ezcurra, 2010). Using data for developed, semi-developed and developing countries, 
Tobin (2010) found that fiscal decentralisation is positively related with GDP growth in 
developed countries, but not in semi-developed and developing countries. Sorens (2012) 
suggest that there should be a compensation program, otherwise decentralisation will 
exacerbate inequalities.  
The higher independence from local and regional governments induces to jurisdictional 
competition for: 1) public resources, 2) political support from the central government, and 
3) for private investments (Sorens, 2012, Markusen, 2007). Such competition might also 
enhance regional inequalities, given that some cities are in better conditions to compete 
than others(Cheshire and Magrini, 2009). Still, even if some cities grow faster, depending 
on the kinds of policies followed, competing to attract investments could cause good 
results in the long-term.  
Whether policies followed enhance regional competitiveness, such strategies will increase 
growth and wellbeing in the long-term. While if competition is incentives-based, it should 
boost investment, yet it can lead to short-term effects or even a race to the bottom. An 
example of the later is when high amounts of money are spent to bring new investments, 
such that the gains of the new investments may be offset by the grants given (Thomas, 
2011). This can be really harmful for local administrations. In spite of it, incentives have 
been a frequent mean to attract foreign investment in developed and developing countries 
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(Fisher, 2007). In this way, fiscal and political decentralisation have different potential 
effects on regional economic growth and income inequalities across regions.   
2.2 Competing governments and private investment attraction  
According to Budd (1998) regional competition is a process parallel to globalisation, but it 
is actually more concrete. In a context in which capitals and people became more 
footloose, governments acting in the name of a city/region will attempt to attract mobile 
resources, frequently by means of specific incentives packages complemented with other 
kinds of policies (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998, Johansson, 2000).  
Governments are the leading actors in regional competition strategies formulation, even 
though regional competition could also analyse the actions of firms and other private actors 
(Batey and Frederich, 2000). While their bargaining position however, is also dependant 
on their available resources, policy guidelines and institutional framework. Yet the 
attention to the strategic planning will rely on their awareness of the direct competence 
with other regions at the national or international scale.  
There has been a large discussion on the type of policies that could be considered within 
competition. Some authors consider differently regional competition and competitiveness- 
increasing policies. While others think that aiming to increase the attractiveness of a region 
by any mean, is a regional competition policy. After revising different approaches, it is 
important to mention that in either classification, those strategies aiming to attract and 
retain investments based on marketing, incentives, promotion, or grants are not sustainable 
in the long-term, and can be called low-road or soft policies. Given that they do not 
increase the competitive capacity of the region. While other policies strengthening 
competitive capabilities both with physical or non-physical capital assets, can be called 
high-road or hard competition policies, and are sustainable in the long-term (Cheshire and 
Gordon, 1998, Malecki, 2004, Lever, 1999).  
Potter (2009) classifies competition policies in two groups: indirect and direct. Among the 
formers are found namely subsidies, national/regional/local planning, and improvement in 
the transport infrastructure or other networks for trade. Meanwhile in the later are those 
which promote spillovers effects between enterprises, such as support for clusters 
formation, policies of knowledge transfer, innovation and entrepreneurship, since Potter 
argues that those are the sources of real competitiveness.  
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Malecki (2004) mentions as low-road policies for instance, marketing, capturing the media 
attention, for instance those regions that advertise their self as “the best place to invest”, or 
try to get a good place in competitiveness rankings; competition for tourism by means of 
improving the cultural scene, such as the architecture, art and history, encouraging 
diversity in restaurants and shops, which are desirable for both, local and tourist; getting 
some sports, drinking or eating events; and offering low environment regulations and 
wages levels. On the high road, are those that encourage innovation, knowledge and spatial 
spillovers, which to some extent are immobile assets, as the tacit knowledge that cannot be 
replicated somewhere else. 
Indeed, real competition strategies are long-term formulations that must rely on a thorough 
study of regional capabilities, namely, in which activities they are able to compete; their 
direct competitors and the organizational resources needed in the long-term, otherwise they 
become purely good intentions and discourses (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998).  
In the case of Mexico and other developing countries, offering incentives helps to 
compensate some disadvantages against developed countries in terms of infrastructure and 
well-founded institutions (Harding and Javorcik, 2011). Nevertheless, incentives cannot be 
a long-term policy since it may generate employment, but no a significant increase on 
wellbeing and local competitiveness in the long-term (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998, Romer, 
1993).  On the contrary, it has been also widely discussed that undertaking only low-
road/soft policies can lead to the denominated race to the bottom.  This is, when 
governments could be incurring in high costs in order to attract investment. It could 
encompass pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs such as environmental costs, wellbeing of 
the labour force and fiscal costs.  
Regions have to improve their competitiveness level, and local governments should seek to 
develop linkages between new foreign firms and local firms (Romer, 1993, Cheshire and 
Gordon, 1998, Malecki, 2004, Greenstone et al., 2010). Indeed, according to Thomas 
(2003) instead of competing to get investments, governments should try to improve their 
bargaining position, that is increasing the city attractiveness. Governments should destine 
their resources to improve local endowments. It will increase the city attractiveness, and 
private investment will grow owing to the better production conditions, which may amplify 
their profits, to a larger extend than receiving any kind of incentive. 
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According to Greenstone et al. (2010) firms consider the local endowments such as the 
inputs supply, labour force, communications, and transports when evaluating location 
decisions. However, if they can find similar conditions in more than one city, then the 
bargaining with local authorities takes place. Thus offering incentives becomes a non-
cooperative game in which all have to offer the best they have in order to get the 
investment, and frequently governments from developing countries or poorer regions pay 
high amounts of money, which would be traduced on fiscal deficit crisis (Thomas, 2011). 
In this way, although the local endowments and market size are important drivers for 
private investment (Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1996), incentives can influence on investment 
decisions. Not only for foreign investment, but also for domestic investors that receive 
grants for training, R&D investment, or other inputs.  
Despite of the potential problems generated by incentives-based strategies, there have been 
documented a wide use of such policies in developed and developing countries (Markusen, 
2007, Thomas, 2000, Thomas, 2011), leading to fiscal problems, and potentially 
exacerbating regional income disparities entering into a race to the bottom situation. In the 
US, Canada and EU competing with grants, incentives and lower taxes has been regulated 
because it is potentially harmful, and it is considered unfair to compete with other than 
competitive advantages (Thomas, 2011). In addition, wealthier administrations are usually 
in possibilities to offer better incentives; this is what could enhance uneven economic 
performance.  
It is also documented that some industries do not invest unless an attractive package of 
incentives is offered, such as semi-conductors and the automotive, even if they still have to 
take into account the local/regional features (Thomas, 2011, Geerdink and Stauvermann, 
2010, Greenstone et al., 2010). In Mexico, the automotive has been a vehicle to transform 
the industry. The profile of Mexican industry is no longer a low-technology profile such as 
maquiladora, but medium and high technology, given the development of the automotive 
and aerospace (Samford and Gómez, 2012). Therefore, both industries have been subject to 
large amounts of incentives from the federal government in most places where they are 
located, rising regional competition given that state governments can also go on their own 
to bargain with the firms. This is what has been stated with the recent announcement of 
BMW new plant in San Luis Potosi, in which the governor claims to have gone over 5 
years of talks with the company.  
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In sum, it is widely known that investments are flowing from countries to countries, and 
even some developing countries are becoming source of investments to other countries. 
Although their location decisions can ben complex and not easily to disentangle, revealed 
competition indexes, country, regional and local level features are documented to assess 
places. Additionally to the negotiation held, either with governments or with other 
entrepreneurs already settled within the industry and even in other industries (Jordaan, 
2008). In such context, regardless the competition strategies employed, it is a non-
cooperative game which policy-makers cannot neglect (Malecki, 2004, Camagni, 2002), 
especially in a country such as Mexico with substantial inward foreign investment flows.  
3. Empirical evidence. Effects of competition strategies and 
decentralisation on private investment. 
As discussed before, decentralisation is not a direct channel to promote investments, yet it 
could induce competition within countries. In the Mexican case, fiscal and political 
decentralisation allowed regional governments to pursue better economic performance, 
which entails different fields of competition. In consequence, the empirical applications do 
not directly test effects of decentralisation over private investment increases, but on 
regional disparities. Nevertheless, in the context, it serves as a reference.  
Some researchers in Mexico have tested changes in political behaviours at local level given 
the decentralisation occurred that endowed municipalities and states with more powers to 
influence on development and economic performance outcomes. Moreno (2013) found that 
decentralisation has transformed rural governments behaviour to a good extent by fostering 
accountability and entrepreneurship fashion management. Gonzalez-Rivas (2014) found 
that given the decentralisation, participation from local citizens find channels to strive for 
better services. Both studies converge to claim that decentralisation might have induced 
improvements in governments’ behaviours, at the same time that it opened channels for 
location actions.  
Within the empirical applications testing effectiveness of competition strategies, different 
policies are subject to analysis, namely regional funds, regional infrastructure investments, 
incentives-based policies, and tax competition. One critic to the empirical applications is 
that competition is frequently assessed taking expenditures on policies as a reference, 
though the identification of specific fields of competition is less common. Using the total 
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expenditures conveys the assumption of generalised competition. Some works have tried to 
tackle this issue, by finding competitive, complementary relationships between regions in 
the same country, which are revised later (Márquez and Hewings, 2003, Postiglione and 
Hewings, 2008). Yet, a more detailed job to find competitive intensity according to 
economic structure in European regions is presented by Burger et al. (Burger et al., 2013).  
The present chapter does not focus on competition intensity, yet on the extent to which the 
policies aimed to attract investment, have actually achieved that aim, as a public policy 
assessment exercise. In this exercise the possibility of competition between regions should 
be also assessed, given that decentralisation endowed municipalities to undertake 
investment attraction policies. Similar works assessing different types of policies for 
investment enhancement are listed here as well as the approaches assuming generalised 
competition across proximate regions. 
In their work Harding and Javorcik (2011) tried to determine whether the incentives given 
to foreign enterprises were effectively attracting new FDI inflows coming out from US 
enterprises. The data set contains information for 124 countries, developed and 
undeveloped, from different economic sectors. It comes from a survey undertaken by the 
authors in a project on the aegis of the World Bank during 2005 and 2006. The work only 
considered the information from countries where the enterprises receiving the incentives 
were within an economic activity belonging to a national target, and based on that the 
government offered subsidies. The target should not be those industries already 
developed/successful in the country, because in such case the effect of the subsidy on the 
location could be biased. The increments of FDI inflows could be more influenced for 
accumulative processes rather than responsive to incentives. The model employed is a first 
differences model, in order to measure whether the investment promotion produced an 
increase on the inflows FDI, compared to the last year and not the total or the average 
through the time. Some control variables are the time to get a construction permit, the cost 
of doing business and the availability of information in the US from the host country. 
The authors concluded that FDI incentives are more effective on developing countries 
since they have to compensate their asymmetry on information, corruption, and 
bureaucracy. Incentives appeared to be more effective in countries where English was not 
the official language, had less effective government, showed higher corruption levels and 
longer time was required to start a business or to obtain a construction permit. In summary, 
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those countries actually paid-off for their lack in the institutional framework. In sum, the 
incentives in fact fostered inward investment. 
An interesting work about incentives to domestic firms is the one by Bernini and Pellegrini 
(2011). They researched on the effects that the state aid on capital accumulation had over 
the period 1996-2004 in southern Italy. Doing a benchmark between subsidized and non-
subsidized firms, it is concluded that in the short-term there is higher growth on output, 
employment, and fixed assets in the former group, but lower growth in Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP). In the long-term, given a negative effect on productivity the gains 
obtained in the short-term are offset. This confirms what was pointed out before by 
Cheshire and Gordon (1998), Malecki (2004), Romer (1993). In the short- term incentives 
might increase private investment, foreign and domestic.  But in the long-term, regions 
should strive to increase competitive advantages, that is, to enhance productivity 
increments. Worse cases had been documented in which the cities are worse off than 
before the new investment was launched, given the significant amounts of money spent to 
bring the firm (Rodirguez-Pose and Arbix, 2001, Greenstone et. al. 2010, Thomas, 2011).  
Criscuolo et al. (2012) carried out an analysis to assess the effects from the UK program 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) on aided firms. They found that the program had a 
positive effect on employment, investment, and net entry, but no on Total Factor 
Productivity TFP. 
Marquez and Hewings (2003) analysed level II NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
for Statistics), for the period from 1972 to 1997 in Spain. The work attempted to 
characterize relations between geographical neighbours. The model  employs the regional 
share of the GDP by each region, and by means of an Error Correction Model and Engle-
Granger equation, it is estimated the co-integration vector between each region and its 
neighbours. When the coefficient showed a negative sign they defined the relationship as 
competitive and complementary if the sign was positive.  That is, it is assumed competition 
when regions have divergent growth patterns, and complementarily if regions grow 
together. The limitation of this approach is that the sign of the cointegrating vector of 
regional GDP shares could not be enough to support competition against all neighbours. 
There might not be actual economic relation with one or more of the neighbours. And 
perhaps the reference region is actually more related to cities with similar-complementary 
specialisation, or in a higher hierarchy. Postiglione and Hewings (2008), studied Italian 
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regions using NUTS I, NUTS II and NUTS III in order to depict not only horizontal but 
also vertical relations between regions.  
4. Fiscal decentralisation and local competitive actions in Mexico  
4.1 Decentralised resources 
The resources allocated to municipalities and states are mainly distributed by means of the 
items 28 and 33, as well as other less important expenditure chapters. Federal government 
could also transfer some resources directly to municipalities when there is a specific 
project. Item 33 is tagged and it has to be destined to health, education and public 
infrastructure in deprived areas. Item 28, is unconditioned, so it can be spent to support 
firms, provide incentives, and infrastructure.  
The allocation criteria for these funds used to be confusing, but they have been clarified 
and improved through the time. In 2007, the criteria for item 28 changed in order to 
enhance economic growth and tax collection efficiency. At the state level, before 2007 
45.17% was allocated proportional to population. The following 45.17% for improvement 
in tax collection, those who did better, got more resources. The rest 9.66% was distributed 
contrary to the other two rules. That is, taking the inverse and giving more to those that had 
less population and less tax collection, with a compensation aim. According to the federal 
government, these criteria did not stimulated tax collection efficiency or pursuing regional 
economic growth, since there were no incentives, nor clear mechanisms to get more funds 
(Peña-Ahumada, 2011).  
The new law in 2007 established that 60% of the funds are distributed according to the 
GDP per capita growth in each State. The next 30% are distributed according to growth 
rate of taxes collection over the last three years, in order to reward those that made major 
collection efforts an increased the quantity, no matter whether the absolute value is high or 
low. The last 10% is distributed proportionally to the absolute level of taxes collection. In 
this way, federal government is trying to encourage local administrations to pursue 
regional economic growth as well as to increase their effort for tax collection. From the 
total amount received, the states have to distribute at least the 20% to the municipalities. 
The distribution formula from states to municipalities is different in each state. It mainly 
relies on two criteria: population and tax collection. Furthermore, there are also other funds 
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created to increase transfers to those with higher tax collection efficiency and with lower 
GDP per capita.  
Due to the fiscal decentralisation, the total incomes in municipalities have increased in 
145% compared to 1993. The resources in local administrations are spent in three main 
items, current expenditures (53%), Economic fostering and subsidies –EF&S- (15%), and 
Public infrastructure investment –PIII- (15%). Indeed, the second and third items 
encompass undertaken actions to boost investment growth. From 1993 to 2010 EF&S has 
increased 160% and PIII 50%. It confirms the increasing importance of economic planning 
and incentives at local level. Their actions to pursue economic development and foster 
investment have had positive effects (Lorens et al., 2002, Rodríguez-Pose and Palavicini-
Corona, 2013). 
 
EF&S contains the expenditure on marketing of the city, tourism offices, subsidies and 
transfers to firms, economic development offices, and some other transfers to local offices 
for education, health and political parties. Given the availability of the data it is not 
possible to get to know the shares of these expenditures before 2001. In that year, it is 
possible to disaggregate the data into transferences, subsidies and other kind of help. The 
transferences are the most important within this expenditure chapter, with an average of 
62% from 2001-2010. This includes all transfers to public offices as mentioned earlier. The 
following 22% is destined to any other kind of help, which is usually for social 
expenditure. The final 16% corresponds to subsidies which can be given for consumption, 
production or transport. This is, not all of these subsidies are pure incentives to firms. In 
this way, this expenditure item is more related with economic and development fostering 
than with incentives-based policies. It is important to remark that the subsidies mentioned 
here are more likely granted to domestic firms, which are those attended at local levels, 
still some tax exemptions could be given. Yet, the most important incentives come through 
states and federal governments.  
PII comprises all investments exerted at local level on public works and any other 
investments that are not physical assets, such us investment to increase public security and 
other planning activities. In this case physical investment has comprised 91% of the total 
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expenditures from 1990-2010. Those public works could include urban infrastructure, 
communications, and improvement of basic services, among others.  
In sum, Mexican cities have increased their expenditure powers. Still, the changes in 
distribution criterion seemed to have changed the amounts per capita allocated per city to 
favour wealthier cities. Compared to 1993, in 2012, cities with GDP above the national 
average received 20% more funds per capita than those under the average. It might have 
fostered to maintain or even increase the income differentials across regions, supporting 
the findings of the researchers reported before.   
4.2 Local policies to encourage investment and economic increases 
As discussed above different aspects such the initial conditions, transports, roads, general 
infrastructure, human capital, and access to markets are among the most important drivers 
for investment growth. Regional strategies, public expenditure, incentives to the private 
sector, the public services available, and the support to the enterprises might also affect 
private investor decisions. Together with the gradual abolition of import tariffs, the actions 
undertaken at local and regional levels to pursue economic success have been increased. 
Monetary and non-monetary incentives given to new foreign investment increased over the 
years. According to the Economic Census of INEGI, the revenues from subsidies for 
foreign firms increased 8 times from 1998 to 2008. In addition, the federal government has 
different funds to give grants and credit to domestic and foreign firms. Yet, the most 
important incentives are received by foreign firms, especially in the automotive and the 
aerospace. In 2011 80% of incentives given by ProMexico (federal office to promote 
investment) were granted to automotive firms, and the other 20% were firms within 
aerospace.   
In addition, the support to firms have increased and improved. According to the results of 
the Doing Business project from the World Bank, Mexico has improved facilitating the 
business opening from 57 days in 2006 to 9 in 2013. The support to domestic firms is 
usually undertaken by local governments, while the states and federal offices attend 
foreign investors. For local firms the support is to ease paperwork when opening an 
enterprise. As well as to get incentives or credits available at local, state or federal level. 
Domestic firms may also receive training on basic administration to improve 
entrepreneurship. For foreign firms, paperwork, transports, energy, supply chain and 
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labour force training are the most common needs attended. Also, depending on industry 
they may be able to get grants, such as the automotive and the aerospace as well as the 
related industries. In ProMexico, there is also funding for R&D within firms, especially 
when the universities or students are involved.   
In spite of the larger decentralised resources, political decentralisation happened more 
slowly. Municipalities are still highly dependent on higher administration levels for 
policymaking and their income. When municipalities propose policies, setting the main 
tasks to attend during their tenure, generally the higher levels of government, specially the 
state, also influence on their decisions, and provide important part from the money exerted. 
In addition, due to the need of coordination and larger resources available in upper levels; 
municipalities rarely could implement economic policies without the support of the state.  
For instance, to boost tourism activities, the automotive, the maquiladoras, primary 
activities, agro-industry, etc., it is frequently required high amounts of resources which are 
not available at the municipal level. Consequently, the whole project depends on the 
federal and state financial resources and political support (Costa-I-Font et al., 2003, 
Samford and Gómez, 2012, Topal, 2013).   
In sum, about 30% of the total income at the local level is spent to foster economic growth. 
The investments to support firms’ needs, promote the city, and improve public 
infrastructure as well as the coordinated actions to increase the support from state and 
federal government, should have an effect in the private investment that is worth to 
measure.  
4.3 Subsidies revenues of firms 
Since the expenditure items EF&S and PIII cannot be disaggregated for years previous to 
2001, and even so, the information is not specific enough; incentives-based competition 
cannot be explicitly identified, should there exists. Nevertheless, it is possible to get some 
data on subsidies revenues perceived by firms, in the Economic Census for 1998, 2003 and 
2008. The data is aggregated by municipality up to 4-digit level disaggregation by 
economic activities, but it is not possible to have access to firm level data. These revenues 
are total incomes by subsidies, but it does not specify the source of income, this is 
municipal, state, federal governments, or any other institution.  
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From there it was found that, foreign firms have considerably increased the subsidies 
revenues, while there was no real increment for national ones. The total subsidies revenues 
of foreign firms in 2008 were 21 times larger than in 1998. To some extent, it also regards 
with the FDI growth. For instance,  according to the Secretariat of Economy in 1998, the 
total FDI –new investment and reinvestment- was 8, 373 USD millions, and by 2008 it was 
25, 864 USD millions, which is more than 2 times larger. Yet, the proportion of subsidies 
revenues over total FDI also increased. In 1998 it was 4%, while in 2008 it was 28%, in 
other words, in 1998 by $1 USD dollar investment there were only $4 cents subsidies, and 
they increased to $28 cents in 2008.  
As regards with the economic activities supported, in 1998, most of subsidies were 
received by firms within Transports, storage and mail (46%), Other Services (36%) and 
Manufactures (10%). That structure changed completely in 2008, when most subsidies 
were received by Manufactures (61%) and Wholesale trade (36%). The changes in 
distribution confirm the existence of incentives-based policies to encourage investment of 
manufacturing firms; specially automotive and related firms. Indeed, 80% of the total 
subsidies revenues in manufacturing sector, went to automotive firms. It also confirms the 
statement by Thomas (2011) that automotive firms do not invest unless they receive 
incentives. The other 20% is concentrated in food industry, textiles, and chemicals. It is 
also important to remark that firms receiving subsidies are quite concentrated. In 1998 the 
firms were located in only 12 municipalities, by 2008 it spread out to 38. Is does not mean, 
for instance, that the new investment/re-investment was settled in only 12 municipalities, 
but only those firms have reported subsidies revenues in the census. It confirms that 
favouritism in not only towards some economic activities, but it is also geographically 
discriminatory. 
Meanwhile, the total subsidies revenues of national firms had decreased in 39% in 2008, 
compared to 1998 levels
1
. Among the most important economic activities supported are 
whole trade, scientific services, and manufactures. In 1998, the distribution was as follows; 
19% Financial services, 18% Scientific, professional and technical services, 15% 
Manufactures, 12% Information in mass media services. In 2008 it was 26% Other services 
–they mainly include repair services of different nature-, 22% Transport, mail and storage, 
22% Insurance and financial services, 10% Manufactures.  
                                                     
1
 Subsidies given to CFE (Comisión Federal de Electricidad), National electricity supplier are not included. 
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As for the proportion of subsidies revenues to new investment, in 1998 $1.00 USD dollar 
of new investment had corresponded to $38 MXN cents of subsidies revenues, and by 
2008 this proportion diminished to $35 MXN cents. It is clear that national Manufactures 
are getting fewer incentives than foreign firms are, which is a constant complain from 
national industries.  
The above paragraphs provide evidence of incentives-based policies, in order to bring 
some more concrete data to the discussion. As regards with information of incentives given 
to specific firms, governments should report this when they do it, especially if the firms are 
recipients from any particular fund. The information presented here is more comprehensive 
but it does not allow getting to know exact amounts per firm, but just the averages, surely 
firms are not getting only few Mexican cents by each dollar invested. The incentives are 
highly concentrated to few cities, and surely to some firms, as shown in the information 
published in the different registers. For recent years there can be consulted subsidies given 
by the Secretariat of Economy on their website, together with the recipient names by 
fund/programme source. 
5. Data and methodology 
5.1 Data 
The data employed here comes from different databases published by the National Bureau 
of Statistics (INEGI). For production and firms characteristics the Economic Census by 
INEGI are going to be used. This is a very rich database at firm level. Given confidentiality 
problems, firms cannot be analysed as units of study. In this work, the data is aggregated at 
the municipal level, including 17 economic sub-sectors to account for manufacturing 
production, trade and services. The activities included are listed in the A.Table 2 of the 
annex. Given that no information on commodities production is taken into account, the 
data would frequently correspond to cities’ production. 
The Economic Census is a survey that is carried out every five years in Mexico. There is 
information about production, employment, investment, expenditures, taxes, and revenues 
for domestic and foreign own firms. The Economic Census includes almost all economic 
activities except for agriculture and livestock activities, which are covered in a separated 
census. The Economic Census encompasses the whole national territory and includes all 
firms answering the questionnaire –all firms are asked to do so, but they could refuse to 
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answer-. Firms without a fixed establishment are not considered. In the case of 
manufacturing, trade and non-financial services, the survey do not take into account all 
rural communities, but in some areas chosen randomly. The reason is that these economic 
activities are rare in small rural communities, therefore the survey is not applied 
everywhere, such as it is performed with the rest of industries. In this way, this is the data 
base with the richest information about production of almost all economic sectors, and all 
type of firms.  
Differently to other data bases, Economic Census provides information about the firms that 
are installed and producing in a specific geographic area, rather than where the 
headquarters are settled. Depending on the type of firm, different questionnaires are used 
and this serves also as input for estimating national GDP.  
For the censuses after 1998, foreign and domestic firms can be distinguished at the locality 
level; before, it was only possible at the state level. Thus, when possible, the estimations 
are divided into domestic and foreign firms, this is for the period 1998-2008. Also the 
expenditures EFS& and PIII are expected to have different effects on manufacturing firms 
and all the others, because many policies are intended to support manufacturing firms, 
specially foreign ones, and public infrastructure is more essential for their productivity. 
Thus, the models are also estimated separating manufacturing firms and all the others. 
5.2 Sample 
In Mexico, according to INEGI, urban communities are those with more than 2, 500 
inhabitants. Given its extended territory and significant rural production, in 2010 from the 
total 187, 938 localities existing in the country, more than 90% had less than 2, 500 
inhabitants. Nevertheless, in that year 78% of the population was living in urban 
communities and most population lives in medium-size and big cities, which also 
contributed with the major part of national product. There are 2445 municipalities, each of 
them is usually composed of several communities, and there are lot of small municipalities 
that do not have even 50, 000 inhabitants. Therefore, some data is difficult to trace in very 
small municipalities, as some information can be highly costly to collect, and the 
population and production considered is small. It is also important to highlight that most 
data is only available at municipal level.  
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Additionally, municipal governments which could be making policies to foster economic 
growth in the sense that has been explained along the chapter will occur more frequently in 
medium-size and above-size municipalities. The threshold is usually above 80 000/100 000 
depending on the classification (Sobrino, 2003).  
Given the government organisation, it is important to remark that the biggest municipality 
or municipalities in each state will concentrate most of population and production, and 
therefore it might concentrate most economic policies and resources, this is why it is 
considered important to include at least one municipality per state, as there are small states 
with no more than one medium-size city. Under those considerations, this is, the 
population and production contribution, together with the availability of data, the sample 
includes all urban municipalities larger than 80, 000 inhabitants by 2005, in order to 
include at least one municipality in each state.  
Among the sample chosen, some municipalities have been established as metropolitan 
areas given their proximity and interaction with other surrounding urban areas. These 
metropolitan areas are defined by CONAPO (National Bureau for Population). In total, 
there are 67 cities bigger than 80, 000 inhabitants, which contributed with about 60% of 
the national population and 85% of the Total Gross Production
2
 (TGP) during the period of 
study. These 67 cities comprise 365 municipalities, this is, there are many cities composed 
by more than once municipality; when that is the case, the information for those 
municipalities in the metropolitan area is aggregated. In this way, the regional unit of 
analysis are municipalities and cities (metropolitan areas). In all cases, most information is 
taken from municipal databases, given that it is not possible to disaggregate data at city 
level in Mexico. Still, as mentioned earlier, production mostly corresponds to urban areas. 
Hence, the unit of analysis are referred here indistinctively as cities/municipalities, 
understanding that some entities correspond to one municipality, while other to several.  
Mexico City and the cities in the most important oil-producers states -Tabasco and 
Campeche- are excluded from the sample to diminish bias in the results. Mexico City is a 
huge economic centre with its own dynamism. The oil producers have big amounts of 
foreign investment and high GDP per capita, yet its dynamism relies on the natural 
resources existent rather than in local policies. Many other researchers usually exclude oil 
                                                     
2
 Total Gross Production including only the 17 economic activities explained above, and specified in the 
Annex. It does not include mining, agriculture, livestock, electricity generation and oil production.  
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producers and Mexico City when doing empirical models in Mexico, see for instance 
(Sanchez-Reaza and Rodriguez-Pose, 2002, Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2005, Rodriguez-Oreggia, 
2007, Sobrino, 2003). In sum, the sample accounts for most major cities in Mexico, except 
those mentioned above. In that way, the sample contributed with about 65% of the national 
TGP in the period. 
5.3 The model  
The proposed baseline equation is the following: 
 
                                    (1) 
Where     denotes new private investment with respect to the previous year,    stands for 
the time invariant characteristics of each city, this is city Fixed Effects (FE).    is the time 
dummy.      is a vector of control variables for city   in the year  .        is one of the 
interest variables for expenditures on Economic Fostering activities per employee for city   
in the year  .        is the other interest variable, Public Investment on Infrastructure per 
employee for city   in the year  .     is the error term. The specification of the variables is 
done in the following section.  
For the estimation method, first, it should be taken into account that given that these are 
regional units, it is necessary to account for FE in the estimations. Additionally, cities 
within the same country might be affected by the performance of other cities to a certain 
extent. It can cause violation of one of the assumptions for panel data models, this is, 
independence across panels. Also, some external shocks such as the US crisis or 
macroeconomic policy, which cannot be modelled and can violate independency across 
panels as well (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). Cross section correlation can be partially treated 
introducing time dummies, which is also made in the model to use, yet it entails that 
correlation for every pair of units are the same (Hoechle, 2007).  
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) pointed out that even the modest presence of spatial dependence 
could cause an important bias in the OLS standard errors, because the orthogonality 
conditions in the variance matrix are violated. They propose a model assuming a spatial 
and temporal correlation in the residuals. The degree of dependence between two-cross 
sectional units depends on the size of the constant factors and their persistence over the 
time. The covariance matrix is robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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When proposed, this method was based on asymptotic properties and it was recommended 
for large samples (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). Nevertheless, for its implementation in Stata, 
the method was improved, and proved to work well with small samples, especially for 
large N and small T panels (Hoechle, 2007); the Monte Carlo simulations were done with 
even a T=5. The method applies a Newey-West type correction to the sequence of cross-
sectional averages of the moment conditions. This allows that the estimator is consistent 
independently of the size of N.  
This estimator is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as 
well, still if no cross-section dependence is found, it is recommended to use other 
estimation methods more ad hoc. There are other methods available in cases of larger 
panels, especially when N is close to T, such as the estimators based on feasible 
generalised least squares. However given the shape of this data set -large N and small T- 
such methods are not appropriated. Also there is the panel-corrected standard errors 
method that uses pool OLS, which is less convenient in this data set, as no FE approach 
can be used. The common correlated effects (CCE) method proposed by Chudick, Pesaran 
and Tosetti (2011) is not feasible for this data set either, given the T available. Moreover, it 
is more adequate when lagged dependent variables are used, and the data presents 
autocorrelation; neither case in this data set.   
Cross section dependence was tested using the test proposed by De Hoyos and Sarafidis 
(2006) tests. It was found cross-section dependence, and thus one of the estimation 
methods to test is one that deals with cross-section dependence. Given the size of the 
sample, it is believed that Driscoll and Kraay is the best method in this case, additional to 
the fact that FE can be modelled as well.  
Other concern in the data is the possibility of endogeneity of the interest variables. It is 
possible that the more private investment occurred in one year, the more money exerted on 
PII and EF&S by the governments; and no the other way around, especially if there are 
subsidies given. Nonetheless, as said before, for EF&S it is important to remind that the 
subsidies constitute a small share of the total expenditure item. Also, since the 
expenditures comprise the budget of public offices they will continue working whether 
there are more or less investors every year. Still, endogeneity of the variables is going to be 
tested using difference GMM approach. Additionally, the lags of the interest variables are 
also used in order to reduce possibility of endogenous variables. Likewise, given the type 
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of expenditures, it is also likely that the expenditures influence only on future investment 
decisions that occur months or years after the government has exerted the money. Given 
the availability of data for public expenditures, it is possible to use up to the 3
rd
 lag for all 
models without losing any observation.   
To test endogeneity an IV approach can be used. In order to do it, difference GMM model 
is going to be used, as it is efficient enough when only right hand variables are believed to 
be endogenous. It has been suggested by Bond et al (2001) that Systems GMM are more 
efficient when the time series are persistent. Nevertheless, whether the dependent variable 
is not lagged, no persistent series are present and there is only presence of endogeneity of 
right hand variables the Sargan test of Overidentifying restrictions and related tests are 
enough to assess the validity of the instruments, which can be simply the lags of the 
instrumented variables (Bond et al., 2001). 
5.4 The variables 
The dependent variable in the model is the new private investment; the indicator for such 
variable employed here is the new investment per year, as given in the Economic Census.  
The investment corresponds to the total investment made by the firm during the previous 
year –January to December-. For comparison purposes across the censuses, it was found to 
be the best indicator for private investment. 
For some variables the natural logarithm is used in order to find elasticities between the 
interest variables and the new private investment. The monetary variables are expressed in 
MXN pesos at constant prices of 2003. 
For right hand variables, considering those frequently used in empirical works, the model 
controls for some regional features such as market size, labour force availability, public 
infrastructure, health, education, economic structure and economic specialisation degree.  
Economic fostering and subsidies (EF&S) 
This variable contains the total expenditures of the municipal government in economic 
fostering, subsidies and transfers to firms, people and public offices, described above. In 
order to take into account the size of the municipality, the variable used in the models is 
the expenditure done per employee in the city. The number of employees is taken into 
50 
 
account, instead of the population, given that this expenditure might be more related to the 
level of economic activity and employment, rather than just the size of the population. This 
variable is expected to have a positive effect on the investment levels. It is important to 
highlight that domestic and foreign firms receive different types of support. Since the 
municipalities usually support domestic firms, their expenditures might have larger effects 
in domestic investment increments than in foreign investment.  
Public investment on infrastructure (PII) 
This is the expenditure item to build public infrastructure in the municipalities. Different 
kinds of infrastructure could be built, such as roads, pavement, drainage, water feeds, etc. 
This item also contains the non-physical investment which encompasses security and some 
other expenditure for fostering private investment; this is not well specified in the data. 
Yet, most of the expenditures regards with physical infrastructure, as explained in the 4.2 
section of this chapter.  Similarly to the EF&S variable, to take into account the size of the 
city the variable used in the models is the total expenditure on PII per employee in the city. 
Economic diversity/specialisation  
The spillovers effects from the same or other industries could influence the investment 
decision of firms (Duranton and Puga, 2000). A way to control for this is to include a 
variable for economic specialisation. It tells about the presence of few or lot of different 
industries, therefore the possibility for spillovers intra or inter industry. An absolute 
indicator is used since the interest is to control for diversity inside the city, regardless to 
how important is the production of such city in the national scale. The specialisation level 
is measured according to the size of a specific industry respect to the total TGP in the same 
city. Therefore, the share of the industry with highest contribution to the city’s TGP is 
used. When the number is high, it can be said that the city is highly specialised and more 
reliant on one industry. When the number is low the city has more economic diversity. The 
extreme case would be a city that is specialised to only one industry, the indicator would 
be 1. On the opposite, if the city is evenly diversified and all industries were equally 
important, the lowest number would be 1/17= 0.0588, considering the 17 industries 
included. Some industries might growth faster in a specialised city due to the intra-industry 
spillovers. But others could benefit more from inter-industry interactions, and thus grow 
more in diversified cities (Glaesser et al., 1991).  
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Public Infrastructure stock index
3
 
An index was built using indicators for available infrastructure of electricity, water, roads, 
communications and drainage system. In empirical research infrastructure indicators vary a 
lot. Some researchers use the landlines available, or other stock that indicates good 
availability of services; while others use expenditures (Easterly, 2001). Nonetheless, given 
the corruption or differences in needs, similar investment levels do not entails similar 
endowments of infrastructure stock. Thus it is important to add indicators of the stock, 
when available (Fuentes, 2003, Straub, 2008, Delgado and Alvarez, 2001). AS regards 
with the expected sign, public infrastructure is positively related to investment increments 
(Dall'erba and Le Gallo, 2008).  However, according to Fuentes (2003), in Mexico not all 
the cities with relatively better infrastructure endowments are the most successful ones 
because cities with high economic growth attract more population and firms, making 
difficult for the local authorities to respond fast to the infrastructure needs, especially in the 
north. In other words, cities with more dynamic growth might have more infrastructure 
needs, given the difficulties of adjusting to the demand.  
Economic Active Population  
As a growth model approach it is useful to control for the labour force availability, which 
should be positively related to private investment. This is the population over 12 years old 
in the city.  
Manufacturing employment 
This is a control variable for economic structure (Alecke et al., 2012), which might also 
influence the private investment growth rate.  Cities specialised in manufacturing activities 
might be more dynamic than others. On the other side, if the city relies a lot in few 
industries, it might be very vulnerable to external shocks. The variable is the share of total 
employees in manufacturing activities over the total employment in the city.  
The summary statistics of the variables are included in the following Table 2.1.  
 
                                                     
3
 More details about the variables and the estimation method is given in the annex. 
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Table 2.1 Variables summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max 
New private investment. Thousands (MXN) 252 
$1,381,418.0
0 2454620 -$1,630,061.00 $20,800,000.00 
Economic diversion/specialisation index 252 0.4774761 0.1602751 0.1650831 0.9466147 
Economic Active Population 252 452832 482535.5 39348 3185553 
Infant mortality rate per 1000 births 252 13.96909 5.56099 2.119626 33.83838 
Economic Fostering and subsidies per employee 252 $140.99 152.24 $0.00 $1,082.36 
Economic Fostering and subsidies per employee (T-3) 252 $102.85 134.21 $0.00 $1,163.32 
Public Physical Investment per employee 252 $503.14 747.24 $0.00 $9,887.51 
Public Physical Investment per employee (T-3) 252 $322.73 324.54 $0.00 $2,692.93 
Public infrastructure stock index 252 22.11187 6.430653 9.138739 38.75019 
Share of manufacturing employment 252 0.2743205 0.1481094 0.0388917 0.6566179 
Domestic market potential. Thousands (MXN) 252 
$50,800,000.
00 7.16E+07 $1,105,058.00 $515,000,000.00 
Total Gross Product. Thousands (MXN) 252 
$45,300,000.
00 7.12E+07 $289,972.60 $511,000,000.00 
Gcompetition EF&S. Thousands (MXN) 252 -$0.87 2.67E+00 -$6.69 $15.17 
Gcompetition PII. Thousands (MXN) 252 -$0.09 6.33E+00 -$10.55 $42.21 
Scompetition EF&S. Thousands (MXN) 252 -$0.30 3.66E+00 -$6.09 $31.54 
Scompetition PII. Thousands (MXN) 252 $0.01 8.73E+00 -$17.39 $66.07 
6. Empirical Results 
First, there was estimated the baseline equation for all the municipalities form year 1993 to 
2008. As mentioned before, when using the whole period it is not possible to split the firms 
into domestic and foreign, thus, all firms are included. In Table 2.2 the results of the 
baseline equation are presented using the different estimation methods. In column (1) 
pooled OLS are reported, FE with White standard errors are in column (2), column (3) 
presents Driscoll and Kraay, and difference GMM estimator with forward orthogonal 
transformation is in column (4). All models have been estimated using year dummies.  
Pooled OLS tend to be less efficient given the higher number of constraints imposed to the 
estimation. Standard errors are bigger and coefficients might be biased due to the need of 
controlling for FE. It can be seen that the pooled OLS results are not consistent with the 
expected sign of all variables, and showed significant differences in infant mortality rate, 
market potential and market size variables. Fixed effects model is more consistent, which 
confirms that it is better to add within FE when addressing regions. Nonetheless, when 
using FE with Driscoll and Kraay method to address dependence across panels, 
coefficients and signs remain the same, yet the model is more efficient, thus the standard 
errors are smaller. 
In column (4) with difference GMM method the sign of the variables are the same and the 
coefficients are slightly lower, which confirms consistency in the model results. In this 
estimation given the estimation method used, it is expected to reject autocorrelation in first 
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order, but no in second order. This is confirmed by the tests shown at the end of the table. 
Hansen statistic indicates that the instruments used for the potential endogenous variables 
are valid, which used up to the second lag of the variables using collapse option to avoid 
proliferation of instruments, as it decreases efficiency in the model.  
Table 2.2 Results including all firms, 1993-2008 
 
Dependent variable: Ln New private investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS_base FE_base DK_base gmm_base 
Economic diversity/specialisation -0.3615 0.1196 0.1196 0.1133 
  (0.3053) (0.5431) (0.2984) (0.5494) 
Ln Economic Active Population -0.0913 0.5071 0.5071 0.5038 
  (0.1255) (0.4805) (0.6960) (0.4786) 
Infant mortality rate -0.0002 -0.0110 -0.0110* -0.0112 
  (0.0077) (0.0115) (0.0057) (0.0116) 
Ln EF&S per employee 0.0291** 0.0312*** 0.0312*** 0.0338*** 
  (0.0124) (0.0091) (0.0084) (0.0101) 
Ln PII per employee 0.1256*** 0.1003*** 0.1003*** 0.0959*** 
  (0.0418) (0.0251) (0.0191) (0.0295) 
Public infrastructure stock index 0.0085 0.0382* 0.0382** 0.0386* 
  (0.0075) (0.0227) (0.0162) (0.0227) 
Ln Manufacturing employment share of total employment -0.1943* 0.1017 0.1017 0.1037 
  (0.1078) (0.2915) (0.1325) (0.2967) 
Ln Market potential 0.1642 2.5498*** 2.5498*** 2.5851*** 
  (0.1353) (0.7050) (0.2017) (0.7018) 
Ln of TGP 0.8804*** -1.9508*** -1.9508*** -1.9790*** 
  (0.1443) (0.6109) (0.2788) (0.6081) 
Constant -4.4529*** -5.1472 -5.1472  
  (0.8702) (7.4904) (7.1196)   
Obs 248 248 248 185 
N_clust 63 63  63 
r2 0.845 0.256     
Instruments    16 
Autocorrelation  test AR(1) p-value  0.000 
Autocorrelation  test AR(2) p-value  0.342 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test)  0.356 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 
As explained before, according to Bond et al. (2001) when the endogeneity regards only 
with right hand variables, this is, the lag of the dependent variable is not present at the right 
hand variables, and there is no persistent series, the Hansen tests and consistency in 
coefficients is enough to decide on the validity of the instruments and the model. 
Particularly, the interest variables that were suspected to be endogenous showed very 
similar results than FE with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, it can be concluded that 
endogeneity is not an issue. Additionally cross section dependence was accepted and when 
using DK standard errors to deal with it, the model is more efficient. In consequence, it is 
considered that the best estimation method is DK, which has been chosen as the main 
method for the rest of estimations.  
As said earlier, it could also be expected that the expenditures influence on private 
investment decisions after some time of the exertion, rather than on the same year. Hence, 
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using lags of the expenditure variables instead of the contemporaneous data might be more 
adequate. In consequence, the baseline equation has been re-estimated with the different 
methods but using the third lag of the interest variables, instead of the contemporaneous 
data. This is shown in the Table 2.3. 
It can be observed that most variables do not change their sign and their coefficients vary 
slightly compared to the results in table 2.2. However, the sign of PII has changed. It 
makes sense, since this is investment in public infrastructure, which effects over 
investment decisions are more likely to be revealed in the mid and long terms. It is 
worrisome that the effect shows to be negative, while it was expected to have positive 
influence on private investors. 
Table 2.3 Baseline results including all firms. Using lags of interest variables. 
Dependent variable: Ln New private investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS_base FE_base DK_base gmm_base 
Economic diversity/specialisation -0.4700 0.0223 0.0223 0.0216 
  (0.2982) (0.5586) (0.3029) (0.5611) 
Ln Economic Active Population -0.1011 0.1549 0.1549 0.1545 
  (0.1327) (0.4479) (0.6769) (0.4518) 
Infant mortality rate 0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0034 
  (0.0088) (0.0115) (0.0053) (0.0116) 
Ln EF&S* (T-3) 0.0517** 0.0404** 0.0404*** 0.0401** 
  (0.0237) (0.0198) (0.0079) (0.0200) 
Ln PII* (T-3) -0.0291 -0.0592*** -0.0592*** -0.0595*** 
  (0.0234) (0.0218) (0.0089) (0.0217) 
Public infrastructure stock index 0.0048 0.0455* 0.0455*** 0.0455* 
  (0.0075) (0.0235) (0.0165) (0.0236) 
Ln Manufacturing employment share of total 
employment -0.2607** 0.2812 0.2812 0.2818 
  (0.1116) (0.2694) (0.2389) (0.2722) 
Ln Market potential 0.1182 2.7926*** 2.7926*** 2.7935*** 
  (0.1454) (1.0115) (0.3045) (1.0150) 
Ln of TGP 0.9475*** -2.1506** -2.1506*** -2.1517** 
  (0.1507) (0.9543) (0.3303) (0.9575) 
Constant -3.8736*** -0.7309 -0.7309  
  (0.8557) (6.8992) (8.2779)   
Obs 248 248 248 185 
N_clust 63 63  63 
r2 0.832 0.207     
Instruments    16 
Autocorrelation  test AR(1) p-value  0.000 
Autocorrelation  test AR(2) p-value  0.847 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test)  0.177 
*Total expenditures per employee in the city 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 
As regards with the validity of the models, the results are similar to the previous table. 
Pooled OLS method seems less efficient than the others, and the sign of variables such as 
infant mortality rate, market size, and industrial employment share are the opposite, 
compared to the other methods. Meanwhile, FE with White standard errors, DK and 
difference GMM estimation results are consistent. The variables’ coefficients for FE, DK 
and difference GMM methods are slightly different, and sometimes the same. The interest 
variables are very close to the FE results and the Hansen test showed the instruments to be 
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valid. In view of that, it can be said that endogeneity is not a problem in the models, since 
very similar results are obtained with the three methods, yet DK is the most efficient. The 
difference in signs of the variable PII per employee can be identified as the effect over the 
time or within the mid-term.  
In view of this, it is considered more appropriated to use the interest variables with lags. It 
can be done at no cost of the other data, since these variables are available every year. In 
other words, taking three years lags do not affect the availability of the other data in the 
Economic Census. Hence, the number of periods used in the models remained the same.  
In these baseline results, is shown that governments’ expenditures on PII are slightly more 
important than those in EF&S. Nevertheless, the former might have negative influence on 
private investment decisions. This can be related to the type of projects and public works 
done at the local level in Mexico. Namely, the municipality contribute with public works 
on parks, drainage, urban roads, water feeds, general cleaning and other local infrastructure 
that is not directly linked to firms’ needs, but with general services and wellbeing. The 
coefficient indicates that for every 10% increase on PII per employee undertaken in     
year, there has been 0.59% decrease on new private investment with respect to the previous 
year of the Economic Census. Likewise, for 10% increase on EF&S per employee in     
year, there has been 0.4% increments in new private investment with respect to the 
previous year.  
It has been found that the market potential is the most important driver of investment, and 
there are decreasing returns to the level of total TGP. This is related to the city size, the 
larger gross production the smaller rates of new investment. Public stock of infrastructure 
has been confirmed as a significant driver for private investment, which should have been 
reinforced by the local expenditures on PII, yet several reasons might explain the opposite 
sign of the variable. First, it should be taken into account that infrastructure stock regards 
with the actual assets available in the city, while PII is the expenditure item. As mentioned 
before, expenditures on infrastructure are frequently an easy source of resources, thus 
corruption might be involved causing high expenditures but few physical assets (Straub, 
2008). In addition, the assets may be more costly in some places than in others given the 
geography or other natural conditions. Other public infrastructure projects from state and 
federal government might be more influential for investment decisions.  
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Given that variable for infrastructure is an index which annual value depend on the other 
cities endowments, the coefficient is hard to interpret in absolute terms. Still, it is clear that 
more public infrastructure stock influences positively the new private investment. In this 
case 10% increase in the index, induced 0.45% increments on private investment during 
the period 1993-2008.  
Infant mortality rate showed the expected sign but it is not statistically significant, neither 
the rest of the variables, namely Economic Active Population, Economic specialisation 
index and share of employment on manufacturing activities. Infant mortality rate was 
statistically significant in the previous results on table 2.2, with a higher coefficient. This 
might indicate that its true value is larger. 
Once it has been established the best method for this panel data, the different variables 
proposed before are added to the baseline results in the Table 2.4. For comparison purposes 
the baseline results are in column (1), the competition variables are in columns (2) and (3) 
and the interaction terms in columns (4) and (5). The additional variables are expressed in 
levels and not in logarithms. From the results, it is clear that Gcompetition is more 
important than Scompetition. It means that spending more money in EF&S and PII than 
geographically close cities can lead to larger growth in private investment. Meanwhile, 
competing with cities with similar economic specialisation showed less importance. 
According to the political organisation, within one state, most times political capitals get 
more political support and financial resources, making that competition within the same 
state the most important for Mexican cities.  
The coefficient for GcompetitionPII is 0.0371 and for GcompetitionEF&S is 0.0417, it 
means that a sum of $100.00 MXN is related to approximately 0.37%
4
 and 0.42% larger 
new private investment, respectively. For instance, there are at least 10 cities which had 
more than $1, 000.00 MXN in either variable, which could entail influence on private 
investment to a good extent by this mean. The size of economic specialisation effect is 
much smaller. The coefficient indicates that a city is spending a total of $100 MXN more 
than its close competitors in PII is related to higher new private investment of 0.16%, 
while Scompetition for EF&S was not significant. 
                                                     
4
 Since this variable is measured in thousands. 
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Considering that the yearly growth rates of private investment are also small, the effects of 
competition should not be neglected, especially if major spending might represent more 
downstream resources boosting investments, yet it surely cannot be taken as a leading 
strategic policy.  
Table 2.4 Alternative results including all firms with Driscoll and Kraay method. 
Dependent variable: Ln New private investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DK_base Gcomp Scomp Ind*EF&S Ind*PIII 
Economic diversity/specialisation 0.0223 0.3928 0.1215 0.0195 0.2397 
  (0.3029) (0.4433) (0.3232) (0.3183) (0.3612) 
Ln Economic Active Population 0.1549 0.9018* 0.3870 0.1791 0.3406 
  (0.6769) (0.5030) (0.6889) (0.6860) (0.7030) 
Infant mortality rate -0.0034 -0.0079 -0.0046 -0.0057 -0.0038 
  (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0062) 
Ln EF&S (T-3)* 0.0404*** 0.0411*** 0.0362*** 0.0381*** 0.0395*** 
  (0.0079) (0.0071) (0.0077) (0.0087) (0.0069) 
Ln PII (T-3)* -0.0592*** -0.0577*** -0.0579*** -0.0775*** -0.0479*** 
  (0.0089) (0.0098) (0.0076) (0.0133) (0.0159) 
Public infrastructure stock index 0.0455*** 0.0385*** 0.0422*** 0.0426** 0.0400*** 
  (0.0165) (0.0112) (0.0139) (0.0168) (0.0139) 
Ln Manufacturing employment share of total employment 0.2812 0.1966** 0.2999 0.2076 0.1354 
  (0.2389) (0.0931) (0.1818) (0.2215) (0.2161) 
Ln Market potential 2.7926*** 2.2445*** 2.4627*** 2.9154*** 2.4800*** 
  (0.3045) (0.3214) (0.4384) (0.2878) (0.3029) 
Ln of TGP -2.1506*** -1.7081*** -1.9444*** -2.2726*** -1.9000*** 
  (0.3303) (0.2743) (0.4509) (0.3306) (0.3054) 
Geographic competition EF&S(T-3)* 
 
0.0417*** 
     
 
(0.0080) 
   Geographic competition PIII(T-3)* 
 
0.0371*** 
     
 
(0.0062) 
   Competition by economic specialisation EF&S(T-3)* 
 
 
0.0051 
    
 
 
(0.0043) 
  Competition by economic specialisation PIII(T-3)* 
 
 
0.0163*** 
    
 
 
(0.0048) 
  Manufacturing employment share EF&S(T-3)* 
  
 
0.0020** 
   
  
 
(0.0010) 
 Manufacturing employment share PII(T-3)* 
    
0.0015*** 
  
    
(0.0004) 
Constant -0.7309 -8.2425 -1.3840 -1.0737 -2.3284 
  (8.2779) (5.8672) (8.1417) (8.1627) (8.4161) 
Obs 248 248 248 248 248 
*Total expenditures per employee in the city 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
  
 
The interaction terms in columns (3) and (4) are statistically significant. Nonetheless, 
manufacturing employment is not significant in any case, the additional effect is very 
small, and given that the coefficient of the interest variables become a bit smaller when 
introducing the interaction term; it cannot be concluded that there are actual additional 
effects of such expenditures according to the level of manufacturing employment in the 
city. 
The following Table 2.5 presents the results for all manufacturing firms –foreign and 
domestic- from 1993 to 2008. The baseline results in column (1) present various 
differences with the total results in table 2.4. The interest variables remained with the same 
sign but smaller coefficients than those for the total firms. In any case, the elasticity is less 
than 1%. In the base equation in column (1), for 10% increase in EF&S expenditures in the 
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year    , there was an increment of 0.32% in new private investment, while for 10% 
increase of PII in the year    , there was a decrease of 0.39% in new private investment. 
It would have been expected that manufacturing firms were more influenced by the EF&S 
investment, since many cities aim to encourage the manufacturing sector, but the 
coefficient is about the same. Still, the negative effect of PII is smaller than for the total 
firms, which indicate that some manufacturing firms might be positively influenced.  
Most of the variables sign remained the same, except for Economic diversity/specialisation 
index. It might indicate different effects of economic diversity on manufacturing firms 
which, benefiting more from smaller index. This is more diversified economies. Still, the 
variable is not significant in any case, thus no conclusion can be drawn. The infant 
mortality rate has a negative sign, its coefficient is larger, and it is statistically significant 
similarly to the results in table 2.3.  
Table 2.5 Results including only manufacturing firms, 1993-2008, using Driscoll and Kraay method. 
Dependent variable: Ln New private investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DK_base Gcomp Scomp Ind*EF&S Ind*PIII 
Economic diversity/specialisation -0.2192 -0.0056 -0.1699 -0.2723 -0.0001 
  (0.1811) (0.2855) (0.1765) (0.2036) (0.2391) 
Ln Economic Active Population 0.1541 0.7287 0.3494 0.1763 0.3378 
  (0.5688) (0.5852) (0.6298) (0.5841) (0.6239) 
Infant mortality rate -0.0120*** -0.0154*** -0.0111*** -0.0138*** -0.0125*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0036) 
Ln EF&S (T-3)* 0.0317* 0.0336* 0.0299* 0.0308 0.0309* 
  (0.0180) (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0190) (0.0163) 
Ln PII (T-3)* -0.0392*** -0.0324*** -0.0284*** -0.0505*** -0.0283*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0041) (0.0136) (0.0076) 
Public infrastructure stock index 0.0734** 0.0708** 0.0735** 0.0728** 0.0682* 
  (0.0317) (0.0340) (0.0349) (0.0308) (0.0357) 
Ln Manufacturing employment share of total employment 0.9153*** 0.8679*** 0.9318*** 0.8735*** 0.7636*** 
  (0.1217) (0.0267) (0.0966) (0.1114) (0.0930) 
Ln Market potential 2.3876*** 1.9416*** 2.0546*** 2.4695*** 2.0805*** 
  (0.6092) (0.5517) (0.7241) (0.6400) (0.5963) 
Ln of TGP -1.6091** -1.2131** -1.3516* -1.6681** -1.3643** 
  (0.6414) (0.5483) (0.7456) (0.6749) (0.6151) 
Geographic competition EF&S(T-3)* 
 
0.0321* 
     
 
(0.0178) 
   Geographic competition PIII(T-3)* 
 
0.0283*** 
     
 
(0.0085) 
   Competition by economic specialisation EF&S(T-3)* 
 
 
-0.0086 
    
 
 
(0.0075) 
  Competition by economic specialisation PIII(T-3)* 
 
 
0.0141*** 
    
 
 
(0.0042) 
  Manufacturing employment share EF&S(T-3)* 
  
 
0.0017 
   
  
 
(0.0015) 
 Manufacturing employment share PII(T-3)* 
    
0.0015*** 
  
    
(0.0004) 
Constant -3.5382 -9.8636 -4.6820 -4.2249 -5.1237 
  (7.2932) (6.3251) (7.5923) (7.4046) (7.5267) 
Obs 246 246 246 246 246 
*Total expenditure per employee in the city 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  
 
There are two findings important to remark. First, the share of the manufacturing 
employment is significant in these estimations, which is related to the role played by other 
manufacturing firms in the city, and of course it is also linked to the same firms that are re-
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investing in the city. Second, the coefficient of public infrastructure index is about 60% 
larger for manufacturing firms, which regards with the nature of such firms that benefit 
more from the available public infrastructure.  
For competition variables in columns (2) and (3), similarly to the previous results, 
spending more than the geographically close cities is more important than spending more 
than cities with similar economic specialisation. Both coefficients are a bit smaller 
compared to the total firms, which is also in line with the main interest variables 
coefficients, since the spending of local governments on EF&S and PII is less important 
for manufacturing firms than for the total, and therefore the expenditures compared to 
close potential competitors. According to their coefficients if the sum of the expenditures 
on EF&S and PII in the year (   ) is $100.00 MXN higher than the regional competitors 
the city had 0.32% and 0.28% more new private investment, respectively. As for 
ScompetitionPII, the coefficient indicated that a city spending $100.00 MXN than cities 
with similar economic specialisation on year (   ) had 0.14% more private investment.  
The models with the interaction terms in columns (4) and (5) showed that, in the case of 
EF&S, the additional effect given the level of manufacturing employments is not 
significant, while the interaction term with PII is statistically significant. Considering that 
the individual effect of the variable PII is negative, the positive sign of the interaction term 
could indicate that cities with higher shares of manufacturing employment might have 
lesser negative effects of the total expenditures on PII. Additionally, the individual effect 
of the variable is bigger from -0.0392 in column (1) to -0.0283 in column (5). The 
coefficient of the interaction term indicate that, for instance, if a city share of 
manufacturing employment is 0.5, by every $10.00 MXN expenditures on PII per 
employee there is an additional increase of 0.75% of new private investment, which is 
added to the individual effect. In this case they cannot be added directly given that PII 
coefficient is presented in natural logarithms.  
The following tables present the results for the models divided into domestic and 
foreign/joint-venture firms, then the period is from 1998 to 2008, as explained before. In 
Table 2.6, results for all domestic firms are presented, and table 2.7 presents results for all 
foreign/joint venture firms. In the first column of each group are the baseline results, and 
then competition and interaction variables are added in the following columns. It should be 
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taken into account that the period is different, and cities are grouped in a different way, 
which caused considerable changes in the results, compared to the previous tables.  
In Table 2.6 in column (1) the baseline results are considerably different than those found 
in table 2.3. It could be not only because of the different grouping way, but also because of 
the period. The interest variables have changed the coefficient sign, indicating different 
effects of public expenditures across domestic/foreign-joint venture firms. This will be also 
different when estimating results for manufacturing firms. It seems that in average, the 
public expenditures on EF&S have had a negative effect over domestic investors’ 
decisions, although the size of the coefficient is small, 10% increase on EF&S per 
employee in the year (   ), is related to only 0.21% decrease in new private investment. 
Still this is worrisome given that most of the attention received by domestic firms comes 
from municipal governments, and this results indicate that their effort are not encouraging 
private investment, as they should. The variable PII is not statistically significant. This 
again indicates little or negative effect of these expenditure items on private investment 
growth.  
The economic diversity/specialisation index has become significant and its coefficient is 
larger. This means that the higher value, the more rapid growth of private investment. In 
other words, domestic private investment growth rates are higher when the city is more 
specialised. The public infrastructure stock index is negatively correlated to the new 
private investment, as well as the share of manufacturing employment in the city and the 
total TGP. Infant mortality rate did not show the expected sign. Given that it had the 
correct sign for total results, and for foreign firms, this could indicate that domestic firms’ 
investment growth is not highly influenced by the local health and wellbeing; while this is 
more important for foreign investors, as it will be shown later.  
In sum, according to these results, domestic firms’ investment is positively influenced only 
by the potential market, the availability of labour force –EAP- and the higher economic 
specialisation of the cities.  Whereas the local public policies to foster private investment, 
particularly EF&S, might have negative effects over private investment, and the public 
infrastructure investment –PII- showed null influence.  
From those results, it can be expected that the competition variables and the interaction 
terms have null or little effect over new private investment. In column (2) and (3) only 
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GcompetitionPII is statistically significant with a coefficient of similar size to the previous 
results. Nevertheless, given the null effect of this variable on the baseline results, it cannot 
be asserted that competing by PII would have a great effect over firms’ investments.  
The interaction terms in columns (4) and (5), only the interaction term with PII is 
statistically significant. Nevertheless, due to the non-significance of PII, it is not possible 
to confirm additional effects of public expenditures given certain level of manufacturing 
employment.  
Table 2.6 Results including only domestic firms 1998-2008, total. Using Driscoll and Kraay method. 
Dependent variable: Ln  New private investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
base Gcomp Scomp Ind*EF&S Ind*PII 
Economic diversity/specialisation 0.4949* 0.4473** 0.4070 0.4591* 0.4649* 
  (0.2670) (0.2140) (0.3130) (0.2448) (0.2616) 
Ln Economic Active Population 1.6927*** 1.7516*** 1.8003*** 1.6914*** 1.8301*** 
  (0.1059) (0.0076) (0.0668) (0.1266) (0.0380) 
Infant mortality rate 0.0271** 0.0254* 0.0256* 0.0253* 0.0278** 
  (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0121) 
Ln EF&S (T-3)* -0.0205*** -0.0181*** -0.0202*** -0.0213*** -0.0164*** 
  (0.0058) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0055) (0.0049) 
Ln PII (T-3)* -0.0010 0.0009 -0.0056 -0.0128 0.0057 
  (0.0145) (0.0111) (0.0134) (0.0229) (0.0119) 
Public infrastructure stock index -0.0206* -0.0207** -0.0216** -0.0215** -0.0198* 
  (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0098) (0.0116) 
Ln Manufacturing employment share of total employment -0.8973*** -0.8180** -0.8160** -0.8951*** -0.9088*** 
  (0.3113) (0.3411) (0.3555) (0.3021) (0.3157) 
Ln Market potential 0.8445*** 0.6822*** 0.8206*** 0.9012*** 0.6956*** 
  (0.2058) (0.1508) (0.1415) (0.1599) (0.1506) 
Ln of TGP -0.7454*** -0.6292** -0.7854*** -0.8028*** -0.6475** 
  (0.2459) (0.2623) (0.2089) (0.1706) (0.2692) 
Geographic competition EF&S(T-3)* 
 
0.0110 
     
 
(0.0170) 
   Geographic competition PII(T-3)* 
 
0.0132* 
     
 
(0.0079) 
   Competition by economic specialisation EF&S(T-3)* 
  
0.0080 
    
  
(0.0079) 
  Competition by economic specialisation PII(T-3)* 
  
0.0057 
    
  
(0.0077) 
  Manufacturing employment share×EF&S(T-3)* 
   
0.0012 
   
   
(0.0014) 
 Manufacturing employment share×PII(T-3)* 
    
0.0008* 
  
    
(0.0005) 
Constant -10.5924*** -10.3551*** -10.6645*** -10.5263*** -11.5509*** 
  (2.3900) (2.1923) (2.4120) (2.1814) (2.9030) 
Obs 187 187 187 187 187 
*Total expenditures per employee in the city 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 
 
Now, it is interesting to compare these results with the obtained when estimating models 
with foreign/joint-venture firms, on Table 2.7. The number of observations is reduced 
given that there are some cities within the sample in which there are no foreign/joint 
venture firms. In column (1) it is clear that municipal expenditures on EF&S and PII have 
had a significant effect over foreign firms, similarly to the total results in table 2.3. It is 
thus interesting to find that municipal expenditures on EF&S could actually influence 
positively foreign investment, but no on domestic firms. On the other side, PII 
expenditures showed a negative sign, and its coefficient is slightly larger than the EF&S. In 
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this way, by 10% on EF&S and PII, there could be an increment of new private investment 
for 0.5% and a decrease for 0.53%, respectively.   
It was also found that the domestic market potential and the US market potential are the 
most significant drivers to foreign/joint-venture firms. Infant mortality rate showed a 
negative sign, yet not statistically significant, neither public infrastructure stock index, and 
the share of manufacturing employment. This is related to the type of firms mixed here. 
There are firms within financial services, tourism services and manufacturing. For 
instance, in case of manufacturing firms public infrastructure index is statistically 
significant, as it is shown in table 2.9. Meanwhile, it is less essential for tourism and other 
type of services, especially roads (Dall'erba and Le Gallo, 2008).  
 
Table 2.7 Results including only foreign and joint-venture firms 1998-2008, total. Using Driscoll and Kraay method. 
Dependent variable: Ln  New private investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
base Gcomp Scomp Ind*EF&S Ind*PII 
Economic diversity/specialisation 0.2345 0.4154 0.2414 0.0525 0.2365 
  (0.8365) (0.6083) (0.8385) (0.9059) (0.7835) 
Ln Economic Active Population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Infant mortality rate -0.0090 -0.0119 -0.0092 -0.0153 -0.0097 
  (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0150) (0.0154) 
Ln EF&S(T-3)* 0.0491*** 0.0331*** 0.0462*** 0.0438*** 0.0540*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0040) (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0015) 
Ln PII(T-3)* -0.0537 -0.0694** -0.0703* -0.1070*** -0.0348 
  (0.0344) (0.0403) (0.0370) (0.0396) (0.0412) 
Public infrastructure stock index 0.0173 0.0160 0.0170 0.0160 0.0181 
  (0.0142) (0.0162) (0.0142) (0.0135) (0.0144) 
Ln Manufacturing employment share of total employment -0.1843 -0.2153 -0.1422 -0.0308 -0.2525 
  (1.0502) (1.1233) (1.0535) (1.0258) (1.0437) 
Ln Market potential 1.4013*** 1.7101*** 1.4769*** 1.5837*** 1.3413*** 
  (0.2385) (0.1606) (0.2119) (0.2117) (0.2073) 
Ln of TGP -1.6889*** -2.0454*** -1.7877*** -1.9123*** -1.6617*** 
  (0.0867) (0.0955) (0.0804) (0.0607) (0.0904) 
Ln US market potential 0.9475*** 0.9897*** 0.9726*** 1.0131*** 0.9609*** 
  (0.2339) (0.2294) (0.2641) (0.2290) (0.1991) 
Geographic competition EF&S(T-3)* 
 
0.1324*** 
     
 
(0.0472) 
   Geographic competition PII(T-3)* 
 
0.0111*** 
 
    
 
(0.0092) 
 
  Competition by economic specialisation EF&S(T-3)* 
  
-0.0589** 
    
  
(0.0156) 
  Competition by economic specialisation PII(T-3)* 
  
-0.3541** 
 
   
  
(0.0043) 
 
 Manufacturing employment share×EF&S(T-3)* 
   
0.0053*** 
 
  
   
(0.0008) 
 
Manufacturing employment share×PII(T-3)* 
    
0.0016*** 
  
    
(0.0003) 
Obs 183 183 183 183 183 
*Total expenditures per employee in the city 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 
The competition variables added in columns (2) and (3) showed that those cities within the 
same geographic region spending more on EF&S and PII have fostered foreign private 
investment. According to their coefficients if the sum of the expenditures on EF&S and PII 
in the year (   ) is $100.00 MXN higher than the regional competitors, the city had 
1.32% and 0.11% more new private investment, respectively. The size of the effect is in 
line with the effects of the individual variables, as EF&S has larger and positive effects. In 
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fact, this result tells that competition can significantly influence foreign investors. On the 
contrary, investing more than cities with similar economic specialisation did not show a 
positive influence on private investment. 
As said before, geographic competition might be linked to the competition occurred within 
the same states. At the same time, considering that Scompetition is meaningful only for 
foreign firms, this could indicate a race to the bottom. In other words, that investing much 
more money than cities with similar economic speciation has not positively influenced 
foreign investment as they might respond more importantly to other cities characteristics, 
or incentives.  
The interaction terms in columns (4) and (5) indicate that indeed, municipal expenditures 
can encourage more investment in cities with larger share of manufacturing employment. 
Namely, if the share of manufacturing employment is 0.27 –which is the mean of this 
variable-, then the additional effect of spending $10.00 MXN per employee in EF&S on 
year (   ) would increase private investment in 0.41%. Nevertheless, the interpretation 
of the total effect is not straightforward, since the manufacturing variable itself has a 
negative sign, and it is not statistically significant. Still, it can be said that municipal 
expenditures do have additional positive effects on new private investments from 
foreign/joint ventures depending on the level of manufacturing employment. Even for PII 
expenditures, since its coefficient is larger in column (5), meaning that its total effect is 
less negative or it could be even positive.  
The last two tables present the results for manufacturing firms, domestic in Table 2.8 and 
foreign/joint ventures in Table 2.9. For domestic firms on table 2.8 the baseline results in 
column (1) showed that the expenditures at the local level have had negative effects over 
private investment, which is opposite to what should be expected, but in line with the 
previous results for domestic firms. As said before, local governments tend to provide 
support to domestic firms rather than to foreign ones, and in many cases their efforts are 
aimed to encourage manufacturing investment. Therefore, finding negative relationship is 
worrisome, since the policies are not hitting their goals. The coefficients indicate the for 
10% increase on EF&S and PII in the (   ) year, there was a decrease of 0.67% and 
0.49% in new private investment, respectively.  
According to the results, cities with larger share of manufacturing employment have had 
less private investment growth, which is only true when firms are divided into domestic 
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and foreign firms. In the case of foreign firms, it seems that higher private investment 
growth could be positively influenced by the level of manufacturing employment in the 
city, as shown in table 2.9, while the opposite effect is seen in domestic firms. This might 
regard with competition. It is frequent that cities with high proportion of manufacturing 
firms have also wide presence of foreign investors. In such cases, domestic investors might 
be displaced as found by Aitken and Harrison (1999). Of course if domestic firms become 
suppliers and there are vertical spillovers, foreign investment may encourage domestic 
investment in manufacturing and boost productivity. Nevertheless, this is a process that can 
be very limited, as documented by Contreras et al (2010). 
Table 2.8 Results including only domestic firms 1998-2008, manufacturing. Using Driscoll and Kraay method. 
Dependent variable: Ln  New private investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
base Gcomp Scomp Ind*EF&S Ind*PII 
Economic diversity/specialisation -0.3379 -0.4151 -0.3567 -0.3847 -0.3866 
  (0.4304) (0.3702) (0.4525) (0.4250) (0.4025) 
Ln Economic Active Population 1.3340** 1.3538** 1.5157* 1.3289** 1.6458** 
  (0.5842) (0.6710) (0.9028) (0.5536) (0.6953) 
Infant mortality rate 0.0071 0.0030 0.0115 0.0035 0.0090 
  (0.0240) (0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0251) (0.0240) 
Ln EF&S (T-3)* -0.0671*** -0.0632*** -0.0616*** -0.0680*** -0.0601*** 
  (0.0149) (0.0126) (0.0118) (0.0136) (0.0127) 
Ln PII (T-3)* -0.0481*** -0.0541** -0.0302 -0.0666** -0.0376*** 
  (0.0170) (0.0261) (0.0188) (0.0271) (0.0135) 
Public infrastructure stock index 0.0971*** 0.0965*** 0.1027*** 0.0967*** 0.0997*** 
  (0.0260) (0.0257) (0.0271) (0.0262) (0.0280) 
Ln Manufacturing employment share of total employment -0.7675* -0.6516* -0.7486 -0.7666** -0.8019* 
  (0.3873) (0.3637) (0.4968) (0.3729) (0.4017) 
Ln Market potential 1.3560* 1.0862 1.1966* 1.4203* 1.0533 
  (0.7747) (0.7052) (0.7017) (0.7490) (0.6594) 
Ln of TGP -0.2671 -0.1220 -0.1232 -0.3644 -0.0685 
  (0.6586) (0.6194) (0.6394) (0.6101) (0.6479) 
Geographic competition EF&S(T-3)* 
 
0.0396 
     
 
(0.0271) 
   Geographic competition PII(T-3)* 
 
0.0173*** 
     
 
(0.0039) 
   Competition by economic specialisation EF&S(T-3)* 
  
-0.0238 
    
  
(0.0214) 
  Competition by economic specialisation PII(T-3)* 
  
0.0109 
    
  
(0.0125) 
  Manufacturing employment share×EF&S(T-3)* 
   
0.0020** 
   
   
(0.0009) 
 Manufacturing employment share×PII(T-3)* 
    
0.0016*** 
  
    
(0.0002) 
Constant -25.7846** -23.5506* -27.9951** -25.1238** -28.1708** 
  (12.1548) (12.5212) (11.9801) (11.5941) (12.3057) 
Obs 178 178 178 178 178 
*Total expenditures per employee in the city 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
Resuming, in the case of domestic manufacturing firms market potential has been 
identified as the most important driver for investment, to a similar extent than the 
availability of labour force. It is remarkable that public infrastructure stock has a positive 
sign, opposite to the results when including all firms on table 2.5. In this way, it can be 
suspected that local projects of public infrastructure investments tend to be highly 
inefficient or do not bring immediate benefits for manufacturing firms. Namely, the 
expenditures do not show any positive influence, while the actual assets are positively 
linked to private investment. Additionally to inefficiencies or corruption ongoing, local 
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projects could affect domestic firms if debt is used to undertake such investments, which 
do not affect foreign firms since they do not need financing support from local 
governments. 
The economic diversity/specialisation index changed its sign as well as the infant mortality 
rate, yet they are not statistically significant. As regards with competition variables in 
columns (2) and (3), only GcompetitionPII is significant. Even if the effect is positive, it is 
not enough to overpass the negative effect from the variable PII itself. This indicate, that 
compared to other close competitors, expenditures on PII might have a smaller negative 
influence on private investment, but it does not seem to be a likely competition strategy. 
The size of the coefficient indicates that if the sum of the difference in year (   ) is 
$100.00 MXN more than the competitors; the city could have an increment of 0.17% in 
new private investment. 
When adding the interaction terms in columns (4) and (5), both terms are statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, the expenditures variables –EF&S and PII- and the share of 
manufacturing employment showed a negative effect over private investment. Hence, there 
might be lesser negative effects of local expenditures over investment with a certain level 
of manufacturing employment. Still, the total effect could remain negative, due to several 
possibilities commented before, especially the type of public investments as well as the 
competition/displacement of firms caused by foreign investors presence if there are not 
enough vertical or horizontal spillovers.  
For foreign firms the results are presented in Table 2.9.  In this case some observations are 
missing since not all the municipalities included in the sample have significant presence of 
foreign investment and they are dropped from the sample.  
It was found that the programs undertaken at the municipal level have had positive and 
large effects over foreign investment. The EF&S coefficient for manufacturing firms is 
almost 5 times bigger than the coefficient for total foreign firms. As said before, this 
expenditure item comprise the budget from local offices for economic planning, marketing, 
tourism, entrepreneurship support, as well as subsidies or local admin-fees/taxes 
exemptions. In all cases for domestic firms, the expenditure item showed a negative 
relationship, while it is positive for foreign firms. The coefficient indicates that for 10% 
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increase in EF&S in the year (   ) there has been increments in new private investments 
of 1.9%.  
Table 2.9 Results including only foreign/joint-venture manufacturing firms 1998-2008. Using Driscoll and Kraay 
method.  
Dependent variable: Ln  New private investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
base Gcomp Scomp Ind*EF&S Ind*PII 
Economic diversity/specialisation 0.6083 0.3906 0.5615 0.6002 0.5730 
  (0.6708) (0.7624) (0.6760) (0.7050) (0.6365) 
Ln Economic Active Population -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Infant mortality rate -0.0096 -0.0102 -0.0099 -0.0208** -0.0095 
  (0.0123) (0.0110) (0.0127) (0.0082) (0.0122) 
Ln EF&S (T-3)* 0.1996*** 0.1914*** 0.1869*** 0.1993*** 0.1983*** 
  (0.0384) (0.0334) (0.0376) (0.0440) (0.0430) 
Ln PII (T-3)* 0.0103 -0.0150 -0.0097 -0.0539 0.0071 
  (0.0789) (0.0786) (0.0791) (0.0953) (0.0676) 
Public infrastructure stock index 0.1051*** 0.1179*** 0.1128*** 0.0958*** 0.1052*** 
  (0.0168) (0.0198) (0.0174) (0.0168) (0.0171) 
Ln Manufacturing employment share of total employment 0.5599 0.5144 0.5834 0.6673 0.5904 
  (0.7304) (0.7348) (0.7163) (0.7053) (0.8254) 
Ln Market potential -0.9535 -0.7970 -0.8717 -0.7318 -0.9298 
  (0.6219) (0.5742) (0.6464) (0.6385) (0.6085) 
Ln of TGP 0.0226 -0.1517 -0.0976 -0.2545 0.0090 
 
(0.5953) (0.5936) (0.6346) (0.6582) (0.6118) 
Ln US market potential 1.4898*** 1.4938*** 1.5198*** 1.5754*** 1.4853*** 
  (0.3955) (0.3472) (0.4129) (0.3616) (0.3868) 
Geographic competition EF&S(T-3)* 
 
0.0571 
     
 
(0.0327) 
   Geographic competition PII(T-3)* 
 
0.1008 
     
 
(0.0104) 
   Competition by economic specialisation EF&S(T-3)* 
  
0.0682 
    
  
(0.0148) 
  Competition by economic specialisation PII(T-3)* 
  
-0.6307** 
    
  
(0.0050) 
  Manufacturing employment share×EF&S(T-3)* 
   
0.0058*** 
   
   
(0.0014) 
 Manufacturing employment share×PII(T-3)* 
    
-0.0003 
  
    
(0.0010) 
Obs 162 162 162 162 162 
*Total expenditures per employee in the city 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 
Expenditures on PII had a positive sign, yet its coefficient is not statistically significant, 
while, the public infrastructure stock it positive and significant. Once more time, this 
confirms that the local projects of infrastructure do not positively affect private investment, 
yet it is essential to improve local infrastructure endowments. 
The US market potential is the most important investment driver for manufacturing firms. 
In case of total firms, the coefficient was smaller given that there are firms in other regions 
far from the border and some touristic places in which foreign investment do not regard 
with the US market, or in which the economies of scale are compensated by transport 
costs. Local market size and domestic market potential are not statistically significant, 
confirming the central role of US market for manufacturing firms, since domestic market 
potential is positively correlated to total of firms on table 2.7. It should be also remarked 
that one of the most important regions for foreign investment is Mexico City and its 
metropolitan area, which could have biased the sign and coefficient of the variable, since 
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its investments there are not that related to the geographic position, but it is the most 
important centre for foreign investors.  
As for economic diversity/specialisation, the column (1) could indicate that foreign firms 
benefit from economic specialisation, yet the coefficient is not significant, and no 
conclusion can be drawn from there. Infant mortality rate has the expected sign –negative- 
but it is not statistically significant, neither EAP.  
Competition variables in columns (2) and (3) are not statistically significant, except for 
ScompetitionPII. In column (1), the investment in infrastructure –PII- did not appeared 
statistically significant. While in column (3), it showed a negative relationship, as well as 
the competition variable. This confirms that that if PII have an effect over foreign investors 
decisions, it may be negative, even when comparing the level of investment to other cities. 
At the same time, competition with EF&S is not statistically significant in any case, even if 
this showed to have positive influence on investment. In consequence, it can be said that 
foreign investors may not regard a lot these public investments compared to other cities 
geographically close, or with similar economic specialisation, but only in absolute terms. 
In other words, the EF&S actually have had a positive effect on new foreign investment, 
but it does not seem to work as a competition instrument. Indeed, as said before, upper 
government levels provide the most important incentives packages, which could be taken 
as incentives-based competition, thus comparing the level of local expenditures on EF&S 
and PII between cities do not matter for foreign investors. 
Finally on columns (4) and (5) are the interaction terms. The results obtained seem to 
indicate that EF&S could be more effective when the share of manufacturing employment 
is bigger in the city. Still, the manufacturing employment is not significant by itself, thus 
the effect is not conclusive. 
7. Conclusions 
In Mexico, empirical works with cities or municipalities are rare, due to the lack of 
information, as well as the methodological problems when formulating a growth model. 
Moreover, it is believed that actions on behalf of municipal governments and their 
expenditures to foster investment has little or null effect, first, due to the three-partnership 
system, second, because of the few resources available in local administrations. The results 
showed that local policies matters for private investment increase. In average, for the 
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period 1993-2008, expenditures on EF&S showed positive effects on private investment, 
while PII had negative influence.  
Nevertheless, when breaking to domestic/foreign total and manufacturing firms, for the 
period 1998-2008 the results vary a lot. Domestic firms’ investment is not positively 
related to the interest variables. This is crucial to make a call on revising the type of 
investments undertaken and the way governments are helping local firms. Particularly 
because most programs run by municipal governments have the aim of encouraging private 
investment, either by making easier the paperwork, giving support for opening new firms, 
marketing the place, and all other actions mentioned before that are encompassed within 
the item EF&S. Additionally, the infrastructure projects, are likely to respond to state 
government plans, adequate to the needs of foreign investors if existing, or improve basic 
services to households, which might not directly affect domestic private investor decisions. 
Still, public infrastructure stock is showed positive correlation with domestic 
manufacturing firms, which confirms that indeed, increasing public infrastructure 
endowments is beneficial, at least for this sector, meanwhile PII is not. In consequence, 
seeking major effectiveness in expenditures for concreting more public works should be 
the aim. Indeed improving infrastructure is one of the most important parts of competition 
in the long-term (Budd, 1998, Budd and Hirmis, 2004).    
Foreign investors revealed to be benefited from expenditures on EF&S but not from PII. 
As said in the corresponding section, subsidies in municipal administrations are usually 
very small. Still, perhaps those cities spending more on EF&S are also participating in 
coordination with upper government levels to get resources and incentives for foreign 
firms, in this way, the resources spent on EF&S showed a positive effect, even if the 
amount is relatively small.  
It is clear that the results confirm that decentralisation has endowed local governments to 
actually pursue economic growth to a good extent by means of fostering private 
investment. In addition, considering that the distribution criteria are changing to increase 
equalisation across regions, this might also allow lagged regions to impel private 
investment.  
As regards with competition, the results are quite diverse for every group. These variables 
showed positive effects particularly in the total foreign/joint-venture firms. While for 
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domestic firms, it was only significant GcompetitionPII. This is a remarkable result; it 
shows that competition is particularly significant when attracting foreign firms. Those 
expenditures do not regard with significant incentives, but with local competitiveness 
enhancement, therefore this competition is not a race to the bottom, which is a positive 
result. Nevertheless, given the different signs and effects across firms, it is clear that 
competing by this mean should not be the main strategy, especially because Scompetition 
showed negative correlation in the case of foreign firms. In consequence, cities that intend 
to compete with other cities in similar economic specialisation might not get positive 
results, but those competing regionally. 
The infrastructure endowments showed a large elasticity with the new private investment, 
confirming that rather than looking to offer more incentives to the enterprises the best way 
to make a city more attractive in economic terms, is by means of the infrastructure 
improvement, as well as the better education and health services that enhance labour force 
productivity. This is the ground to make a call to increase efforts towards improvements in 
physical endowments in Mexican cities. Especially, to increase the effectiveness of the 
expenditures, since they appeared to have the opposite effects, this could be also caused by 
corruption, regardless of other mismanagements and inefficiencies.  
The US market is among the most important drivers for new private investment of 
foreign/joint-venture firms. Still, given that public infrastructure stock, EF&S expenditures 
and public infrastructure stock also showed positive influence on foreign investment, 
investing in such policies could be good to encourage foreign investment. Nonetheless, it 
should not be neglected that domestic firms should receive more attention to find the 
reasons behind the negative correlation with municipal expenditures; especially 
considering that domestic firms are the main targets of municipal administrations.   
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Chapter 3 
The influence of local endowments and regional 
competition on productivity: Evidence from Mexican 
cities and states. 
Abstract 
Mexico has gradually increased fiscal and political decentralisation in favour of municipal 
and state governments. Many municipal and state governments take advantage of this 
process in order to foster economic growth. Such actions can be classified as competitive 
actions, thus the policies are analysed underneath this approach. Among the actual policies 
implemented, Mexican governments provide different kinds of support to domestic and 
foreign firms, and also invest in public infrastructure. The actual effects of these 
expenditures over firms’ productivity have not been tested yet. Thus, using panel data 
analysis at two different disaggregation levels, cities/metropolitan areas and states; the 
effect of the total expenditures exerted by government administrations over total 
productivity is tested. The results showed that the policies implemented in municipalities 
have had little or even negative effects over firms’ productivity. Meanwhile, the policies 
implemented by states have had larger influence on productivity increases. Other regional 
features such as economic specialisation, infrastructure, market size, US market potential 
as well as productivity of foreign firms are also essential for productivity growth. In 
addition, it was found that corruption has a large and negative effect over productivity, 
however the corruption indexes are only available at state level. Finally, even after the 
decentralisation undertaken, federal investment proved to be a significant trigger for 
productivity increases. 
1. Introduction 
One of the most important roles of governments is managing public money to attend the 
public duties, such as security, health, urbanisation, transport means, economic 
development, etc. Strictly speaking, all these matters are encompassed within economics in 
the sense of the Greek root oikonomia, which means administration. Nevertheless, 
economics policies have the specific aim to purse economic growth, and increase 
wellbeing and quality of life, which can frequently raise competition at regional/city scale.  
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It is well established that there is trend towards higher participation of regional and local 
government on economics policymaking, the called bottom-up approached. Consequently, 
the influence of territories as determinants of firms’ competitiveness, have become an 
important topic of debate (Kitson et al., 2004). Moreover, the role of competition among 
cities has been also put forward in the governments’ political agenda, understanding the 
race towards competitiveness as part of regional competition (Kitson et al., 2004).  
During the last two decades, municipal (local) and state (regional) governments in Mexico, 
have increased their role in policymaking. Different strategies to pursue economic growth 
have been applied around the country, and some have been focused to attract foreign firms, 
especially in the centre and north-bordering regions. This may have raised/increased 
regional competition. Nevertheless, given the institutional framework and the relatively 
small amount of resources available in municipalities and states -comparatively with the 
federal level- the competition might not be through millionaire bidding wars. Instead, to 
foster private investment growth, governments compete by building and strengthening 
competitive advantages.  
The effects of the resources spent with those aims have not been assessed yet. However, it 
is becoming more relevant over the years due to the increasing funds which have 
incremented at least 4 and 2 times at the local and regional levels respectively. Likewise, 
the funds available for joint participation with the federal government are also increasing. 
Therefore, local and regional governments’ role has become a potential trigger for 
economic growth. Given that the policies undertaken may affect firms’ productivity, the 
present chapter seeks to answer this question: have the municipal and state expenditures on 
economic development and regional competition policies had any influence on firms’ 
productivity? 
To address this question a fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard 
errors to deal with cross section dependence, is used. The analysis is carried out at the state 
and municipal levels separately for the period from 1997 to 2011 and 1998 to 2008, 
respectively, which defers due to data availability. For municipalities, the models were 
estimated for national and foreign firms, which in turn were also divided into total and 
manufacturing firms.  
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Among the most important results, it was found that municipal expenditures have had little 
or negative effects on productivity increases of both, national and foreign firms. This might 
indicate that focused incentives foster firms’ inefficiencies. In addition, the investment 
decisions might be poor, ending up with opposite results to what it is expected.  
On the contrary, the funds from state showed positive and greater influence on 
productivity, which might be due to better/longer-term planning given their longer tenure. 
Nevertheless,  federal physical investment showed larger importance. Consequently, it can 
be said that in spite of the decentralisation process undertaken in the last three decades, 
Mexican states and municipalities highly rely on federal policies and expenditures to foster 
productivity, and therefore achieve higher economic growth.  
Other feature such as economic specialisation, domestic/US market potential, and public 
infrastructure stock have been found highly important for productivity increases. In the 
case of manufacturing firms, electricity has been identified as an important productivity 
drawback, as confirmed by (Salgado Banda and Bernal Verdugo, 2011). 
This paper also contributes to the literature by bringing on information about the kinds of 
competitive policies followed in Mexico.   
The paper is distributed as follows. In the following section, some literature about regional 
competition policies and their effects over firms’ productivity is discussed. In the third 
section empirical evidence is presented. The fourth discusses policies undertaken and the 
resources available in Mexican municipalities and states. The fifth describes the models 
used. The sixth presents the results and the seventh brings further discussion and 
conclusions. 
2. Effects of competition and economic policies on firms’ productivity.  
2.1 Competing regions: Competing governments 
Given that territories’ endowments may constitute a significant determinant for firms’ 
productivity, competitiveness at the regional and urban scale has been widely discussed, 
yet criticised. One of the most important critics is that firms face markets, and bad results 
could lead them to bankruptcy, yet regions will not go bankruptcy (Krugman, 1994). 
Regions may possibly strive for success, but one region’s triumphs do not entail the defeat 
of the others. Economic performance is not always relative; regions seek for wellbeing on 
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their own, regardless the results obtained by others. Nevertheless, some features matters 
when attracting mobile resources. There are regions with similar competitive advantages, 
which might raise direct competition for mobile firms (Camagni, 2002). Besides, there can 
be other competition fields, such as public funds allocation, political support  or 
urbanisation economies (Begg, 1999, Johansson, 2000).  
Despite of the critics and significant debate, many researchers and policy makers have 
agreed that regions and cities may compete to attract and retain economic resources, which 
is generically called regional competition (Camagni, 2002, Kresl and Gappert, 1995, 
Porter, 2003, Storper, 1997). Therefore, revealed competitiveness of cities and regions has 
become an essential reference for policy making (Burger et al., 2013). Given the gradual 
economic integration between countries and transports costs drops, mobile firms have a 
wider set of options to locate. Besides regional and urban endowments, firms also look for 
incentives, when available (Greenstone et al., 2010), thus a moral hazard problem might 
be present. For instance, it has been documented that automotive and semiconductors 
companies do not locate unless they receive a considerable incentive- package,  although 
of course, the local endowments will constitute the most significant part on their location 
decision (Thomas, 2011, Greenstone et al., 2010).  
Due to regional differences in economic specialisation, local endowments and 
development within the same country, nations have been fragmented into cities and regions 
when depicting competitive advantages. That is, one may speak about London, Frankfurt, 
Tokyo, and New York when it comes to financial centres, instead of UK, Germany, Japan 
and US, in a general way. Therefore, indexes of competitiveness and competitive 
advantages at city level had been generated in the last 30 years. 
The information generated on competitive advantages had been highly appreciated by 
firms, and competitiveness indexes publication by national or international research 
agencies have triggered governments’ efforts to pursue competitiveness improvement. A 
clear example is the project undertaken by the World Bank Doing Business as a benchmark 
of institutional differences and their interference when opening an enterprise for a large set 
of countries. Every year the reforms undertaken by each country are published and 
compared to previous years. The World Bank assesses whether the reforms actually 
improve the institutional conditions for doing business or not. This cannot be taken a 
simple research project, but as a call for governments to undertake policies in pro of doing 
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business. The OECD has also produced competitiveness indexes for countries and cities, 
which more than benchmark documents; they are suggestion-policy references. For 
instance, in the EU  the competitiveness/competition measurements are reference points for 
policy making (Burger et al., 2013, Cheshire and Gordon, 1998).  
Nevertheless, it is not correct to compare cities in the way that some competitiveness 
indexes do. Firms have specific needs, when seeking for potential locations the list 
becomes quite narrow, that is, not all cities compete against all (Greenstone et al., 2010, 
Burger et al., 2013). For instance, high technology firms and headquarters are proved to 
locate in richer areas, while developing countries would attract low and medium 
technology firms (Burger et al., 2013). Frequently, the latter may offer low wages, low 
taxes, and attractive incentives sets, even when the firms are low value added, given the 
importance of employment generation (Malecki, 2004).  
Although cities may not compete in the way firms do, governments actually pursue 
economic development, and the resources destined to this goal may be even excessive 
(Kitson et al., 2004, Thomas, 2003). Thus, competition and competitiveness are ever more 
important as regional policy drivers (Burger et al., 2013). More importantly, competition 
does not seek economic equality, but it may encourage regional inequalities; that is richer 
regions may have better conditions to pursue economic growth.  
2.2 The concept of regional competition  
Some definitions of territorial competition are stated to clearly set the framework for 
policies assessment in this work. The concept is problematic to some extent. The line 
between regional competition and regional/urban competitiveness concepts is still blurred, 
and sometimes they are considered the same (Kitson et al., 2004, Lever and Turok, 1999). 
The concept by Cheshire and Gordon (1998) has been widely accepted, since it states a 
difference between competition and competitiveness itself. They state that territorial 
competition is ‘a process through which groups, acting on behalf of a regional or sub 
regional economy (typically a city-region), seek to promote it as a location for economic 
activity either implicitly or explicitly in competition with other areas’ (p.385). Indeed, it is 
clear that, agents representing regions are competing -not regions- especially public 
officers in democratic countries seeking for votes (Kresl and Gappert, 1995, Malecki, 
2004, Turok, 2004).  
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However, it should be remarked that also private actors could participate in competition 
policies design (Johansson, 2000). In addition, the quality of life, and living standard as 
goals should be also added to the territorial competition concept. An example is the 
definition by Poot (2000), who defined territorial competition as ‘the actions of economics 
agents that are taken to enhance the standard of living in their own territories, such as 
regions, cities or countries’ (p.205).  
2.3 Regional competition strategies and their influence on firms’ productivity 
Regional competition strategies could be classified into two groups: hard and soft. The 
hard strategies are those aimed to improve the competitiveness determinants that may help 
to increase firms’ productivity directly, that is, policies enhancing competitive capabilities 
(Kitson et al., 2004, Malecki, 2004, Cheshire, 1999). The soft strategies regards to promote 
the region by means of marketing, and specially by giving grants, special concessions, gifts 
and tax exemptions to firms in order to encourage their location or re-investment; in other 
words, incentives-based strategies. This is the so-called race to the bottom, since it could 
be a zero-sum game from the regional point of view (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998) and even 
a negative-sum game when one region benefits may not offset the losses from others 
(Thomas, 2011, Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix, 2001). In Table 3.10 is presented a brief 
classification of territorial competition policies.  
Table 3.10 Territorial competition policies classification 
Zero-sum (soft) Growth Enhancing (hard) Network Enhancing (hard) 
Pure promotion Training Internal networking 
Capturing mobile investment Fostering entrepreneurship External (non-local) networks 
Investment subsidies Helping new firms Benchmarking assessments 
Subsidized premises Business advice Airline and air freight links 
 Uncertainty reduction Scanning globally for new 
knowledge 
 Coordination  
 Infrastructure investment  
Source: the first two columns belongs to Cheshire and Gordon (1998) and the third one to Malecki (2004). 
 
2.3.1 Incentives-based  strategies 
The incentives-based strategies have been regulated given the numerous cases in which 
high amounts of incentives were offered to firms around Europe and the US (Thomas, 
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2003, Markusen, 2007). Furthermore, this encourages regional inequalities, since richer 
regions have more money to offer grants, which put them in an advantageous position. 
More importantly, wealthy regions could also give away grants to foster location of firms 
that would have located there anyway, given their local endowments, and other regional 
features. As regards with poorer areas, they might opt for exemptions more than cash 
grants (Thomas, 2011). For instance, in Mexican municipalities, it is more common to 
grant tax exemptions rather than cash grants, given the scarcer funds; cash grants 
frequently comes through the federal government.  
Beyond the possibility of encouraging regional income disparities, one essential critic for 
incentive-based strategies is that they could support inefficiency; they would keep on the 
market firms that might not be profitable without the  incentives (Thomas, 2003). 
Moreover, firms may even change their production technology in order to take advantage 
of incentives, which could prevent productivity optimisation. For instance, Blonigen and 
Kolpin (2007), cites the example of Mercedez-Bens automotive that located in Alabama in 
the 90’s, and given the low qualification of labour force, they had to change their 
production technology by becoming less capital intensive.  
Incentives and exemptions may lower the public resources available to attend other areas; 
therefore high expenditures in these matters may worsen the general production conditions, 
specially public services and infrastructure in detriment of firms’ productivity (Dabla-
Norris et al., 2011).  
Incentives from local and state governments could also lead to debt problems or excessive 
grants to win over firms. For instance, there is the case of ThyssenKrupp’s which was 
settled in Alabama in 2007 (Thomas, 2011), pp.50). The firm received $734 USD million 
incentives and created 2700 jobs, in other words, it received around $271, 963 USD per 
job. To choose the location there was a tournament; after a discrimination process, there 
were two competitors left, Alabama and Louisiana. The incentives packages from both 
states were so large that they had to increase their debt limit. Besides, both states incurred 
in expenditures during the lobbying; therefore, there were losses for Louisiana.  
When acquiring high debt, government compete against firms for the available funds in the 
economy, making the credits more expensive, and therefore, fewer profitable projects 
(Dabla-Norris et al., 2011). In Mexico municipal and state governments have recently 
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increased their public debt, competing for credit with the private sector, which may 
constitute a restraint to firms for credit access. Additionally, the debt is frequently used to 
finance part of the current expenditures, which may be an indicator of bad local 
management and organisational skills by itself (Correa Gomes et al., 2013). 
In the short-term, in case of developing countries and less developed regions within 
developed economies, incentives-based policies should be implemented with compensation 
aims, to reactivate regions in crisis, or to balance competitive weaknesses (Romer, 1993). 
Incentives aimed to reactivate lagged regions or to compensate poorer areas in the 
European have shown positive effects over employment; private investment, and GDP 
growth, yet, productivity had not been boosted (Alecke et al., 2012, Criscuolo et al., 2012, 
Schalk and Untiedt, 2000, Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011, Devereux et al., 2007).  
According to Harding and Javorcik (2011) targeted promotion (incentives-based) is more 
likely to work in countries with issues such as lack of good institutions, corruption, 
insecurity, crime, low qualifications of labour force, etc. Thus incentives-based strategies 
may lead to higher foreign investment and local GDP growth (Jordaan and Rodriguez-
Oreggia, 2012), but productivity increments in developing countries are less certain 
(Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Empirical studies at this regard are going to be depicted in 
the corresponding section. 
2.3.2 Strategies enhancing competitive capabilities 
These strategies could address topics on public infrastructure, local amenities, I+D 
investment programs, entrepreneurship training, improvements on labour force skills, as 
well as networking enhancing. This last one has been particularly discussed because by 
enhancing local networks, tacit knowledge would be generated and firms would get 
attached to one place owing to specific characteristics that cannot be replicated somewhere 
else, leading to a better competitive position (Malecki, 2004, Capello and Camagni, 2005).  
This strategies are usually identified within competitiveness literature as determinants or 
drivers of competitiveness in the mid and long-terms (Boshma, 2004, Turok, 2004).  
In fact, governments usually combine both kinds of policies, that is, hard and soft 
strategies. Given the scarce resources, governments should target the activities to foster in 
order to make an efficient use of resources, and encourage specialisation, which is actually 
a competition strategy (Kresl and Gappert, 1995, Begg, 2002, Camagni, 2002). They can 
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also choose economic activities that are more desirable in terms of value added, 
employment created, and benefits for the firms located there (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998). 
Nonetheless, in the long-term they should combine incentive-based strategies with the 
construction of competitive advantages that actually improve production conditions for 
foreign as well as for national firms (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998).  
The strategies to be analysed are mixed. A large proportion of the resources are dedicated 
to public infrastructure, which is positively related to increments in labour force and 
aggregate firms’ productivity, as well as increasing economies of scope (Dabla-Norris et 
al., 2011). These effects might be diminished due to inefficiencies of public investment, as 
well as corruption and funds diversion in developing countries (Straub, 2008). In Mexico 
infrastructure has been found as a significant driver for GDP growth (Rodriguez-Oreggia, 
2007) and convergence (Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2005). Yet in case of productivity, empirical 
models the relationship with infrastructure can be contradictory, since the places with 
better public infrastructure are not always the most productive ones (Fuentes, 2003).    
3. Empirical evidence  
Within the empirical works, just few test the effects of competition policies with firm data, 
while most researchers work at the regional level. Among the former, using information 
for southern Italy,  Bernini and Pellegrini (2011) researched on the effects that the state aid 
on capital accumulation had over the period 1996-2004. They chose a control group to find 
performance differences between subsidized and non-subsidized firms. They conclude that 
in the short-term there is higher growth on output, employment, and fixed assets in the 
former group, but lower growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Therefore, in the long-
term given a negative effect on productivity, -main competitiveness determinant-, the 
short-term effects seem to be offset owing to those losses.  
Similar results are found by Criscuolo et al. (2012) when assessing the effects from the UK 
program Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) on aided firms. They found that the program 
had a positive effect on employment, investment, and net entry, but no on TFP. The 
program was effective in small firms and even though is a targeted aid program; they 
found that the “cost per job” creation was low, $6,300.  
Among the works assessing effects of regional funds is Schalk and Utiedt (2000), which 
evaluated the effects of regional funds in Germany for the period 1978-1989. These funds 
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include not only incentives to productive projects, like the above works, but also 
investments on public infrastructure, similarly to the approach of the present document. 
Using a neoclassical approach, they found a positive effect on private investment and 
employment in the manufacturing sector.  However, they did not find evidence of 
convergence on labour productivity, neither on GDP growth.  
According to Alecke et al. (2012), most studies in Germany fail to account for spatial 
dependence which could significantly bias the results. Therefore, they also test the 
influence of regional funds (program called GRW) on regional productivity growth for a 
different period, from 1994 to 2006. Differently to Schalk and Utiedt (2000), Alecke et al. 
used panel data analysis and then a spatial weight matrix was added to account for the 
effects of spatial interaction/dependencies. The results showed conditional convergence 
and a positive relationship between funds allocated and labour productivity growth, 
measured by GDP per worker.  
As mentioned before, the competition strategies aimed to attract more foreign firms also 
have a potential effect over aggregate productivity by this mean. Nevertheless, there is a 
debate in the literature whether spillovers may occur, and the way they would (Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999). In Mexico, as well as in other developing countries, foreign investment is 
fostered given the possibilities of GDP growth, boosting labour force skills, technology 
transfers, employment growth, and higher wages, among others benefits. Without doubt, 
the automotive and aerospace industries have brought many of these benefits to Mexico 
(Jordaan and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2012, Jordaan, 2011).  
It has been proved the existence of vertical backwards spillovers, but negative horizontal 
spillovers (Jordaan, 2008a, Jordaan, 2011). In other words, there have been confirmed 
spillovers intra industries to the suppliers of foreign firms, in which given the technology 
difference, Mexican firms can massively benefit of these interactions. Meanwhile firms 
within the same sector have experienced negative spillovers, as expected according to 
some researchers (Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004).  From a wider view, FDI constitute a 
significant driver for GDP growth, especially in the manufacturing sector (Jordaan and 
Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2012). Most studies on FDI have focussed in the manufacturing sector, 
one reason is that most investments flows to manufacturing firms, other is the larger 
information availability. Yet there are also lot of participation in retail-trade, finance, real-
state business, and tourism services, areas in which competition have also displaced firms, 
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while in some cases could have fostered higher efficiency (Topal, 2013, Smarzynska 
Javorcik, 2004). This work also tests foreign firms’ productivity effect on the aggregate 
productivity of cities as a whole.  
Aitken and Harrison (1999) tested the effects of FDI presence over productivity of  
domestic and joint-venture firms. The results suggest that FDI negatively affected the 
productivity of domestic plants. The gains from FDI seemed to be entirely captured by 
joint ventures. Thus, indirectly, policies aimed to attract FDI might affect negatively the 
productivity of domestic firms.  
4. Local and regional competition policies in Mexico 
4.1 The local and regional budgets 
The taxes revenues in states are small compared to the total incomes. The proportion of tax 
revenues over total incomes was between 2% and 3% for 1989 to 2011; while the average 
in municipalities was 16% for the same period. Due to the fiscal agreement, some taxes 
could be collected in states and sent directly to the federal administration. It will devolve 
and redistribute the resources by means of diverse federal funds, mainly items 28 and 33. 
These in turn will be also re-distributed to municipalities.   
Compared to 1993, by 2011 municipal and state governments experienced an income 
increase up to 1.5 and 2 times, respectively. This is shown in the Figure 3.1 where the total 
income levels of municipalities and states from 1993 to 2011 are plotted in the left axis, 
while the percentage growth in on the right axis. In 1993 states and municipalities budgets 
together, compared to the federal budget, used to represent less than 35% of the later, while 
by 2011 the proportion increased to 55%.  
Consequently, although municipal and state governments have greater limitations, the 
effectiveness of their expenditures and policies implemented has enlarged over the years. 
Also, given the co-partnership work, expenditures exertion and planning is essential and 
could make a difference to get positive effects out of decentralisation in Mexico (Moreno, 
2013).  
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Figure 3.1 Left axis. Total income in real mxn pesos. Right axis. Annual growth with respect to 1993 income. 
Fiscal decentralisation entails the increment of mainly two transfer funds, item 28 and item 
33. From the increasing incomes, some are labelled, and cannot be freely exerted by state 
and municipal administrations, or they might be subject to national priorities.  
Item 33 delivers labelled resources to be exerted on health and education principally, tasks 
that used to be managed from the federal level, and were decentralised during the term in 
office of Mr. Ernesto Zedillo, as one of the most significant decentralisations reforms 
(Courchene and Díaz-Cayeros, 2000). Item 33 also includes resources for public safety, 
poverty alleviation, infrastructure and institutional improvements. The later theme includes 
the resources aimed to do planning and organisational improvements. For instance, when 
opening a new business entrepreneurs need to do paperwork with different public offices at 
municipal, state and/or federal levels, which can take long time. Some administrations 
endeavour continuously to achieve the one stop shop by coordinating with upper levels and 
hiring public consultants to help firms with paperwork and allow to complete the process 
by means of the municipality, saving time as well as steps
5
. Other institutional 
improvements such as monitoring the goals achieved by programs implemented could be 
                                                     
5
 Public consultants at the municipal level in Hermosillo commented about these reforms in the country, 
and the World Bank documents them. Doing business reforms, Mexico. 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/overview/economy/mexico 
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also included here, which has the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the public 
expending.  
4.2 Resources and means for undertaking regional competition and economic 
policies 
4.2.1 Co-Partnership funds 
States government departments are frequently the mediators to access funds when there are 
foreign firms, while municipal administrations attend to national and/or smaller projects. 
For most funds, there needs to be coordination from the three levels, which is also stated in 
the operating criteria of the funds. 
Whether foreign firms want to access federal incentives, they could also directly go to 
federal instances such as ProMexico and the Secretariat of Economy on their regional 
branches, depending on the fund they want to access. There are funds with specific targets, 
that is, they give the grant when firms are willing to improve logistics (PROLOGYCA), to 
undertake innovation projects (FINNOVA, CONACYT), to decrease greenhouse gas 
emissions (FINNOVA), among others.  
Some programs from federal government are aimed to attend mostly rural and 
marginalised areas in order to foster self-employment (PRONAFI, FOMMUR, FONAES). 
There are other funds intended to encourage software development, innovation, or firms’ 
investment growth (PROIND, FINNOVA, PRODIAT, COMPITE, among others). Most of 
funds would finance partially the total cost of the new investment to be exerted and 
additional to the federal financing, local or regional government could provide more 
financial support, or other kind of aid. For instance, during 2011, FOMMUR granted 74 
USD millions to 14,936 recipients, and only about 20% was contributed by federal 
government.  
Due to unemployment problems, after 2000 the federal government have considerably 
increased the number of projects and funds to provide credits for SME’s (Small and 
Medium Enterprises). They operate through different channels, coordinating efforts either 
with entrepreneurs’ chambers, or with municipal and state’s economics departments. 
Among the conditions to access credits or grants, small firms should take some training, 
and formulate the investment project. Thus, municipal and state economic departments 
provide consultancy in order to fulfil the paper work, but also to increase the probability of 
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firms’ survival by advising on marketing and administration matters. There could be also 
micro-financing offices or enterprises that could borrow credits from federal government 
to give loans to SME’s, which is a third channel to administrate credits. 
Finally, it is also important to remark that due to the priority given to automotive and 
aerospace by federal government, firms within these-and related industries have received 
major attention on behalf of ProMexico. For instance in 2011, 80% of incentives were 
granted to automotive firms, and the other 20% were firms within aerospace industry.  
4.2.2 States and municipalities 
Although the total expenditures from both, local and regional governments, are much less 
than the federal budget, about the half in 2011, local and regional economic development 
policies may have had a significant effect over firms’ productivity. The channels are 
manifold, first, directly through investments and local policies. Second, indirectly, due to 
three-partnership programs and proactivity to make better planning and lobbying for 
resources. Resources are more easily obtained if they are aimed to deprived areas, or to 
build basic infrastructure. For instance, urbanisation works such as streets paving, public 
gardens construction, and sewage works; transport means/roads. Other way is to follow 
federal policies guidelines on economic development policies, such as investment 
attraction policies, marketing touristic areas, developing “Pueblos Mágicos6”, delivering 
training for local entrepreneurs, and getting credit or funds for local or foreign firms.  
Given the fiscal system in Mexico, the possibilities to undertake tax competition are very 
limited. At the municipal level just exemptions on land-property taxes and construction 
permissions are the most frequent tax-incentives, since land property is the most important 
tax paid to the local administrations by firms settling. Indeed land-property tax and water 
payments are the most important from own incomes at this level (Peña-Ahumada, 2011).  
Likewise, states do not set lots of state-taxes, yet they may still provide exemptions on 
some registration fees when opening new firms, on vehicle ownership-tax for firms, or 
taxes on real estate properties. It varies according to the state. The full list can be checked 
                                                     
6
 Pueblos Mágicos is a program started in 2001 by the Secretariat of Tourism (SECTUR) in order to increase 
and promote the appraisal of typical towns in Mexico, and provide an alternative source of income for their 
inhabitants. 
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in the website of ProMexico , which is the promotion and marketing office for foreign 
investment at the federal level. 
All programs and actions to foster investment and improve production conditions are 
difficult to monitor. Yet, from the local and state administrations most of the resources 
spent on tax exemptions, grants, incentives, entrepreneurship training, and investment 
promotion are registered in one expenditure chapter that is going to be called Economic 
Fostering and Subsidies (EF&S), from here onwards. This item might also include 
expenditures on education, health, and political parties, as well as tourism and economics 
departments’ budgets. Given that the item cannot be disaggregated7, the total sum is used 
in the analysis. In other words, it comprises most expenditure on territorial competition 
policies.  
In addition, municipalities and states also undertake infrastructure investment which is 
registered in a different spending chapter. It also encompasses other types of non-physical
8
 
investments. This non-physical investment may also include other resources spent to 
pursue economic development given that INEGI states that non-physical investment is the 
one aimed to increase inhabitants’ wellbeing such as public security, economic or 
institutional development). However, given that the physical investments, that is, public 
works on infrastructure, constitute the major proportion of this expenditure chapter, it is 
called Public Infrastructure Investment (PII) from here onwards. Given that these two 
spending chapters -EF&S and PII- register the resources exerted to foster economic 
development and competition policies - at both municipal and state scales- they are the 
main interest variables to estimate policies’ effects. 
The total expenditures in these two items have increased considerably. At the municipal 
level the total growth of EF&S for the period, 1993-2011, is 207% while PII 122%. For 
states, the total growth is 434% and 52%, respectively. Given that states exert bigger 
proportions of decentralised expenditures on health and on education, the growth of EF&S 
is much larger for states. Nevertheless, the resources spent to foster economic growth are 
still highly centralised. In 1993 the resources from federal government on similar 
expenditure chapters were 6 times larger than the sum of municipal and state governments, 
                                                     
7
 In the last years, it can be disaggregated, but not for most of the period of study. 
8
 INEGI states that as non-physical investment is that aimed to increase inhabitants wellbeing such as public 
security, economic or institutional development. 
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yet the difference decreased by 2011, when federal budget was 3.7 times the budget of 
Local and state budgets.  
In this way, the higher participation from municipal and state governments has become 
ever more essential to foster economic growth. More importantly they constitute key actors 
to support national firms, easing doing business. Indeed, from 2011, INEGI started running 
a survey with municipal and state governments in order to evaluate their institutional 
management. Among other things, they search whether the institutions are evaluating 
budget implementation and the results obtained afterwards. They assess to what extent the 
institutions have worked based on general plans and if they evaluate the compliance of 
those plans. This new practice confirms the higher interest on local and regional 
governments’ management, given their increasing role for economic policies. In fact, the 
work from Rodríguez-Pose and Palavicini-Corona (2013) did something similar, by asking 
to more than 800 local governments whether they undertake planning and LED (Local 
Economic Development) policies. The results showed that governments applying LED 
policies actually influenced on the improvement of human development. 
In sum, Mexican governments do not undertake bidding wars, or purely incentives-based 
competition policies to attract foreign firms because federal government usually gives the 
pecuniary incentives, which indeed may highly bias the location decisions from foreign 
firms beyond local endowments and economic policies.  
The subsidies revenues obtained by firms has increased in recent years, yet they are still 
low, compared to the total investment existing. According to the registers of the Economic 
Census, by 2008 for every dollar of new investment in foreign-own/joint-venture firms 
they had $18 cents subsidies revenues. While Mexican firms in total had received $34 
cents. In average the amounts are small, yet they are distributed among very few firms, 
especially in the case of foreign. In addition, this proportion has been enlarged for foreign 
firms, while it has diminished for domestic. Compared to 1998, subsidies to Mexican firms 
decreased 11%, while for foreign firms increased in about 30 times.  
Municipal and state policy-makers would mostly play hard competition strategies while 
undertaking incentives-based policies to a lesser extent frequently highly coordinated with 
the federal government. In consequence, local and regional governments should strive to 
pursue competitive advantages, if they want to become more attractive for foreign firms 
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and encourage national firms’ growth. Especially, they must play a managerial role to take 
advantage from the federal funds available. In addition, when attending foreign firms, 
beyond incentives, policy makers need to attend their needs and create the conditions for 
their settlement, which usually regards with networking to supplier chain, ensuring local 
services and easing paper work.  
5. Empirical application  
5.1 Sample  
The smallest unit of public administration in Mexico is the municipality. However, as 
explained before, they are subordinated to the state level. Consequently, two scale of 
analyses are used here, that is, state and municipal. There are 2457 municipalities in 
Mexico, yet, such as in the previous chapter in order to include only medium size to big 
urban municipalities the sample includes those with more than 80, 000 inhabitants in 2005.  
Given the geographic proximity and economic interaction of some municipalities, the 
National Council of Population (CONAPO) have defined Metropolitan Areas (MA). 
Therefore, when the municipality  is part of a MA, all the municipalities are included 
together as a unique regional unit. In total there are 43 MA and 24 municipalities with 
more than 80, 000 inhabitants. They contributed with an average of 60% of national 
population in the period of study, and 85% of TGP.  
Mexico City, Tabasco and Campeche are excluded from the model, given that they might 
be outliers. Mexico City has a different dynamic and economic pattern since historically it 
has constituted the main economic centre in Mexico. Its economies of scale and scope may 
not rely only on local governments policies during the period of study. Tabasco and 
Campeche are the main oil producers; consequently, they receive considerably more 
federal transfers than the other states. Many researchers do the same when studying 
Mexican regions (Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose, 2004, Rodriguez-Oreggia, 
2005, Sanchez-Reaza and Rodriguez-Pose, 2002). Hence, there are 42 MA and 21 urban 
municipalities in the sample, that is, 63 regional units, which contributed with 65% of 
national TGP. In this way the sample represents the majority of national GDP and they are 
the most important decision centres, where the existence of competition and economic 
development policies are more likely to exist, except for Mexico City.  
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It is important to remark that MA do not have a unique municipal president, but they might 
cooperate to provide some public services, to do planning and to encourage economic 
growth. According to the Mexican Constitution,  Art. 125, when there is geographical 
proximity or the municipalities are too small, they should strive to coordinate with the 
neighbouring municipalities. This is especially the case for the centre region, where many 
municipalities are very close or even together geographically.  
It should be also highlighted that Mexican municipalities can comprise more than one 
urban locality
9
 and rural areas. Yet in all the municipalities within the sample the main 
urban centre concentrates most of population and production, at least 70% from the whole 
municipality. Therefore, given that agricultural and mining production are not included in 
the analysis, neither any other commodity production; the data used is assumed to 
represent cities’ production, in either municipalities or MA. More specifically, firms 
included perform services, trade and manufacturing activities. 
5.2 Data 
Most of data used in this work comes from INEGI and CONAPO databases. If a different 
source is employed it is going to be stated. In Mexico, there is no information for 
municipalities’ production for consecutive years, but for every 5 years from 1989 onwards. 
Still the Economic Census from 1989 is difficult to match with newer data, and it is not 
within the interest period of analysis, that is, when local and regional policies increased 
their influence and decentralisation was intensified. Therefore, the information comes from 
the Economic Census of 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008
10
. In sum the model at the municipal 
level has      and    . The model for states has      and      , given the 
period 1997-2011. 
The Economic Census is a survey undertaken every 5 years to a random sample in the 
whole country, yet it does not include any agriculture, mining or commodities production. 
The GDP at state and national level is estimated differently. They use information provided 
by the different Secretariats as well as the information collected every 5 years with the 
Economic Census.  
                                                     
9
 INEGI considers urban localities those with population greater than 2500 inhabitants.  
10
 The census were published on 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009, respectively, and named with the publication 
year. However the information corresponds to the respective previous year. 
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Within the Economic Census, it is possible to obtain separated information for firms with 
national capital only and those with foreign investment, either in a joint-venture or fully 
foreign-owned firms. The models for cities are separated into foreign and national firms. 
Given that splitting the firms into these two groups is only possible from 1998 onwards, 
the models period is 1998-2008, although some data from 1993 is also employed. 
Given that the unit of analysis are regional units, either municipalities or states. The data 
from Economic Census is added to include all firms within services, trade and 
manufacturing activities settled in the municipality. A concern is that it leads to mix very 
different kinds of firms, increasing the possibility for bias in the results and coefficients. 
Therefore, in order to partially address this issue, the models were estimated for 1) all 
firms within the sample, 2) manufacturing firms. In this way, the model allows accounting 
for more heterogeneity within the cities, of course, firm level analysis by class would 
account for more heterogeneity. Nonetheless, the policies to be assessed are policies that 
aim all economic activities within the cities, thus it is more appropriate to analyse 
aggregated models. Similar works at regional levels have been undertaken before (Costa-I-
Font et al., 2003, Rodríguez Oreggia y Román, 2003, Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2005, 
Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose, 2004, Sanchez-Reaza and Rodriguez-Pose, 2002); 
the innovative of this work is the estimation at municipal level.  
5.3 Variables 
From the literature above cited as well as from regional theory and subject to the 
availability of information in Mexican databases, the variables to include in the model had 
been decided as follows. 
As regards with the dependent variable, it is used a productivity measure, in this case is 
labour force productivity, since the total production is weighted with total employment in 
both cases, states and municipalities. This is the most common measure used, especially if 
the level of analysis is not the firm, when value added over productivity is more useful. 
However, even if this measure is less extensive than multifactor productivity measures, it 
is also a good indicator for regions and cities, especially because when taking gross 
product, the productivity increases of intermediate inputs are also taken into account in the 
whole measure (Schreyer, 2001).  
5.3.1 Municipalities  
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As a left hand variable it is used firms productivity, measured by the Total Gross 
Production (TGP) per worker. For municipalities TGP is the equivalent for GDP, although 
it includes both, value added and intermediate inputs, yet total gross production should be 
used rather than value added.   
 The basic model is written as follows: 
                                                     (1) 
Where         is the productivity measure,      and     are control variables for regional 
and firms endowments respectively.       is the interest variable Economic fostering and 
subsidies,       is the public investment in infrastructure.    is the variable for regional 
characteristics intrinsic to each city, that do not change over the time.     Stands for year 
dummies.     is the error term. Year dummies are added to diminish potential problems due 
to cross section dependence, although this will be also treated, as explained later.  
Economic fostering and subsidies 
       This is the expenditure item referred before.  It includes expenditures on promotion 
and marketing activities; support to SME’s firms, transfers and subsidies to firms as well 
as the budget from some political parties, and other public offices such as tourism and 
economic development. Given that not all the item is exerted on incentives, it would have a 
positive effect through the support given to local firms, or the planning and policymaking. 
Nonetheless, given the range included here, such as wages and general budget to public 
offices, this expenditure item could also show a negative effect on firms’ productivity. To 
take into account the size of the city, the variable is the amount of expenditures per 
employee in the city.  
Public Infrastructure Investment 
       This mainly comprises expenditures on public infrastructure works. Other 
investments to increase human capital or public security might be included here. Yet this is 
not well specified, nor disaggregated. It is expected to have a positive relationship to firms’ 
productivity (Dall'erba and Le Gallo, 2008), yet given the differences is prices and 
corruption, the total effects might be diminished (Straub, 2008). Likewise with the 
previous variable, expenditures per employee in the city are used.  
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Specialisation index 
The economic diversity/specialisation had been a topic of debate. Empirical works have 
been undertaken to find whether crossed-spillovers, economic diversity, is better for firms 
productivity increments, or whether within-industry spillovers, economic specialisation, 
fosters more rapid increases in productivity. Results are diverse, and some support 
economic diversity, Jacob (1969) externalities , while others support Marshallian 
externalities (1890), (Glaesser et al., 1991). According to Salgado and Bernal (2011) in 
Mexico manufacturing firms in more diversified cities tend to invest more in technology, 
yet they have lower productivity growth. Thus, it could be expected a positive sign of the 
variable, at least for manufacturing firms.  
The variable could be relative, that is, measuring the concentration of the production of 
determined industry in each region. Namely, the region with highest production in the 
country would be the most specialised on it. It is better used when researching on clusters 
or specific industries.  
Differently, in this work the variable aim is to control for the diversity/specialisation within 
the same region, that is, the effects of economic structure regardless their size or the 
leading industry (Glaesser et al., 1991, Duranton and Puga, 2000). Therefore, the share of 
the industry with highest contribution to the city’s production is used.  
Weather the number is high, it tells about a highly specialised region, thus relatively more 
dependent from one industry. If on the contrary the number is low it indicates a diversified 
economic structure. The extreme case would be a city that is specialised to only one 
industry, so the number would be 1. On the opposite, since there have been taken 17 
industries, if the city is evenly diversified and all economic activities were producing equal 
TGP proportions, the number would be 1/17= 0.0588.   
Domestic market potential 
Given the importance of economies of scale, local and potential markets size is a 
significant determinant for firms’ productivity, especially for manufacturing firms. It is 
estimated as follows:  
     ∑      
 
     
 
   (2) 
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     Within 300 km travel distance.   
Where     is the market potential of city   in the year    
       Km distance between municipalities  
It is important to highlight that this variable includes both, local market size and outer 
market potential since it is also adding when    . 
Manufacturing employment share over total employment 
The economic structure in the city might be also significant for productivity growth, 
especially the proportion of manufacturing firms. Hence, it is commonly used as a control 
variable in empirical studies (Alecke et al., 2012). To some extent the specialisation 
variable controls for economic structure. However, a region could be specialised to tourism 
activities while other to services, having small share of manufacturing activities.  
Foreign/domestic firms productivity 
This is a control variable for crossed effects from domestic to foreign firms and vice versa. 
For example, the presence of foreign firms highly productive might generate competition 
to domestic ones. In turn, if they are in different sectors, they may not be affected, while if 
they are in similar economic activities there can lead to competition -negative effects- or 
technology transfers -positive effects-, as reviewed in the empirical works listed.  
Public infrastructure stock  
There is no doubt that public infrastructure is a significant determinant of firms’ 
productivity. In Mexico, it is difficult to find information at the municipal level, and some 
data is not available for all years needed. Ideally, the economic infrastructure would 
consider energy, transports, public services, and communications endowments (Hansen, 
1965). Some researchers in Mexico only use the number of land lines per head as indicator 
for infrastructure, others use the expenditures.  
It is better to have the actual stocks than the expenditures, given that the construction costs 
are not always the same, either because of geographical conditions, input costs, or simply 
corruption (Biehl, 1988, Straub, 2008).  Considering that, to build the index there were 
97 
 
added the physical stocks for economic infrastructure as follows: for energy, electricity 
supply lines per capita; for public services, water feeds per capita and sewage feeds per 
capita; for transports, Km of roads per area in Km
2
; and for communications, number of 
flight passengers per capita. It could be also included some endowments for social 
infrastructure such as hospital beds. But, for cities it was easier to use an alternative 
variable to control for health. The variable is the same as the index used in chapter 2. To 
see the whole method see the A.1 in the annex.  
Kilometres of roads 
Kilometres of main roads weighted with the municipal area in Km
2 I
 is used as an 
alternative indicator for public infrastructure stock. According to Dall'erba and Le Gallo  
(2008) it is possible that accessibility is the most important infrastructure endowment. It 
may increase capital accumulation to wealthy regions given that it allows firms to increase 
the economies of scale given the lower transports costs.  
Infant mortality rate 
Infant mortality rate is used as control variable for health. It should have a negative 
relationship with productivity. The smaller the rate, the higher productivity, given that it is 
agreed that this is a good indicator for general health and wellbeing in empirical studies 
(Easterly, 2001).  
Given that firms’ productivity not only yields on regional features such as those mentioned 
above, control variables for internal firms’ endowments have been also included.  
Human capital  
The human capital inside the firm will also determine the productivity level. The best 
indicator would be to have the employees classified into high and low skilled labour, as 
well as their experience, which is commonly tested in empirical studies. However, INEGI 
only provide data on the number of employees classified into management/other kinds of 
employees, operative workers, owners/decision makers, and family members. It was taken 
the ratio of management/other types of employees over total employment for this variable. 
It provides information about the relative skills of the employees. Although, the operative 
employees do not always stands for low skilled labour force, but no more specific 
information is available.  
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Electricity cost 
Especially in the manufacturing sector, the electricity cost is one of the most important 
inputs. It has been highlighted as a bottle neck in Mexico, which can be an important 
drawback for firms’ productivity (Salgado Banda and Bernal Verdugo, 2011). This 
variable used is the proportion of electricity expenditures over total revenues. Remarking 
that owing to different and extreme weather conditions by regions, electricity is an 
important expenditure during summer, potentially affecting firms’ productivity in 
bordering cities.  
In the following table the summary statistics for all variables used at the municipal level 
are presented.  
Table 3.2 Summary statistics of variables at municipal level 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Total Gross Product per employee (MXN) 252 $388.55 296.5065 $48.83 $2,332.23 
Human capital inside firm 252 0.1651893 0.125164 0.0114209 0.5187533 
Electricity consumption share of total revenues  252 0.0105524 0.0048883 0.0024275 0.0309058 
Economic diversion/specialisation index 252 0.4774761 0.1602751 0.1650831 0.9466147 
Infant mortality rate per 1000 births 252 13.96909 5.56099 2.119626 33.83838 
Economic Fostering and subsidies per employee 
(MXN) 
252 $140.99 152.24 $0.00 $1,082.36 
Public Physical Investment per employee (MXN) 252 $503.14 747.24 $0.00 $9,887.51 
Public infrastructure stock index 252 22.11187 6.430653 9.138739 38.75019 
Share of manufacturing employment 252 0.2743205 0.1481094 0.0388917 0.6566179 
Domestic market potential. Thousands (MXN) 252 $50,800,000.00 71600000 $1,105,058.00 $515,000,000.00 
Km main roads per municipal area Km2 252 428.3295 407.4346 24 2333.09 
Ln EF&S lagged5 189 $133.61 154.8704 $0.00 $1,082.36 
Ln PII lagged5 189 $470.02 798.0178 $0.00 $9,887.51 
Productivity of domestic firms 189 $651.80 1103.06 -$2,858.90 $10,225.72 
Productivity of foreign/joint venture  firms 189 $939.80 1.27E+03 $0.00 $9,997.07 
5.3.2 States 
The dependent variable is the total GDP over total employment in the state
11
. It is 
important to remark that, differently to the municipality, for states all industries are 
included because states’ institutions should take into account a broader range of topics and 
geographic areas, including rural areas and small cities not taken into account in the 
municipal models. Therefore, states’ expenditures on EF&S and PII and any other public 
resources are not only used in urban areas.  
Given the differences in databases, the control variables are not the same as with 
municipalities. Among the similar control variables are economic specialisation, domestic 
                                                     
11
 This variable is taken from the employment surveys available for various years in INEGI.  
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market potential, share of employee in manufacturing activities, infant mortality rate, as 
well as the expenditures on EF&S and PII undertaken by the states administrations. Some 
differences are stated.  
The basic model is written as follows: 
                                               (3) 
         is the productivity measure.      is a group of control variables.     Is a time 
trend,        and       are the interest variables,    Stands for year dummies and     is the 
error term.  
Public infrastructure stock 
Given that there is more information about physical endowments in states, additional 
physical endowments are used to build the variable. The index includes not only 
productive infrastructure as the cities index, but also social infrastructure endowments. 
Following Delgado and Alvarez (2001) the infrastructure listed is divided into economic 
and social types.  
Economic infrastructure 
 Communications and transports:  
- Number of flight passengers per every 1000 inhabitants. This is an indicator for air 
traffic and the airport capacity. Of course this also indicates the demand level of the 
city and the touristic places have larger amount of traffic.   
- Kilometres of main roads over the total state area (Km2). 
- Number of cargo trucks per very 1000 inhabitants. 
- Ratio of people with pay-tv over total population.  
- Post offices per every 1000 inhabitants. 
 Energy supply: 
- Total of water feeds over per capita. 
- Number of power points per every 1000 inhabitants in the state. 
Social infrastructure 
 Medical services 
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- Number of doctors per every 1000 inhabitants.  
 Education 
- Number of medium-high education schools per every 1000 inhabitants. 
- Number of bachelor level schools per every 1000 inhabitants.  
- Number of Postgraduate schools for every 1000 inhabitants.  
The estimation of the index is also the one used before, but with more information. The 
data is normalised using the maximum value of each variable. Then, the variables are 
averaged by category, assuming that they are interchangeable within the same category. 
The final index is obtained with the geometric mean of all categories.  
It is important to remark that the education infrastructure was only considered medium-
high and high levels, assuming that the higher availability of such education offers, allow 
firms to hire more easily labour force with at least 9 full years of schooling, which is 
higher than the national average provided by INEGI in 2010, this is, 8.6 years.   
Federal investment per employee 
As shown before the expenditures are still highly centralised and the investment exerted 
through federal programs might be also very important when fostering economic 
productivity. At this administrative level, there is information for federal investment, 
which is believed to be a highly influential tool to foster investment, productivity and 
economic growth across the country (Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose, 2004).  The 
variable used is physical federal investment per employee to take the size of the state into 
account.  
US market potential 
In addition, a control variable for US market potential has been included. It is well 
established that many firms located in Mexico are export-based. In such cases, local or 
regional market potential might not influence the production scale, and consequently nor 
the productivity. A positive sign would indicate that firms located nearer to the border tend 
to be more productive, which might be due to economies of scale or better performance of 
foreign firms. The variable is estimated as follows: 
       ∑      
 
  
 
     
      (4) 
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       is the market potential to the US for state   in the year  . 
      is the total GDP of the four bordering states in the US, that is, Texas, California, 
Arizona and New Mexico.  
      is the distance between the capital-city of state   to the US-bordering city  . 
Only the four US-bordering states are included given their geographical proximity. It is 
assumed that firms concede less importance to US market when they are further from the 
border. According to Mexican officials, firms interested in exporting to California or 
Arizona, settle in the northwest Mexican region. Firms willing to supply markets in the 
east may locate in the Mexican east bordering cities. Thus, the distances were calculated in 
kilometres distance to the nearest bordering city in the US side. More specifically, for 
Mexican states in the west side, the distance is estimated to Calexico and San Diego, in 
California, and Naco, in Arizona. For those to the East, the reference cities are Brownville 
and Laredo, in Texas. The distances were calculated using real distances with google maps 
application. 
Government corruption index 
Corruption is one of the most important issues that may prevent public investments, 
especially in infrastructure, from enhancing productivity improvements. It is hard to find 
information for the whole period. The Mexican Transparency group has published several 
indexes at the state level for year 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2010. Even if it is available 
for few years, it will be used as an alternative control variable to find the extent to what 
corruption is related with regional productivity losses.  
FDI flows per employee 
There is a census for inward FDI; new and reinvestments. The problem with this census is 
that many firms are registered where the headquarters of the firm are located, rather than in 
the place where the investment takes place. This is problematic when trying to link this 
with the regional productivity. Thus, this is included as an alternative variable in the 
model. 
Expenditures at municipal level on EF&S and PII 
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The expenditures from municipal administrations in the biggest cities in Mexico are tested 
in the previous model. Then, two variables with the local expenditures on EF&S and PII 
items, including all municipalities in each state are added to test both effects at the same 
time.  Similarly to all the expenditures variables, the variable used is the amount of 
expenditures per employee.  
As regards with firms input costs, given that this data is not firm level, there is no 
information available for inputs costs as detailed as in the Economic Census.  
The summary statistics for the variables are in the following table 3.3 
Table 3.3 Summary statistics for variables at the state level. 
Variable Obs Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max 
GDP per worker (Thousands MXN) 
435 $ 160.25 $ 52.85 $ 74.22 $ 341.14 
Infant mortality rate 
435 17.5525 4.2564 9.6969 33.1536 
Public Infrastructure stock 
435 43.51082 8.893582 18.52248 75.74472 
Specialisation 
435 0.2660693 0.0585489 0.1799 0.5487 
Market potential (Thousands MXN) 
435 $ 199,000,000.00 $ 162,000,000.00 
$ 
31,000,000.00 $ 906,000,000.00 
Federal public investment per employee (Thousands 
MXN) 435 $ 4,695.12 $ 2,350.71 $ 1,402.79 $ 22,464.32 
Manufacturing employment 
435 0.1666206 0.0652969 0.0498739 0.3240274 
Economic Fostering and subsidies per employee (MXN) 
435 $ 8,177.37 $ 3,521.27 $ 0.00 $ 19,096.22 
Public Physical Investment per employee (MXN) 
435 $ 1,589.71 $ 1,168.55 $ 126.74 $ 12,657.41 
US market potential (Thousands MXN) 435 $ 130,000,000.00 $ 493,000,000.00 
$ 
10,800,000.00 
$ 
3,130,000,000.00 
Government Corruption index 145 7.597931 3.080956 1.8 18.8 
FDI per employee lag5 (Thousands USD) 435 $ 3.93 $ 9.03 -$ 2.69 $ 68.12 
Municipal expenditures EF&S per employee (Thousands 
MXN) 435 $ 378.90 $ 210.15 $ 40.57 $ 1,644.53 
Ln Municipal expenditures PII per employee (Thousands 
MXN) 435 $ 1,068.92 $ 576.09 $ 97.75 $ 3,066.12 
5.4 Estimation methodology 
5.4.1 Municipalities 
Given the nature of the data, the estimations should include Fixed effects (FE) to control 
for those features intrinsic to the regions, invariable over the time, which are not captured 
with the variables in the model. In addition, given that these regional entities within the 
same country and due to their geographic neighbouring, there could be a factor common to 
all panels in the error term, violating one of the most important assumptions of FE models, 
that is, and independence across panels (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998, Hoechle, 2007). It could 
be caused by the macroeconomics trend, the violence, US crisis, laws, trade openness, or 
any shock that may affect the country in general and it is not included in the model.  
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To keep a fixed effects approach, the method used by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) is going 
to be used as the base for the models in this work. The authors proposed a variation in 
standard errors that allows correlation across panels and over the time. Moreover, the 
covariance matrix is robust to heteroskedasticity. The model performs well with finite 
samples, even in cases like the present models with N considerable higher than T, although 
bigger T is recommended (Hoechle, 2007). If the models do not have cross section 
dependence but only heteroskedasticity it is better to do just White standard errors.  
For large samples there is also the option of clustered standard errors by Thompson (2011) 
which also tackle dependence across panels and in time. Stata also allows using clustered 
standard errors that deal with one problem at the time, yet it is no suitable for this panel 
given the size of T.  
Due to the nature of the data it could be also expected to have endogenous variables in the 
panels. It is likely that regions with higher productivity also have more money to spend for 
fostering investment or for building public works; this could exacerbate uneven economic 
performance. The larger expenditures induce higher productivity growth and this in turn 
allows for more expenditures. In case of EF&S it could be highly endogenous when 
estimating the model for foreign firms, given that, as shown before, foreign firms are more 
likely to obtain subsidies and many marketing actions would have the aim of bringing 
more FDI. Thus, difference GMM estimator is used. It is preferred to systems GMM, since 
no level equations are required, thus in this case the model is more efficient. There is a 
discussion whether systems GMM performs better than difference GMM. Nevertheless, 
according to Bond et al (2001) whether the dependent variable is not lagged, no persistent 
series are present and there is only potential  endogeneity of right hand variables, the 
Sargan test of Overidentifying restrictions and related tests are enough to assess the 
validity of the instruments. In such case, simply the lags of the instrumented variables can 
serve as instruments. If the test validates the instruments, it is enough to test the validity of 
the model. 
5.4.2 States 
Similarly to the municipalities, it is necessary to take into account FE when estimating 
states models. Moreover, given the geographic interaction and the external shocks, it is 
also expected to find cross-section dependence. Since the number of T is larger, other 
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models to deal with cross section dependence can be also tested. The clustered standard 
errors proposed by Thomson (2011) are not suitable given the size of the panel. 
Additionally it is more commonly used with autoregressive models in financial analysis.  
Other method that could be used in this model is the linear regression with Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSE). This method is known to work well with models in which N and 
T are similar size (Hoechle, 2007). Although more years are available for states, T is still 
about the half of the regional units. This is not a FE approach, but pooled OLS. Therefore 
the results between these two models are very close, as it will be shown in the estimations 
results. One disadvantage compared to Driscoll and Kraay described before is that PCSE 
considers that the intercorrelation between units is the same for all time points.  
The methods based on Pesaran (2006), common correlated effects with the options of mean 
group estimator and augmented mean group estimators, allow for cross sectional 
dependence as well as common factors across panels. Chudik et al. (2011) provides good 
evidence of the consistency of these models in presence of cross sectional dependence, 
defining also two types of dependence: weak and strong. The models are ideally designed 
for large panels, yet Chudik et al. (2011) provide Montecalo simulations for small sample 
properties, which proved good performance from N=20 and T=10. Nevertheless, given the 
way it is modelled, the cross section dependence reduces as N increases relative to T. 
Additionally, Chudik et al (2011) showed that in the case of FE method, the models 
behaved very poorly, hence it is not possible to keep the FE approach when using these 
models. Furthermore, a larger panel would be better. In consequence, in this panel data, 
CCEMG (Common Correlated Effects Mean Group Estimator) and the Augmented 
estimator are less efficient compared to Driscoll and Kraay, which uses FE and provide 
consistent standard errors for cross section across panel and autocorrelation, assuming also 
heterogeneity.  Considering this, results with the different estimation methods are 
presented and discussed in the results section.  
6. Results  
6.1 Municipalities 
Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) proposed a test for cross sectional dependence. Three options 
could be used, Pesaran, Frees and Friedman. Hoyos and Sarafidis recommend comparing 
the results of the three tests. Pesaran works better with large T, and Frees show more 
accuracy when T=30. Pesaran and Frees reject the null of no cross-section dependence, 
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while Friedman accepted the null. In this case, given that the correlation matrix has lot of 
positive and negative correlations, Friedman test is weaken, thus Frees would be more 
reliable, which confirms cross section dependence. These tests are only for reference, since 
given the size of the sample, the variation in positive and negative correlations and the high 
value of absolute correlation, 0.541, either test could be weaken. Yet, given the nature of 
the data it is believed that cross section independence assumption is violated, and this 
should be addressed 
In order to compare the results and test which method is more appropriate,  pooled OLS, 
FE with robust standard errors, FE with Driscoll and Kraay (DK) standard errors, and 
difference GMM with forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) are in shown in that order in 
Table 3.4. Difference GMM with FOD proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), allows to 
keep FE approach, it does not drop the first observation and permits the variables to be 
instrumented with the lags of the explanatory variables.  
It was assumed that EF&S and PII are endogenous, thus, they were added as the GMM-
style variables. It was allowed up to 2 lags, using the option collapse to avoid a large 
number of instruments; these results are in column (4). An additional option was to employ 
larger lags of these variables as excluded instruments. The results using the values of 
EF&S and PII in 1991 as external instruments are in column (5).  
Pooled OLS results are less accurate than the others and its coefficients are highly biased. 
Comparing FE –column (2) - and FE with DK standard errors –column (3)- the coefficients 
are the same, yet the standard errors in the latter are smaller at least 25%, which allows 
some variables to be statistically significant in the DK estimations. In the columns (4) and 
(5) the signs are the same as FE estimations and the coefficients are very similar, except 
for Human capital, which is about the same size as in the pooled OLS model. The Hansen 
tests P-values show that the instruments in GMM estimations are valid. Given that EF&S 
and PII have the same sign and similar coefficient, it can be said that no treatment for 
endogeneity is needed in the model. 
In this baseline model most variables have the expected sign. The interest variables are 
significant. The diverse kinds of support given to firms, and the efforts to attract more 
investments into the cities have had positive effects on aggregate productivity, that is, the 
expenditures on EF&S. On the contrary, PII per employee showed a negative correlation 
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with the dependent variable, indicating that PII investments do not effectively foster 
productivity of private firms. Still its influences is much larger than EF&S, the size of its 
coefficient is about more than two times bigger, indicating possible poor investment 
decisions, and corruption.  
The sign of electricity confirms the claim by Salgado and Bernal (2011), that electricity 
consumption can be a significant obstacle for firms productivity. Firms seem to be more 
productive in cities with higher economic specialisation, which was also highlighted by the 
same authors. Nonetheless, it seems that decreasing returns of scale might be happening in 
places with high proportion of employment in manufacturing activities, since the 
increments in productivity are negatively related to this variable.  
Table 3.4 Baseline results. Full model 1993-2008 
Dependent variable: Total 
Gross Production per 
employee 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS_baseFull FE_baseFull DK_baseFull Gmm_baseFull Gmm_baseFull2 
Human capital inside firm 1.8986** 0.8043** 0.8043* 0.7295** 0.7353** 
  (0.7442) (0.3500) (0.4246) (0.3474) (0.3469) 
ln Electricity consumption 0.0924 -0.1423*** -0.1423*** -0.1480*** -0.1475*** 
  (0.0771) (0.0391) (0.0276) (0.0395) (0.0394) 
Specialisation 1.7036*** 0.2542** 0.2542*** 0.2594** 0.2591** 
  (0.3121) (0.1070) (0.0868) (0.1071) (0.1071) 
Infant mortality rate -0.0041 -0.0026 -0.0026** -0.0028 -0.0028 
  (0.0057) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Ln EF&S 0.0031 0.0059** 0.0059*** 0.0051 0.0051* 
  (0.0091) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Ln PII -0.0151 -0.0157 -0.0157** -0.0102 -0.0106 
  (0.0247) (0.0100) (0.0074) (0.0104) (0.0102) 
Public Infrastructure stock -0.0030 0.0024 0.0024 0.0020 0.0021 
  (0.0056) (0.0093) (0.0026) (0.0095) (0.0095) 
Ln Market potential 0.3718*** 0.7834*** 0.7834*** 0.7824*** 0.7824*** 
  (0.0345) (0.0755) (0.0123) (0.0768) (0.0768) 
ln Manufacturing 
employment 
0.0754 -0.1782** -0.1782*** -0.1846** -0.1840** 
  (0.0593) (0.0855) (0.0207) (0.0894) (0.0891) 
Constant -1.0873 -8.6070*** -8.6070*** 
    (0.7086) (1.1147) (0.1587) 
  Obs 252 252 252 189 189 
N_clus 63 63 
 
63 63 
r2 0.794 0.941       
Instruments 
   
16 18 
Autocorrelation  test AR(1) p-value 
 
0.002 0 
Autocorrelation  test AR(2) p-value 
 
0.248 0.249 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test) 
  
0.885 0.763 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 
Infrastructure has been proved to be a significant driver for regional GDP growth; 
nevertheless, the coefficient sign in these results is not significant. A reason could be that 
cities with higher productivity might have relatively less public infrastructure. According 
to Fuentes (2003) cities with faster economic growth, which might also have large 
productivity increments, tend to have relative smaller amount of infrastructure, given that it 
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is difficult to keep track on the infrastructure construction demand by people and firms; 
especially in the north region.  
Alternatively, in table 3.5, column (2) is shown the alternative model using only the 
Kilometres of roads as an infrastructure indicator, which showed a positive sign. This is in 
line with the statements of Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008) that roads are more meaningful 
for firms productivity increases than some other public infrastructure. The baseline results 
are kept in column (1) with comparison purposes.  
Table 3.5 Results including domestic and foreign firms together 1993-2008. Using Driscoll and Kraay method. 
ALL FIRMS 1993-2008 
  All firms Manufacturing   
Dependent variable: Total Gross 
Production per employee 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Base Base_Roads Base_lags Base Base_Roads Base_lags 
Human capital inside firm 0.8043* 0.8302* 0.5593* 0.6765 0.6793 0.5119 
  (0.4246) (0.4318) (0.3256) (0.4846) (0.4939) (0.3349) 
ln Electricity consumption -0.1423*** -0.1446*** -0.1517*** -0.2194*** -0.2193*** -0.2203*** 
  (0.0276) (0.0281) (0.0325) (0.0474) (0.0472) (0.0468) 
Specialisation 0.2542*** 0.2555*** 0.2703*** -0.8845*** -0.8853*** -0.8620*** 
  (0.0868) (0.0867) (0.0799) (0.1768) (0.1755) (0.1767) 
Infant mortality rate -0.0026** -0.0025* -0.0027** -0.0053*** -0.0054*** -0.0044*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0014) 
Ln EF&S 0.0059*** 0.0054** 
 
0.0098* 0.0098* 
 
  (0.0019) (0.0023) 
 
(0.0053) (0.0054) 
 
Ln PII -0.0157** -0.0157** 
 
-0.0052 -0.0051 
 
  (0.0074) (0.0073) 
 
(0.0106) (0.0102) 
 
Public Infrastructure  0.0024 
 
0.0011 0.0009 
 
0.0007 
  (0.0026) 
 
(0.0019) (0.0032) 
 
(0.0025) 
Ln Market potential 0.7834*** 0.7844*** 0.7707*** 0.8660*** 0.8656*** 0.8584*** 
  (0.0123) (0.0129) (0.0175) (0.0396) (0.0405) (0.0408) 
ln Manufacturing employment -0.1782*** -0.1801*** -0.1787*** -0.6264*** -0.6282*** -0.6265*** 
  (0.0207) (0.0170) (0.0123) (0.0167) (0.0120) (0.0211) 
Ln Km main roads 
 
0.0238** 
 
  -0.0017 
 
  
 
(0.0100) 
 
  (0.0081) 
 
Ln EF&S lagged5 
  
-0.0070***   
 
0.0052** 
  
  
(0.0021)   
 
(0.0024) 
Ln PII lagged5 
  
0.0071**   
 
-0.0024 
  
  
(0.0028)   
 
(0.0042) 
Constant -8.6070*** -8.7288*** -8.4025*** -10.2626*** -10.2272*** -10.0920*** 
  (0.1587) (0.1353) (0.1622) (0.6526) (0.6818) (0.7410) 
Obs 252 252 252 252 252 252 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 
The results for manufacturing firms are slightly different. Opposite to the total results, the 
baseline model for manufacturing firms in column (4) of Table 3.Table 3.5 Results 
including domestic and foreign firms together 1993-2008. Using Driscoll and Kraay 
method. showed that manufacturing firms benefit more from economic diversity rather 
than specialisation, in favour of Jacobs externalities, mentioned before. The domestic 
market potential coefficient is about 30% higher. Local expenditures in EF&S and PII have 
the same effect direction compared to total firms, yet PII is not statistically significant.  
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It is noticeable that the coefficient for electricity is at least 50% higher for manufacturing 
firms. That is, productivity per worker is negatively affected by electricity cost to a higher 
extent than the total firms’ average. The human capital inside the firm showed a positive 
sign, still, it is not significant for manufacturing firms. This is could be a result of the firm 
nature. Manufacturing firms are expected to have larger proportions of operative labourers, 
rather than management ones; which does not regard with skills or experience inside the 
firm. In consequence, the measurement management/other type of employees over total 
employments is not effective as human capital indicator. As regards with infrastructure 
neither public infrastructure stock nor Km of roads –column (5)- are positively related to 
productivity increases.  
In table 3.5 alternative results are presented using the 5
th
 lag of EF&S and PII instead. 
Notice that given the larger availability of expenditures data –differently to production 
data- it is possible to have lags without losing one observation in the whole model. It is 
observed that the coefficients changed in the opposite way in column (3). That is, when 
using the lagged variables, EF&S effect is negative, while PII is positive. An interpretation 
is that policies to support firms do not show a positive effect on firms productivity within 
the following 5 years, confirming that some types of support could actually foster 
inefficiencies inside the firms (Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011). While investment in public 
infrastructure actually showed positive effects in the following 5 years. For manufacturing 
firms in column (6), the signs remain, but PII is still not significant, which is indicating 
that PII expenditures do not effectively ease production conditions for firms. Yet, it might 
be good for some firms, since the effect is not definitively negative.  
Now the results are separated into domestic and foreign/joint-venture firms. These are 
presented in table 3.6 and table 3.7, respectively. First, observing results in Table 3.4, 
domestic firms, some differences with the previous tables can be noticed. EF&S is not 
statistically significant in any case, indicating that the help provided by municipalities is 
not effectively fostering productivity. PII coefficient increased considerably, especially for 
manufacturing firms, indeed, the coefficient in column (4) is two times larger than column 
(1) -this is for total firms- still with a negative effect. Additionally, compared to baseline 
results, the coefficient is also larger. It could be could be related to the period, given that 
the fiscal resources have increased over the time, when the period considered is more 
recent, the coefficients are larger; additionally to the fact that the previous results are for all 
firms, and these ones only for domestic firms.  
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Diversity in cities is good for productivity of total firms in column (1), yet this is not true 
for manufacturing firms in column (4). Other variables such as human capital inside the 
firm, market potential, manufacturing employment, and electricity costs also showed 
higher coefficient than the previous results, especially for manufacturing firms. Infant 
mortality rate do not have the expected sign in the total results, and it is not statistically 
significant for manufacturing firms. 
The productivity of foreign firms has been also included as an explanatory variable. It was 
explained before that this is only possible for this period 1998-2008. Its coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant when estimating results for all domestic firms in 
column (1). It indicates that there might be competition with foreign firms. That is, 
increases in productivity of firms with foreign investment, leads to productivity losses for 
national firms. The variable is still negative but it is much smaller for manufacturing firms, 
as shown in column (4). Perhaps the increments of foreign firms’ productivity might be 
have very different effects across industries and firms, creating competition and 
productivity decreases in some firms, while fostering it in others. According to Jordaan 
(2008; 2011) foreign firms in Mexico might have vertical backward spillovers, transferring 
technology and fostering productivity of suppliers’ chain in the automotive. Yet, there 
might be also losses and displacement of others, since negative horizontal effects exist.  
Table 3.5 Results for domestic firms. Using Driscoll and Kraay method. 
NATIONAL FIRMS 1998-2008: All firms Manufacturing   
Dependent variable: Total Gross Production per employee 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Base Base_Roads Base_Lags Base Base_Road Base_Lags 
Human capital inside firm 0.8420 0.7063 1.0378 0.1691 0.1040 0.1999 
  (0.5851) (0.4842) (0.6588) (0.1287) (0.1623) (0.1312) 
ln Electricity consumption -0.4068*** -0.3992*** -0.4009*** -0.5247*** -0.5003*** -0.5252*** 
  (0.0275) (0.0227) (0.0278) (0.0342) (0.0544) (0.0376) 
Specialisation 0.3390** 0.4097** 0.3955** 0.6036* 0.5449* 0.6676* 
  (0.1644) (0.1927) (0.1529) (0.3021) (0.2836) (0.3585) 
Infant mortality rate 0.0078*** 0.0088*** 0.0078*** -0.0049 0.0005 -0.0040 
  (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0055) (0.0079) (0.0041) 
Ln EF&S 0.0163 0.0152   0.0203 0.0144 
   (0.0136) (0.0119)   (0.0146) (0.0186) 
 Ln PII -0.0375*** -0.0367***   -0.0650*** -0.0728*** 
   (0.0086) (0.0085)   (0.0179) (0.0151) 
 Public Infrastructure  -0.0085 
 
-0.0107 -0.0725*** 
 
-0.0731*** 
  (0.0141) 
 
(0.0148) (0.0099) 
 
(0.0089) 
Ln Market potential 0.7499*** 0.7581*** 0.7554*** 0.8831*** 0.9033*** 0.8416*** 
  (0.1418) (0.1353) (0.1120) (0.0468) (0.0693) (0.0629) 
ln Manufacturing employment -0.3725** -0.3548** -0.3816*** -0.6364*** -0.6335*** -0.5428*** 
  (0.1706) (0.1638) (0.1348) (0.1688) (0.1896) (0.1289) 
Ln Productivity foreign firms -0.1071*** -0.1147*** -0.1204*** -0.0244** -0.0182* -0.0292** 
  (0.0212) (0.0197) (0.0207) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0143) 
Ln Km main roads 
 
0.0726**   
 
-0.1151** 
   
 
(0.0323)   
 
(0.0469) 
 Ln EF&S lagged5 
  
0.0021 
  
-0.0121 
  
  
(0.0020) 
  
(0.0117) 
Ln PII lagged5 
  
0.0429*** 
  
0.0082 
  
  
(0.0131) 
  
(0.0337) 
Constant -9.0291*** -9.6814*** -9.4161*** -10.2988*** -11.5023*** -9.7254*** 
  (2.5050) (2.2640) (1.9133) (0.8700) (1.1483) (1.2905) 
Obs 188 188 188 171 171 171 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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The public infrastructure stock is not statistically significant for total firms, and it is 
negatively correlated to productivity in case of manufacturing. When using the alternative 
estimations, similarly to the results in table 3.5, the Km of roads are significant and 
positively related to productivity of total firms, while it has a negative sign in case of 
manufacturing firms. In the results including all firms in table 3.5, it was not statistically 
significant in case of manufacturing, column (5), but it was for positive and significant for 
total firms. Now, when splitting the results, it is positive and significant for foreign 
manufacturing firms –shown in the next table-, and negative for domestic ones. It is clear, 
thus, that domestic firms benefit less of the infrastructure stock existing in cities, given that 
their needs might be completely different to the foreign firms, mostly willing to export.   
The baseline results for foreign firms shown in table 3.6, column (1) confirm significant 
differences compared to domestic firms. In first place, economic specialisation is more 
important for foreign firms.  
Public infrastructure stock is negatively correlated with the productivity outputs and the 
coefficient is much larger and significant, compared to domestic firms, and the size is even 
larger for manufacturing. An increment of 10% in the public infrastructure stock caused 
4.1% of productivity losses in total foreign firms, column (1). For manufacturing firms the 
elasticity is such that 10% of infrastructure stock is related to 8.2% productivity losses. It 
could be also interpreted in a different way; firms located in places with better 
infrastructure are not necessarily the most productive. These results are in line with the 
results by Fuentes (Fuentes, 2003) who pointed out that the border region of Mexico have 
lot of infrastructure deficiencies, and cities with the best infrastructure are not the most 
productive.  
When including kilometres of main roads instead of total public infrastructure in column 
(2), the variable is significant, positive, and its coefficient much larger for all firms. The 
coefficient is a bit smaller for manufacturing firms-column (4)-, still high and positive. 
This is clearly related with the type of foreign investments existing in Mexico, which 
usually need good transport means.  
It is interesting to find that both expenditures from local governments showed a negative 
correlation, and they are not statistically significant in the baseline results, although EF&S 
becomes significant in the alternative model in column (2). Perhaps, roads infrastructure is 
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a better indicator for foreign firms, which helped to increase efficiency in the model. The 
coefficient of EF&S becomes significant with a larger coefficient and smaller standard 
error, thus the baseline results could be downwards biased.   
Table 3.6 Results for foreign and joint-venture firms. Using Driscoll and Kraay method. 
FOREIGN AND JOINT-VENTURE 
CAPITAL FIRMS 1998-2008: 
All firms Manufacturing   
Dependent variable: Total Gross 
Production per employee 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Base Base_Roads Base_Lags Base Base_Road Base_Lags 
Human capital inside firm 2.0810*** 2.1255*** 2.0733*** -0.0020** -0.0027*** -0.0021** 
  (0.2073) (0.2147) (0.1918) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
ln Electricity consumption -0.3919*** -0.3835*** -0.3812*** -0.4138*** -0.4261*** -0.4134*** 
  (0.0264) (0.0357) (0.0249) (0.0182) (0.0200) (0.0156) 
Specialisation 1.9658* 2.1996** 1.9295* 1.2530 1.3964 1.1347 
  (1.1196) (1.0971) (0.9792) (0.9069) (0.9364) (0.8524) 
Infant mortality rate 0.0402*** 0.0426*** 0.0400*** 0.0797*** 0.0852*** 0.0824*** 
  (0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0121) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0064) 
Ln EF&S -0.0168 -0.0272***   -0.0223 -0.0224 
   (0.0104) (0.0072)   (0.0221) (0.0190) 
 Ln PII -0.0344*** -0.0305**   -0.0855** -0.0735*** 
   (0.0107) (0.0119)   (0.0337) (0.0269) 
 Public Infrastructure  -0.0186*** 
 
-0.0169*** -0.0489*** 
 
-0.0550*** 
  (0.0030) 
 
(0.0023) (0.0116) 
 
(0.0110) 
Ln Market potential 0.6960*** 0.7313*** 0.7099*** -0.6221*** -0.6360*** -0.7322*** 
  (0.2427) (0.2489) (0.1822) (0.2208) (0.1714) (0.2167) 
ln Manufacturing employment -0.9033*** -0.8703*** -0.8200*** -0.9200 -0.7543 -0.5736 
  (0.1396) (0.1432) (0.1253) (0.5909) (0.5757) (0.5406) 
Ln Productivity domestic firms -0.6323*** -0.6640*** -0.6446*** -0.3389** -0.3262** -0.3496*** 
  (0.0525) (0.0619) (0.0502) (0.1353) (0.1237) (0.1277) 
Ln Km main roads 
 
0.4900***   
 
0.4284*** 
   
 
(0.1297)   
 
(0.1261) 
 Ln EF&S lagged5 
  
-0.0129*** 
  
-0.0617*** 
  
  
(0.0039) 
  
(0.0059) 
Ln PII lagged5 
  
0.1204*** 
  
0.0127 
  
  
(0.0197) 
  
(0.0416) 
Constant -6.0775 -9.7407*** -6.9976** 16.5032*** 13.0859*** 18.6630*** 
  (3.6894) (3.0429) (2.7423) (3.7923) (3.9888) (4.0510) 
Obs 188 188 188 169 169 169 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
In the case of EF&S the negative correlation could be due to inefficiencies fostered when 
firms receive grants, or other types or support. On the other side, the coefficient sign could 
be caused by competition with domestic firms. As said before, the resources spent by 
municipalities to support firms are mainly addressed to domestic firms, and it actually 
showed a positive effect in table 3.6. Hence EF&S might indirectly affect foreign firms’ 
productivity, since higher productivity in national firms has a negative correlation with 
foreign firms’ productivity, see column (1).  
PII showed null effects over productivity of foreign firms. When using the lags of the 
interest variables, column (3), the sign of PII changed. Hence, within 5 years-time, public 
investments at the local level might have positive effects on productivity growth. While the 
coefficient sign for EF&S remained negative for foreign firms. It could be either because 
any support received by means of tax exemptions –municipalities rarely give cash grants to 
foreign firms, but exemptions in local taxes/fees- negatively affect productivity by 
112 
 
fostering inefficiencies, or because it might enhance the productivity of domestic firms, 
which is in detriment of the former.  
Infant mortality rate showed an opposite sign to what was expected in all models. 
Electricity consumption as well as with domestic firms, it is negatively related to 
productivity increases. Human capital, in fact tells that firms with more employees other 
than operative are more productive. Yet this is not true for manufacturing firms. As said 
before, this is related to the kind of production not to skills and qualification.  
Among other differences for manufacturing firms is the negative sign of market potential. 
It regards to the type of firms, frequently exports-oriented. In addition, similar to domestic 
firms, human capital showed a negative sign. Because manufacturing firms benefit more 
from operative labourers, rather than admin and management.  
The productivity increases of domestic firms seem to affect more importantly the 
productivity of foreign firms than the other way round, which is valid for both estimations; 
total and manufacturing. Competition between domestic-Foreign/joint ventures, seem to be 
happening, since at the city level, increases in domestic firms’ productivity negatively 
affect to foreign firms and vice versa. It is clear that, foreign investment have fostered 
economic growth in Mexico (Jordaan and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2012), and it has generated 
positive externalities between industries, but negative externalities within industries 
(Jordaan, 2008b).  
The negative sign of the alternative productivity variables, this is the foreign firms’ 
productivity and domestic firms’ productivity respectively, in column (1)  of table 3.5 and 
3.6, could be explained by the existence of competition  between foreign and domestic 
firms for public resources, suppliers; skilled labour force, etc., even if firms do not 
compete in the same markets. Furthermore, if they are in similar activities, for instance 
tourism services, and other services; foreign firms do not benefit of more productive 
domestic firms, because it becomes more difficult to penetrate the market, while if foreign 
firms are more productive, domestic enterprises are negatively affected and probably 
displacing some. This on the one side could foster larger efficiency (Javorcik et al., 2008). 
On the other side, it may entail that domestic firms simply leave business migrating to less 
competitive markets which induces a general reduction on their aggregate productivity.  
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6.2 States 
First, given the possibility of endogenous variables, there have been tested the interest 
variables likewise in the case of cities. According to Costa-I-Font et al. (2003) federal 
investment is a significant driver for GDP growth, and it does not respond to equalisation 
or any other criteria, but it is likely to respond to political reasons. It has been also 
identified as a potential driver for regional inequalities (Rodríguez Oreggia y Román, 
2003). For these reasons, it is possible that wealthier states have received more federal 
investment through the years increasing their productivity, thus, this variable is potentially 
endogenous. In view of that, similarly to what is has been done before; difference GMM 
estimations have been performed to test endogeneity of EF&S, PII and federal investment 
variables, using FOD as well. 
In addition, cross-section dependence has been tested with Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) 
tests. Pesaran, Frees and Friedman rejected the null of no-cross section dependence, which 
is the expected result, and it is consistent with what it was found for cities. Estimations 
using the pooled OLS, FE with White standard errors, FE with DK standard errors, 
CCEMG, PCSE and difference GMM have been performed. The comparison of different 
estimations methods are presented in table 3.7.  
First, it is observed that the results from pooled OLS –column (1)- and PCSE –column (2)- 
are very similar, the coefficients are just the same, but the latter is more efficient given the 
smaller standard errors, which increases the significance of some variables. The sign are in 
line with most of the other models, and just the size varies. Nonetheless, given the 
importance of individual FE, it has been decided to use a model which has taken this into 
account. It is important to mention that, differently to the municipal models, it was not 
possible to include all the year dummies due to collinearities and very few degrees of 
freedom. 
The coefficient signs of the FE with White standard errors –column (3)- and FE DK –
column (4), are consistent with what was expected. The standard errors of DK are smaller, 
confirming that modelling cross section dependence helps to improve the model, as shown 
when using the PCSE method, compared to pooled OLS. 
In the difference GMM model with FOD -column (5)- the EF&S, PII and Federal 
investment per employee have been treated as endogenous. It was allowed up to 3 lags for 
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instrumenting, using the collapse option to reduce the number of instruments generated. 
Given the values of the AR (2) and Hansen P-values, it can be said that the model is valid 
(Bond et al., 2001). The results showed coefficients downwards biased compared to the FE 
models, especially for PII, still the signs are consistent with the previous results, indicating 
that endogeneity is not an issue, yet these differences could be due to the cross section 
dependence that was detected according to the tests performed. Also, if tested separately as 
GMM-style variables, the three of them accept the null of exogeneity.  
The last two columns show the CCEMG and CCEAMG estimators, both allow for cross 
section dependence, modelling in the standard errors and allowing for common factor 
variables (Chudik et al., 2011). It can be seen that both models are not consistent with what 
was expected from the size and coefficients signs. One reason could be the size of the 
panel, which is very moderate. Indeed, it is recommended for larger panels, still small 
sample tests were provided. Nonetheless, as the cross section dependence reduces with the 
level of N, in this case it is almost 1 to 2, respect to the T available, this could affect the 
results. Additionally, the common factors and averages across panels reduce degrees of 
freedom, which could also considerably affect the efficiency of the model. This is reflected 
in the size of the standard errors, which are much larger than the previous models. In view 
of this, it has been decided that the DK method is the best for the states models as well as 
for municipalities. In fact, the performance of the model should be improved at T has 
increased.  
From the baseline results, expenditures on PII have fostered higher productivity growth 
more importantly than EF&S, which coefficient is one decimal point less to the right. In 
both cases the effects are positive, differently to the results obtained at the municipal level. 
That could indicate better planning, higher efficiency at the state level, especially on PII. 
The larger coefficient of the PII, compared to EF&S, could be because PII potentially 
increases public infrastructure for everyone, while EF&S is usually much narrowed. 
Federal investment per employee coefficient is almost five times bigger than the PII 
coefficient, and about twenty times EF&S. For 10% increase in federal investment per 
employee there is a 0.58% increase in productivity. Smaller results are obtained if more 
money is invested by state governments; by 10% increase in PII and EF&S, there is 0.14% 
and 0.03% productivity growth, respectively. That could indicate either higher inefficiency 
in federal expenditure, or major limitations from states governments to spur productivity 
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growth given their smaller budgets, or less effective investment projects. Also, given that 
the whole state is taken into account, it may happen that projects and incentives could be 
fostering productivity only in some economic sectors, thus the total effect is small. 
Table 3.7 Baseline results for states. 
Dependent variable: GDP per 
worker* 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
base_OLS base_PCSE base_Fe Base_DK base_GMM base_CCEMG base_CCEAMG 
Infant mortality rate -0.0583*** -0.0583*** -0.0254** -0.0254*** -0.0234** 0.0256 -0.0005 
 
(0.0115) (0.0024) (0.0113) (0.0077) (0.0114) (0.0696) (0.0068) 
Public Infrastructure stock 0.0106** 0.0106*** 0.0015 0.0015* 0.0016 -0.0035 -0.0010 
 
(0.0039) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0038) (0.0016) 
Specialisation 1.5603*** 1.5603*** 0.4650 0.4650*** 0.4987 -0.1384 0.1981 
 
(0.3470) (0.1435) (0.3345) (0.0854) (0.3352) (0.1591) (0.1927) 
Ln Market potential 0.1240** 0.1240*** 0.4361* 0.4361*** 0.4402* 0.2320** 0.5736*** 
 
(0.0556) (0.0085) (0.2152) (0.0591) (0.2186) (0.0778) (0.1079) 
Ln Federal public investment 0.0989* 0.0989*** 0.0586** 0.0586*** 0.0516*** 0.0868 0.0215 
 
(0.0580) (0.0180) (0.0249) (0.0122) (0.0170) (0.0444) (0.0252) 
Ln Manufacturing employment 0.0863 0.0863*** 0.0361 0.0361 0.0291 0.1302 -0.0932* 
 
(0.0842) (0.0178) (0.0369) (0.0460) (0.0369) (0.0855) (0.0457) 
Ln EF&S 0.0070 0.0070** 0.0036* 0.0036** 0.0023* 0.0318 0.0083 
 
(0.0078) (0.0032) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0582) (0.0179) 
Ln PII 0.0237 0.0237** 0.0143** 0.0143*** 0.0025 0.0096 0.0002 
 
(0.0248) (0.0096) (0.0064) (0.0050) (0.0044) (0.0225) (0.0068) 
Ln US market potential 0.0158 0.0158*** -0.1909** -0.1909*** -0.9824* 0.0000 0.0050 
 
(0.0216) (0.0041) (0.0717) (0.0627) (0.5112) (0.0000) (0.1586) 
c_d_p 
   
  
  
1.4364*** 
       
(0.2826) 
Obs 406 406 406 406 377     
N_clust 29 29 
     r2 0.813 0.813 0.504     
Instruments         30     
Autocorrelation  test AR(1) p-value 
  
0.002 
  Autocorrelation  test AR(2) p-value 
  
0.300 
  Hansen J statistic (overidentification test)  0.776   
Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
     *The number of employees has been taken from the employment surveys undertaken by INEGI, that is, ENE and ENOE. 
 
The US-market potential showed negative coefficients, indicating that in average, the 
proximity to the border has not fostered higher productivity compared to other states in the 
country, particularly those in the centre with long history of industry development such as 
Puebla, Queretaro, Guanajuato, Estado de Mexico, and Distrito Federal, even if this last is 
not in the sample. Domestic market potential is the most important variable, with the 
highest elasticity, indicating the importance of economies of scale and scope.  
Likewise, although human capital have been pointed out as a regional growth driver by 
some researchers in Mexico, it was not a separated control variable because there have 
been added variables standing for availability of education in the infrastructure index, 
which showed a positive correlation and large size.   
Similarly to the cities results it is clear that economic specialisation is positively related 
with productivity. The interpretation of the coefficient is not easy since it is the share of the 
most important industry in the state. Generally speaking, variables that are measured as 
semi-elasticity in models with a dependent variable in natural logarithms are interpreted as 
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the increment in the dependent variable by increments per unit in the independent variable. 
In this case, the increases in the variable is always less than one, thus what matters more is 
the sign, and the fact that those states more specialised showed to be more productive as 
well.  As regards with the share of manufacturing industry, states with higher participation 
of industrial employment did not show larger productivity growth. The coefficient is 
positive, but it is not statistically significant.  
After these baseline results, some other variables depicted before are added, and the results 
are shown in table 3.8. In the table, baseline results are shown in the first column to keep a 
comparison point, and show that the models are consistent with the base model, yet the 
coefficients change a little when including the other variables.  
In column (2), the corruption variable is added. The number of observations is reduced to 
185, given the fewer observations available for corruption index, 2001-2010. All variables 
have the same sign to the base model, except for the share of manufacturing employment 
which becomes negative, still insignificant. The size of the interest variables changed, 
EF&S increases one digit to the left, and PII decreased one digit to the right. Federal 
investment coefficient became insignificant. In all cases the period could be the cause for 
the changes. The coefficient for corruption is negative and its size is even larger than 
public infrastructure stock. From these results, it is noticed that aggregate productivity can 
be similarly affected by government corruption than by infrastructure endowments. In turn, 
corruption could become more important than the expenditures exerted on PII. This is, PII 
should be concreted with the infrastructure stock increase, which is indeed a broader 
measure of actions to foster productivity, given all the endowments included in this index. 
It is also necessary to remark that in these results, the coefficients of the interest variables 
EF&S and PII are still positive, although the size changed, which regards with the 
difference in period, 2001-2010. 
It was also tested whether the expenditure variables had additional effects given the 
corruption levels, by adding interaction terms with EF&S and PII. None of them were 
significant, thus, the results are not reported.  
In the column (3) are the results adding the FDI flows. To consider the size of the state, 
they are measured per employee. Given that this variable is potentially endogenous, it was 
used the fifth lag in the model. It can be seen that the model is consistent, since the 
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coefficient and significance of the other variables is similar to the base model. The 
coefficient of FDI is very small and non-significant. It might be due to the possibility of 
gains and losses depending on the economic activity, which have been discussed before. 
Table 3.8 Alternative models for states 
Dependent variable: GDP per 
employee* 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Base Corruption FDI Mun_Exp 
Infant mortality rate -0.0254*** -0.0345*** -0.0260*** -0.0216*** 
  (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0069) 
Public Infrastructure stock 0.0015* 0.0030*** 0.0013 0.0010 
  (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Specialisation 0.4650*** 0.5230*** 0.4009*** 0.4620*** 
  (0.0854) (0.1328) (0.0583) (0.0945) 
Ln Market potential 0.4361*** 0.4492*** 0.4407*** 0.4429*** 
  (0.0591) (0.0328) (0.0597) (0.0624) 
Ln Federal public investment 0.0586*** 0.0040 0.0593*** 0.0522*** 
  (0.0122) (0.0099) (0.0124) (0.0118) 
Ln Manufacturing employment 0.0361 -0.0449 0.0343 0.0347 
  (0.0460) (0.0388) (0.0431) (0.0453) 
Ln EF&S per employee 0.0036** 0.0500*** 0.0033** 0.0030** 
  (0.0016) (0.0095) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
Ln PII per employee 0.0143*** 0.0090** 0.0155*** 0.0142*** 
  (0.0050) (0.0035) (0.0051) (0.0046) 
Ln US market potential -0.1909*** -0.2212*** -0.1940*** -0.2067*** 
  (0.0627) (0.0369) (0.0626) (0.0681) 
Ln Corruption 
 
-0.0035*** 
    
 
(0.0008) 
  Ln FDI per employee lag5 
  
0.0014 
   
  
(0.0009) 
 Ln Municipal expenditures EF&S 
   
-0.0013 
  
   
(0.0058) 
Ln Municipal expenditures PII 
   
0.0236*** 
  
   
(0.0072) 
Obs 406 145 389 406 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
*The number of employees has been taken from the employment surveys undertaken by INEGI, that is, 
ENE and ENOE. 
 
Finally, in column (4) the expenditures on EF&S and PII per employee from all 
municipalities within the state are added, not only the sample. The results showed opposite 
signs, that is, negative sign for EF&S and positive for PII. First, the results cannot be 
expected to be the same, since there are included all municipalities and the dependent 
variable includes all economic sectors, different to the cities’ model. Second, the period is 
different.  
In these results EF&S is biased downwards, compared to the base results. As local 
governments highly depend on states for investments and firms support, both variables 
might be related, this is, municipal and state EF&S, causing that the variable for 
municipalities is not significant. Moreover, if there is promotion and marketing activities, 
states and municipalities frequently act together. The correlation between these two 
variables is 0.27. Nevertheless, even if taking out of the models the state level 
expenditures, municipal expenditures keeps the same sign and EF&S is still not 
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statistically significant, while PII remains with similar coefficients. This suggest that only 
the big cities are capable to foster productivity growth through promotion, incentives, 
firms’ support, entrepreneurship training, and all those activities encompassed in EF&S. 
Meanwhile, investments in infrastructure in all municipalities surely affect positively 
productivity levels.  
In spite of the belief that smaller municipalities, especially rural ones, in Mexico are more 
likely to make inefficient investments and to have higher corruption levels, leading to 
lesser outcomes out of public investment (Straub, 2008, Moreno, 2013). The investments 
on public infrastructure showed significant and positive effects over total production per 
employee. It could regard with higher returns for smaller cities and rural communities. 
Namely, investments in public infrastructure cause a larger effect on firms productivity if 
there is less availability, which fails to happen in bigger cities, where larger infrastructure 
is generally available, and larger investments are required (Dall'erba and Le Gallo, 2008). 
This could be also related to the results by Moreno (2013), showing that rural governments 
have improved their management behaviour as a result of the decentralisation in Mexico. 
7. Conclusions  
This paper has contributed to assess the actual effects of local and regional resources spent 
on economic policies over productivity per employee, as well as the influence of some 
regional and firms’ endowments. For cities and MA, it was found that in total and for 
domestic firms EF&S has positive effects over productivity growth. Meanwhile it showed 
a negative sign, and sometimes it was non-significant for foreign firms. It should be 
remarked that these expenditures are usually aimed at domestic firms, thus it is sensible to 
find positive effects over national firms. In consequence, it can be said that the consultancy 
given, incentives, subsidies, promotion and other actions to help firms directly proved to be 
effective to boost productivity, although foreign firms were not that benefited. Such results 
could be in line with the report of the World Bank on its Doing Business in 2014, stating 
that municipal governments have improved their services for firms. 
Investments in public infrastructure are more certainly related to productivity, yet the 
correlation is negative in all cases. It suggests corruption or inefficient investment projects. 
Still, when using the 5
th
 lag, it is shown that within the period of 5 years, the investment 
have had positive effects over productivity growth, for both, domestic and foreign firms, 
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except for the manufacturing sector. Given the type of investment, it is natural to expect 
that the exerted resources have a direct effect over firms’ productivity after some years. It 
gives a good perspective for investments in the mid and longer terms. Furthermore, once 
the infrastructure is improved, especially at state level, productivity is fostered.  
In addition, the results also showed that not only big municipalities, but also small ones 
can promote productivity increases. More importantly, municipal administrations actually 
enhance aggregate productivity by means of PII. Given the sign of this variable in the 
model for municipalities, the result indicates that PII in smaller cities and rural areas can 
effectively boost productivity, contrary to big cities and MA.  
Expenditures exercised by states administrations showed always positive effects, but their 
coefficients were sometimes smaller than in the municipal models. Furthermore, in the 
alternative model with PII of total municipalities and states together, the former showed 
the double elasticity than states PII. More importantly, federal physical investment 
influence on productivity is even larger, about five times the size of PII in the baseline 
results.  
In sum, those results show that local expenditures could also deliver effective 
infrastructure, although its positive effects could be transferred to the mid and long terms 
depending on the area and economic sectors, while although smaller, states expenditures 
always enhance productivity growth. Yet it is the federal government which influences to a 
greater scope. Not only because of the larger amount of resources available, but perhaps 
due to better planning, management and administration.   
One of the most significant results of this paper is the role of corruption, which was 
revealed as an essential determinant of productivity. In this alternative model, the 
government corruption index exhibited a coefficient of similar size than federal 
investment. Its influence cannot be ignored, since its negative effect can cancel some other 
benefits of policies implemented. Namely, if firms usually have to pay for bribes at 
different government levels, and they have frequent issues while dealing with public 
offices, whichever other benefits received are wiped out.  
Competition among domestic and foreign firms is also revealed. The higher productivity of 
foreign/domestic firms, the smaller productivity increases of domestic/foreign firms. The 
average coefficient is smaller for domestic firms and in case of manufacturing firms, the 
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coefficient is even smaller, the size is one digit to the right compared to total firms. It is 
due to the different effects across manufacturing firms, namely, probable positive vertical 
backward spillovers, while negative horizontal spillovers, as reported by Jordaan (2008a). 
For foreign firms, the coefficients were also similar, that is, larger for total firms, compared 
to manufacturing.  
In this way, it was confirmed that in the aggregate, highly productive domestic firms 
negatively affect foreign firms, and vice versa. Yet the potential losses are larger for 
foreign firms. This could be due to the existence of competition rather than cooperation. 
Competition in trade and other services is more natural. Yet, for manufacturing there 
would have been expected higher benefits when domestic firms in the city are more 
productive. In other words, national firms are more likely to benefit from highly productive 
foreign firms, than foreign firms from domestic. Surely the effects differ in diverse 
economic activities, yet the general results showed larger significance of this 
“competition” for foreign firms. This might not regard with fierce competition in the final 
markets, for instance, but competition for economic resources.  
This paper also contributed to fill the lack of information regarding to local and state 
governments means to foster private firms’ productivity. In spite of the disaggregation 
levels, and data problems the models showed consistency.   
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Chapter 4 
Bottom-up or top-down policies to boost investment in 
Mexico? The cases of Mexicali and Hermosillo 
Abstract 
Decentralisation in favour of sub national economies has been undertaken in OECD 
countries, and it has been recommended to Latin America in order to diminish territorial 
inequalities. Reactions towards these processes vary a lot and rely in local developments. 
The present work depicts the institutional changes and policies implemented in two 
northern cities, Mexicali and Hermosillo, which allowed them to achieve higher income 
growth than national average and development of high-technology industries. Sixteen 
interviews were undertaken, 9 in Hermosillo and 7 in Mexicali, in order to find out the 
level of engagement from the government and the types of policies followed. In Mexicali 
the proactivity of local actors to generate long-term policies -differently to most Mexican 
municipalities-, as well as the joint efforts from the three government levels, entrepreneurs, 
and the universities, have transformed the city from a trade-based city to a highly 
competitive industrial city. Differently, Hermosillo leadership came from the state 
government using federal resources to concede economic incentives. The efforts have been 
focused to one firm namely, Ford Motor Company. This allowed to city to become one of 
the most successful in the country by 2010. Long-term planning, as well as the 
coordination and proactivity from private and public sectors seemed to be the key for both 
case studies. Three main conclusions are drawn from here. First, even when local grounded 
policies have been advised to municipalities, state and federal governments may act as 
more effective leaders for economic growth. Second, Mexican municipalities must find 
their ways to overcome the political cycle and engage in long-term planning to assure 
certainty for domestic and foreign investors, which will also increase effectiveness in 
expenditures. Third, local governments can play a significant role in easing business and 
fostering investments by diminishing bureaucracy and boosting state and federal 
investments, rather than by providing incentives to firms. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, given the decentralisation process undertaken in Mexico, 
municipalities and states have gain political and economic power to actively compete for 
new investments attraction. Mexicali and Hermosillo are among the most successful cities 
in the country in this period, yet, their path is divergent. Mexicali showed high engagement 
from local actors, while Hermosillo exhibited the prevalence of the previous models in 
which state and federal governments take the leadership to promote investment. In view of 
that context, this paper seeks to depict the strategy follow by Mexicali and Hermosillo to 
exploit their geographic advantageous position to increase their regional income, based on 
FDI attraction.  
Even when most institutions are the same within the country, the organisation of local 
institutions can vary a lot across the country. Finding the political organisation and specific 
policies followed, as well as the intervention of different government institutions, is simply 
impossible by getting documental information. Therefore, in order to find out the strategies 
followed and their implementation, sixteen interviews were applied to local stakeholders; 7 
in Mexicali and 9 in Hermosillo. The sample includes entrepreneurs representatives; local, 
state and federal officers of economic development; as well as academic researchers. The 
interviews were semi-structured, and they lasted about an hour in average. 
It was found that some strategies followed are in line with some of the policies advised by 
the competitiveness and Local Economic Development (LED) literature. In Mexicali the 
main strategy was to overcome the three year planning existing in most Mexican 
municipalities, which deters economic growth because of the lack of continuity of policies 
in the long-term. Differently, in Hermosillo the foremost strategy is based on keeping the 
Ford plant and convincing the company to increase the production scale rather than 
moving away. In both cases, the strategies followed were aimed to gain ground in the 
global production chain.  
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The interviewees asserted that fiscal and political decentralisation have provided 
opportunities for local authorities to design policies that have significantly improved the 
economic performance in their cities. Nonetheless, the participation and support from 
federal and state levels has been crucial, especially for Hermosillo which indeed has been 
more successful than Mexicali at least for the period of 2003-2010 (OECD).  
On the one side, to some extent these findings discredit the call for the rising of local 
governments’ participation because policies outcomes highly rely on federal and state 
resources. On the other side, cases such as Mexicali and other municipalities which have 
opted to follow LED strategies have assured longer term policies and have helped 
increasing their development; providing evidence that the latter approach is also valid and 
perhaps more adequate to be widespread (Rodríguez-Pose and Palavicini-Corona, 2013).  
The remaining sections of this paper are distributed as follows. Section two discusses the 
literature about the usefulness of local government policies to diminish territorial 
disparities and the specific contribution of LED and competitiveness literature about the 
role of local actors. Section three addresses the decentralisation occurred in Mexico and the 
redistribution of political power as well as foreign investments. Section four brings some 
empirical evidence; most of them case studies, about the empowerment of local actors in 
Mexico. Section five starts addressing the case studies chosen and depicts the motivation 
and design of the case study. Section six introduces the geographic, economic and social 
features of Mexicali and Hermosillo. Section seven describes what was found with the 
interviews about local organisation and changes during the last 25 years. Section eight 
discusses the differences between the two cities and also weights up the extent to which the 
policies explained by the interviewees could be the reason for the economic performance 
of the cities. The final section makes some concluding remarks. It is also important to 
mention that to facilitate the reading about the policies implemented in each city, and the 
likely results obtained, there is a box in the annex, see Box 1 in the annex. 
2. The rising of local governments as a mean for economic development 
and territorial disparities reduction 
2.1 Fiscal and political decentralisation  
Political and fiscal decentralisation have been encouraged and advised to national 
authorities with the assumption that the empowerment of subnational governments might 
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improve economic performance of regions; leading to diminish regional income disparities 
within countries (Giugale and Webb, 2000, Treasury, 2004). Some theorists claim that 
decentralisation is by all means good for regional growth and cohesion (Im, 2010). 
Meanwhile, others assert that decentralisation leads to higher competition within 
subnational economies, especially if there remains a high dependence on central/federal 
resources (Chien and Gordon, 2008).  
In empirical studies, fiscal decentralisation seems to be related with decreasing regional 
inequalities in developed countries, but not in developing ones (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra, 2010a, Lessmann, 2009, Im, 2010). It can be derived from the lack of effective 
compensation systems (Sorens, 2012), as well as inefficiencies in lower government levels 
due to corruption and mismanagement (Correa Gomes et al., 2013).  
Fiscal decentralisation by itself does not allow local governments to achieve their goals 
and pursue economic development. Local and regional governments need the right 
channels to exercise and implement their own policies, this is, political decentralisation. 
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010a) assert that political decentralisation effectively helps 
to reduce territorial disparities. Meanwhile, fiscal decentralisation has the opposite effect, 
which in case of developing countries is larger. As a result, the total effect of 
decentralisation processes is neggative. On the contrary, Moreno (2013) showed that in 
Mexico, at least for rural communities, decentralisation has led efficiency increases in the 
local management, since major accountability en entrepreneurship atitude have been 
amplified. 
Particularly, decentralisation and democratisation has been a proposed channel to diminish 
territorial disparities in Latin America (Topal, 2012, Enríquez Villacorta, 2006). 
Altogether, the implementation of LED policies has been highly advised to these countries 
as a result of the failure of top-down policies (Tomaney et al., 2010). Several works have 
provided evidence of successful cases in which bottom-up policies have been implemented 
substituting the top-down approach, especially when following LED strategies; vindicating 
and conceding importance to continue the efforts towards fiscal and political 
decentralisation. Additionally, significant stream of authors have discussed about the 
advantages of implementing LED strategies as a reaction towards globalisation and the 
increasing regional disparities within countries. Devolution is a necessary but not sufficient 
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condition for the existence of LED strategies. The later have certain characteristics which 
will be described in the following section.  
2.2 The Local Economic Development (LED) approach and local competitiveness 
This section is intended to depict the different elements that have been pointed out as 
essential to achieve economic development within the theoretical and case studies 
literature on LED in order to use them as an analysis framework and identify whether the 
policies implemented in my case studies are in line with these approaches, top-down 
policies, or if there is a mixture of those. Also, some similarities with local competitiveness 
literature are emphasised.  
Political decentralisation might have the aim of increasing the participation from local 
actors, achieving long-term success without recurring to external resources such as FDI or 
top-down policies implementation. Consequently, political decentralisation can also lead to 
engage in LED strategies, which could be interpreted as a mean of empowerment by local 
authorities and other key actors. 
LED strategies were generated in North countries about 30 years ago to solve local 
development problems, after they have been strongly recommended to South countries 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007). Not all the development strategies could be 
considered LED, but those that have the territory as the target entity rather than economic 
sectors. Numerous authors have provided definitions of LED, I present here one by the 
World Bank published at the top of the division’s webpage: “The purpose of local 
economic development (LED) is to build up the economic capacity of a local area to 
improve its economic future and the quality of life for all. It is a process by which public, 
business and nongovernmental sector partners work collectively to create better conditions 
for economic growth and employment generation” 12 . The difference with local 
competitiveness definition is mainly that LED entails the collective work of locals, while 
local competitiveness on its various definitions highlight that competitiveness refers 
basically to increments on the quality of life/wellbeing (Camagni, 2002, Storper, 1997, 
Porter, 1999) and/or productivity of firms (Porter, 1990, Krugman, 1994, Storper, 1997), 
without focusing on the source of the actions that lead towards those means.   
                                                     
12
 Available at http://www.worldbank.org/urban/local/toolkit/pages/defining-led.htm 
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LED approach attempts to find ways for increasing economic development in the 
territories without focusing in attracting new investment or human capital, nor developing 
enterprises that could compete in external markets (OECD, 2008). Yet it does not mean 
that external relationships cannot be exploited. On its side, competitiveness literature 
emphasises more particularly investment attraction and the capacity of regions to compete 
in external markets. Lorens et al. (2002) claim that LED is not opposite to competitiveness, 
but it is the localised part of the competitiveness strategies implemented at the regional and 
country level, focusing more intensively to internal resources rather than the external ones. 
Moreover, this is not a protectionist reaction to globalisation, but it is the way to take 
advantage of the opportunities presented. It is indeed a mean to take the most out of 
regional, national or supranational policies (Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose, 2011).  
LED and local competitiveness policies seek goals beyond economic growth, which is 
emphasised in the main stream of economic literature. LED and competitiveness literature 
points out aims such as economic development or increments on wellbeing (Kresl and 
Gappert, 1995, Camagni, 2002, Boshma, 2004). Additionally local specific characteristics 
namely, social, cultural, historical and institutional aspects are considered as important, 
even essential, parts of the process, which are disregarded in the neoclassical model 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Particularly LED literature stresses the engagement of local 
actors, public and private, which leads to local leaded processes belonging to a region and 
not to a group of individuals, firms or policy-makers (OECD, 1995). More importantly the 
interaction occurred in each place is considered a key factor to generate and maintain local 
development strategies and competitiveness improvement of places (Lorens et al., 2002, 
CAF, 2010). This is the particular ways of interactions will produce different outcomes 
across regions. The outcomes are better if there is good relation between local and external 
partners as new networking and opportunities could be exploited, leading to the 
development of local firms (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998). Moreover, the involvement of 
local private actors in local policies will provide an arena to bring about more people and 
firms benefited, rather than just few entrepreneurs, which happens often in counties such as 
Mexico (Topal, 2012).  
The literature about LED strategies has increasingly acquired major importance as the 
bottom-up approach for economic policies has become more popular as an alternative to 
the top-down approach, given its failure to provide achieve economic development more 
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evenly between regions within countries as top-down policies are not comprehensive 
strategies (Tomaney et al., 2010).  
Several case studies have been documented in which successful cities and localities have 
achieved higher economic development, while attaining considerable engagement from 
local actors, increasing in this way the possibilities to maintain the processes in the 
medium and long terms (Lorens et al., 2002, OECD, 2008, Palavicini Corona, 2012, 
Alliance, 2007). The case studies help to understand common features among regions, 
cities or localities doing well. After those authors the most significant features of 
successful processes could be summarised as follows: 
- Strategic vision, based on the local productive vocations and the definitions of clear 
targets. 
- Actions aimed to increase employment levels as well as to help the enterprises 
improving their competitiveness. 
- Participation from public and private actors. 
- Articulation within the local productive system. 
- The institutionalisation of the process; in order to give certainty to the policy 
guidelines and ensure their continuity in the medium and long terms.   
- Given that the policies approach is bottom-up, the major autonomy at local level; 
the major probability of the process to success.  
Numerous academics have labelled in different ways the listed features to summarise the 
essential requirements to achieve economic competitiveness increasing. To a great extent, 
these features are included within the soft –intangible- determinants of competitiveness 
pointed out by different authors when advising ways to increase regional competitiveness 
(Malecki, 2004, Begg, 2002, Poot, 2000, Kresl and Balwant, 1999). In other words, these 
intangible determinants help to build up long-term competitiveness. Various OECD 
handbooks converge to highlight similar aspects and detail the practical issues of policies 
implementation. 
From the authors, a foremost feature is the institutionalisation of the process, which does 
not only regard with the institutes, laws and offices created, this is the formal institutions; 
yet with informal institutions, or institutional arrangements. Namely, the channels of 
participation and interaction of local stakeholders beyond politicians and entrepreneurs 
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representatives; namely, ONG’s, trade unions, universities, etc. (Potter, 2009). Politicians 
last only few years in office, while citizens and entrepreneurs are there for life time, 
consequently, their engagement guarantees a long-term success.  
Nowadays it is widely spread the idea that institutions are critical for policies results and 
they might explain economic growth and development differences across countries. Yet, 
there is less agreement in the types of efficient institutions that could lead to the best 
results (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013).  
 According to Rodriguez-Pose (2013) the quality of institutions can be undermined by poor 
institutional arrangements and the lack of flexibility for the local actors to interact and 
react to the circumstances presented. From the empirical literature, Lorens et al. (2002) 
findings are in line with this assertion. They state that municipal governments need to be 
strengthened and be able to build up mixed institutions in order to face new responsibilities 
and give a wider scope for their actions. In a similar way, Rodríguez-Pose (2013) 
highlights that when decentralisation occurs, it is extremely important the support from 
well-founded institutions. This feature has been crucial to provide the arena of actions in 
both case studies. 
Other important aspect is the accountability of the locals, namely, higher participation of 
locals in policymaking helps also to ease accountability. As confirmed by Moreno (2013) 
the formulation of local policies after decentralisation processes leading to higher 
engagement of locals has increased accountability and management efficiency in Mexico.  
3. Decentralisation in Mexico  
Centralisation of wealth in few cities of the national urban system is a frequent pattern, 
especially for developing countries (Storper, 2013). The decentralisation process in Mexico 
started during the 70’s -accelerated in the following decades- had the aim to develop other 
economic centres in the urban system and deter centralisation to Mexico City, Guadalajara 
and Monterrey (Casalet, 2000). This process involved actions to develop the transport 
system, transfer production to medium cities, and increase of administrative independence.  
Federal government has gradually increased decentralised funds to states. From 1993 to 
2011, the total increment of unconditional transfers to states was 73%, while conditional 
transfers increased in about 15 times. The latter is due to the decentralisation of education 
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and health expenditures. These are tagged resources that are mainly distributed based on 
previous budgets. Yet, incentives are provided through unconditional transfers, because the 
distribution criteria have been changing over the time. Especially after 2007 they seek to 
encourage state governments to foster economic growth, increase tax collection, deliver 
better education, and achieve poverty and deprivation levels reductions (Peña-Ahumada, 
2011).  Before 2003 there was a general complaint, and some researchers claimed that 
federal transfers  fostered higher regional inequalities favouring wealthy areas (Peña-
Ahumada, 2011, Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose, 2004, Courchene and Díaz-
Cayeros, 2000). However, there is no evidence of the results obtained with the changes 
introduced in 2007.   
During these decades, also democratisation and deep political changes have happened, 
which led to significant differences in the political geography of the country. The dominant 
party, PRI started losing power after 1989, and by 1995 it had lost 7% of the  states and 
45% of municipalities  (Costa-I-Font et al., 2003).  The economic crisis of 1994 induced a 
change in people’s vote, and by the following presidential elections in 2000, for the first 
time in Mexican democracy, an alternative party won the elections. These political changes 
also triggered fiscal and political decentralisation in order to prevent boycotts throughout 
the vertical power relationships when the governors come from different parties, as well as 
inhibiting Pork-barrel politics to gain votes. In this manner, it became imperative to 
institutionalise the resources transferred, make clearer the distribution criteria, and leave 
more autonomy and management capacity to local and regional governments. For instance, 
Pork-barrel politics have been identified during the period 1990-1995 by Costa-I-Font et 
al. (2003). Although it could not be asserted that such problems have been totally over; the 
changes in criteria distribution of federal transfers and the increment of the decentralised 
funds have helped to reduce such behaviours.     
In addition, diverse funds have been created to enhance co-partnerships projects, in which 
local recipients –citizens or entrepreneurs-, municipal, state and federal government get 
involved. For instance, through PRONASOL, as well as other regional programs and 
institutions, with the aim of decreasing poverty, the participation of local citizens in 
policies design has increased. Micro-regions program is aimed to reduce deprivation in the 
most deprived municipalities in the country. In such program the proposals of actions 
should be formulated on behalf of the inhabitants of the regions (Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 
2005). Pueblos Magicos (magical towns) on its side is intended to enhance tourism as an 
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alternative economic activity in small municipalities which could be considered quite 
traditional due to their landscape, food, architecture, historical facts, etc. This programme 
also requires considerable participation from local citizens.  
Likewise, the federal government has established as a priority the support to SME’s (Small 
and Medium Enterprises), and the construction of infrastructure along the bordering cities 
to increase FDI. Linkages between the private sector, and universities and research centres 
have been also fostered (Casalet, 2000).  Financial resources have been granted to regional 
projects in science and technology in partnership with the private sector throughout the 
National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT).   
In sum, throughout this over 3 decades-period, engagement from local stakeholders as well 
as empowering of local and regional governments have become more certain. As a 
consequence, local and state governments gained more opportunities and shared 
responsibilities, to pursue regional development, while federal investment has continued as 
a significant growth driver for regional income (Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose, 
2004).  
Within this context of economic and political changes, municipalities and states have 
embarked on different routes to pursue economic growth and boost development; 
according to their problems, size, economic structure, rural/urban condition or simply the 
local social composition.  
3.1 Redistribution of foreign investment and raise of competition 
The high centralisation of economic activity and population in few cities, namely, Mexico 
City-and the centre region, Monterrey and Guadalajara reinforced the concentration of FDI 
to these cities. The economic liberalisation entailed the transformation of the country, 
which maximum expression was the North Armenta Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
signing in 1994, which placed Mexico among the most important receptors of foreign 
investments among developing countries.  
Although Mexico City and the centre region are still the main receptors of FDI, this is 
about 65% of total FDI from 1994- to 2013, there has been a significant increment of 
investment towards bordering cities. After the NAFTA signing, foreign firms accelerated 
the investment to the Mexican bordering cities to supply the US market. Traditionally, 
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firms that are seeking to supply internal markets and take advantage of the economies of 
scale, tend to locate in the centre, given the size of market potential; while efficiency-
seeking firms locate in the north (Samford and Gómez, 2012).  
Even some decades before the NAFTA, due to the Maquiladora program initiated in 1965, 
the maquiladoras have played a significant role to provide employment in the bordering 
region (Fuentes, 2009). Altogether, other manufacturing activities have been increasing in 
the region. Cities such as Saltillo in Coahuila; Hermosillo in Sonora; and Chihuahua in 
Chihuahua were benefited with the location of automotive firms in the 80´s. This fact 
transformed their economies, bringing considerably larger income than other bordering 
cities, except for Monterrey in Nuevo Leon.  
Nogales in Sonora and Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua have also received important amounts 
of FDI, at the begging with low technology profile firms, such the textiles, and now 
changed to electronics, computers, machinery and equipment, chemicals, aerospace, and 
others (Fuentes, 2009). Likewise, in Baja Californian cities, although maquiladoras are still 
very important, other manufacturing activities have increased in recent years, especially 
the automotive and aerospace industry.   
To illustrate the geographic changes in FDI allocation in the Table 4.11 the total FDI 
flows, the ranking and share for the top 10 receptors, during the period 1993-2013 are 
shown. It is clear that Nuevo Leon has captured much more foreign investment than any 
other bordering state. In fact, it holds the second position in the country just after Mexico 
City, given that Monterrey has been one of the traditional industrial poles in the country.  
Table 4.11 Total FDI flows to the top 10 states in the period 1993-2013. 
State 
Total flows*  
(USD millions) Ranking Share of national total 
National              398,862.71    100% 
Distrito Federal              222,327.20  1 55.7% 
Nuevo León                38,246.64  2 9.6% 
Estado de México                21,228.12  3 5.3% 
Chihuahua                19,965.71  4 5.0% 
Baja California                16,440.65  5 4.1% 
Jalisco                12,414.32  6 3.1% 
Tamaulipas                  7,805.14  7 2.0% 
Puebla                  7,331.73  8 1.8% 
Coahuila de Zaragoza                  5,518.92  9 1.4% 
Sonora                  5,200.45  10 1.3% 
*Source Secretariat of Economy. Department of FDI. This includes flows, reinvestment and debt between firms.  
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As regards with Baja California and Sonora, the former is within the top five in the 
country; and even though Sonora received a third of the total investment received by Baja 
California, it is still among the main FDI receptors in the country. It is also important to 
remark that given the centralised urban systems, big proportions of this investment goes to 
the biggest cities, those are, Tijuana and Mexicali in Baja California and Hermosillo and 
Nogales in Sonora.  
Nevertheless, even with larger amounts of FDI to bordering states, it is clear that the 
concentration to states in the centre, such as Distrito Federal, Estado de Mexico, and 
Puebla remains. While Jalisco located in the occident region, is also high in importance.  
Undoubtedly, attracting foreign investment is one of the most important targets for local 
and regional governments in Mexico due to the possibility of technology transfers, 
employment creation, income increase and the multiplier effect over the local economy. 
Especially because many cities have increased their income as FDI launches. Bordering 
states seek to attract FDI not only because of the significant business opportunities, but in 
some sense is a mandatory; they must strive to take out the most of their advantageous 
geographic localisation, the no one else in the world has. More importantly, effects on 
income levels are clear. Jensen and Rosas (2007) showed that FDI helped to diminish the 
existing gaps in regional income across Mexicans regions during 1990-2000.  
For these reasons, there has been political competition to be favoured by federal 
government, and to be promoted as a receptor of FDI projects. Even when in recent years 
state governments could exert major influence on investment attraction since they also 
have resources to offer incentives, attend firms’ needs and improve competitive 
advantages. The support from federal government could be also vastly influential because 
the most important incentives are given by the federal administration, which mainly 
favours automotive and aerospace industries, since they have been declared as national 
priority. As a result, should states and municipalities want to attract and retain foreign 
investors, they should strive to increase local competitiveness in the long-term, given that 
short-term attractiveness achieved by incentives, is not a secure nor a sustainable way 
towards economic growth, and it is not even under their full control. 
Still incentives-competition on behalf of local and state governments is becoming more 
common.  Targeted promotion, diverse incentives, exemptions of local taxes, free land, and 
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labour force training, as well as the construction of specific infrastructure are among the 
most frequent offers made by state government to compete. Indeed, the interviewees 
asserted that competition is quite intense, even if bidding wars by offering millions of 
dollars on behalf of state or municipal governments is not feasible.  
For instance, BMW announced the intentions to open a new plant in Latin America, yet the 
place remained undefined for a while. First, this led to the competition between Brazil and 
Mexico. Different statements regarding to the final decision were published in the press
13
. 
In addition, it raised competition between Mexican states, which offered incentives 
packages that are not public. Among the competitors were Guanajuato, Querétaro, San 
Luis Potosí and Hidalgo (Franco, 2014). Then, the competitors were narrowed to San Luis 
Potosi and Hidalgo (Cremer, 2014). The final decision was revealed on July this year, the 
winner is San Luis Potosi, located in the centre region (Alper, 2014).  The governor said 
that they were in talks for over 5 years. It entails that during that time there was a 
significant bargaining process between Brazilian and Mexican local, regional and federal 
offices for investment promotion. It surely comprised expenses in order to fulfil the firm 
requirements, and place the best bid; not only by the winner, but by all the other 
competitors. This might have been costly for public administrations; meanwhile the firm 
took the most out of it.  
In this way, the creation of municipal and state especial departments or agencies to 
promote investment, the increasing expenditures on such policies and public infrastructure 
on behalf of local and regional governments, is to some extent justified given that some 
others will be also competing for capitals. The expenses with this aim have increased up to 
1.5 times from 1993 till 2011, in case of the municipalities, and up to 5 times in case of 
states. 
In order to increase policy efficiency and get out better outcomes, given the major 
competitive environment, the planning for each government term and the implementation 
of some performance indicators have been also widely spread, as it has been documented 
by various researchers (González Rivas, 2014, Moreno, 2013, Rodríguez-Pose and 
Palavicini-Corona, 2013).  
                                                     
13 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/18/us-bmw-mexico-
idUSBREA4H03O20140518. http://www.maquilaportal.com/index.php/blog/show/BMW-
denies-new-plant-will-be-built-in-Mexico.html   
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Likewise, the accountability of the implementation of policies based on thoughtful analysis 
of the region needs, as well as the assessment of their goals, have been also launched by 
INEGI by means of the project called Government Census.  In this way, it can be said that 
decentralisation and economic liberalisation has definitively increase empowerment of 
local and regional government. As a result, the competition at the city level has also 
increased. 
4. Empirical evidence of empowerment of local and regional actors in 
Mexico 
As mentioned before, Mexican cities and states have different potential for taking 
advantage of decentralisation and effectively undertake bottom-up policies responding to 
local needs. Bigger cities, especially the state capitals, are usually in the best position, 
while rural areas might be in rears.  
There have been several cases in which can be exemplified the transition from the 
prevalence of top-down policies to bottom-up approaches. The key actors in the process 
are diverse, for instance, leadership can be from local/state public officers, leadership on 
behalf of entrepreneurs; and wider participation of local stakeholders. Though, to be more 
precise, the leadership usually entailed a mixture of the above. Still, there are other 
municipalities in which in spite of the participation from local actors, there could be vast 
influence of upper government levels, especially with pecuniary resources. It involves not 
only the availability of funds, but also the rapid answer to be provided, that could also 
determine the outcomes of the plans to a great extent.  
Topal (2013) documents the three cases of empowerment of local/regional actors to face 
political, social and economic changes occurred with the decentralisation, economic 
liberalisation and democratisation in Mexico. The places are the state of Tabasco, and the 
cities of Chihuahua in Chihuahua, and Acapulco in Guerrero. The raising of local 
leadership took different patterns, and the leaders came from different sectors; state-
institutions, entrepreneurs and organisations of local peasants, respectively.  
In Tabasco, given the oil boom, the leaders of the state-own firm PEMEX strived to retain 
major amount of resources within the state administration. This cannot be taken as a 
bottom-up policy, yet in this case regional authorities endeavoured to retain benefits of oil 
in the state facing the federal government. 
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In case of Chihuahua, the leadership comes from the entrepreneurs. Given the short terms 
in office at the municipal level -3 years-, it is frequent the lack of continuity in public 
policies. With the aim of overcoming this problem in 1991 Chihuahua City created an 
office for local economic development that could implement policies in the long-term, this 
office is called DESEC. Given the decentralisation ongoing, local businessmen found the 
right channel to promote the city and gain ground in the global market towards the 
Twenty-first century, which is indeed the name of the whole project (Topal, 2012) .  
The process occurred in Chihuahua might have been a precedent for Mexicali to carry on 
similar policies and create an akin office in 1993. Other significant similarity with 
Mexicali is the political context. Both states have had important presence of PAN party, in 
which entrepreneurs’ presence and leadership is very important. Therefore, business-men 
have become municipal presidents, and have got involved with public positions. Indeed, 
according to Samford and Gomez (2012) being governed by PAN makes a difference in 
terms of FDI attraction, that is, states with PAN governors tend to undertake policies for 
attracting firms seeking to exploit competitive advantages. On the other hand, it could be a 
result of pork barrel politics during the PAN governing period in the national presidency 
2000-2012. 
In Acapulco, organisations of local entrepreneurs’ have fought against foreign investors. 
Acapulco is one of the most important touristic destinations in Mexico, ant it attracted 
foreign investors as a result. Almost 80% of foreign investment in Guerrero state from 
1999 to 2013 is concentrated in economic activities related to tourism. This has led to a 
conflict owing to the competition, and the displacement of local entrepreneurs by foreign 
firms. Hence, the local peasants have fought against multinationals. They were supported 
by the leftist party PRD to strengthen their power and open political and social spaces for 
local entrepreneurs. It raised violence, but the peasants kept spaces for their business. This 
could be a cause for the significant decreasing of foreign investment to the state, together 
with high crime and violence levels in recent years.  
Other cases in which bottom-up policies were implemented are Nueva Vizcaya in 
Chihuahua and the surrounding region of Guadalajara in Jalisco state. The highlight is that 
the engagement from local stakeholders made the difference. The initiatives began with 
local the ideas of local actors and largely relied on their actions. Of course, coordinated 
and supported by public officers from municipal, state and federal governments. 
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Nueva Vizcaya is a region in state of Chihuahua, the region encompasses 21 
Municipalities. Their main economic activity was the mining, but when mines were closed 
the whole region fall into a significant depression. According to Lorens et al. (2002), the 
participation from the university in order to build bottom-up policies was the key in their 
success.  
In Jalisco, the production is highly centralised in the Metropolitan Area (MA) of 
Guadalajara, causing significant territorial disparities within the state that are difficult to 
overcome. Given the economies of scale, market size, urban amenities and some other 
benefits, Guadalajara is a traditional destination of domestic and foreign investment, which 
is accumulative, recursive, and practically irreversible. In consequence, the local 
stakeholders in the state, especially local entrepreneurs, participated to make a plan for 
diminishing the regional disparities, by taking advantage of the closeness of Guadalajara 
instead of competing with it (Lorens et al., 2002). They developed services to firms and 
agro industrial activities; as a result of such combination they also were able to attract FDI. 
The participation from stakeholders, the political decentralisation from the state 
government, and the consulting with citizens are among the most remarkable features of 
the process (Ruiz D., 2000).  
Palavicini-Corona (2012) compares two cities, Apizacao and Chiautempan in Tlaxcala 
state, where tradition of communal organisation is present. Due to the indigenous 
traditions, citizens are organised and actively participate in public decisions. Indeed, it is 
the only state in the country in which two systems work in parallel; that is, political parties 
and traditional communitarian channels. Apizacao appears as one of the municipalities 
with more LED policies applied during the period of study 1990-2005 among a sample of 
800 municipalities. Although Apizacao and Chiautempan showed significant increase in 
human development, it was larger in Apizacao. According to the author, it is related with 
to the major presence of LED policies.  It is worth noting that there has been significant 
coordination of local actors with the state and federal government to attract new 
investment, especially FDI. In this way their strategies are supported by the external links, 
based on high internal social capital. Owing to their strategic position, near to the biggest 
market in the country, Mexico City, they already had a significant advantage, magnified by 
the local participation.  
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Different to most works on evaluation of bottom-up policies that largely rely on case 
studies, Rodriguez-pose and Palavicini-Corona (2013) present an index to account for the 
number of LED strategies applied in more than 800 municipalities. The index is then used 
as an independent variable in an empirical model which tests its effects on human 
development. Among the LED strategies are considered the following range: whether the 
municipal plan is based on a diagnosis of the local economy and public policy adhere 
environmental considerations; the existence of policies to foster entrepreneurship and 
mechanisms in which private, public, and social sectors engage in public matters; whether 
there is cooperation/coordination with external parties of diverse nature, that is, public or 
private actors. It was found that municipalities engaging more importantly with LED such 
those listed, have improved their human development faster during 1990-2005.  
5. Motivation and design of the case study 
As explained through section three and four, local and regional administrations in Mexico 
have considerably increased their empowerment by means of fiscal and political 
decentralisation. The effects of the increasing expenditures with the aim of co-participate 
to enhance investment and productivity growth can be assessed with empirical 
econometrics, which is part of the interest of this author in recent works. Nevertheless, it 
does not allow assessing the influence of local environments, neither the particular types of 
policies implemented.  
 
Besides, as pointed by Castells (1999), Florida (2003) and other researchers, cities are 
entities in which public and private individuals can be understood as a flow, their 
economic and social performance thus yields from local interactions that should not be 
neglected but explored.  
 
Hermosillo has been a dynamic industrial city due to the presence of Ford Company since 
1986. However, during the 1993-2003 its average production growth was negative, 
according to the Economic Censuses. It later achieved high growth rates from 2003 to 
2008. Its industrial production increased in more than 100% within those 5 years, and it is 
now one of the most successful cities in the country. This path is interesting; its 
performance is different from other cities in the region and the state.  
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Mexicali on the contrary, used to be a trade-based economy 20 years ago. In addition, 
Tijuana is an important competitor for the city. It is the most important city in population 
and production within the state. It has a longer tradition of entrepreneurship and cooperates 
with one of the biggest economies in the world, that is, Sand Diego, California. Hence 
Tijuana constitutes an important competitor in economic and political terms, especially the 
political support from state government is essential.  
 
In spite of such close competitor and some other disadvantages, such as the weather and 
scarcity of skilled labour force, high-technology industry has landed in Mexicali. The city 
is now considered one of the most competitive in the country according to the last report of 
the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (IMCO) in 2012 and previous indexes such as 
Sobrino (2006).  
 
Mexicali and Hermosillo are similar in population and economic structure. Both cities are 
important recipients of FDI, and produce a considerable share of total Mexican exports. 
Among the most important exporting industries are the electronics in Mexicali, and the 
automotive in Hermosillo. Also, in Mexicali the aerospace had been considerably growing 
in recent years as it will be analysed later. In sum, it can be said that both are among the 
most successful in the country.  
 
Consequently, this study is motivated to find out whether their economic performance 
relied in local actions and to what extent the fiscal and political decentralisation have 
changed their position to pursue economic development. Given their advantageous 
geographic position, both cities are likely to attract foreign investment, yet, more specific 
incentives and working ways cannot be found in documental research.  
Fieldwork at those cities has been undertaken to get first-hand information on the 
institutional changes occurred. Sixteen semi-structured interviews were carried out, 7 in 
Mexicali and 9 in Hermosillo. The goal was to obtain information on the type of policies to 
enhance economic growth undertaken at the local level, getting the point of views of 
different groups; those are public officers, private representatives, and academics. The 
interviews lasted from one to three hours, depending on the representative time. The 
interviews were semi-structured and the central questions can be consulted in the annex 
Box 2. Additionally, lot of information came across given the freedom of interviewees to 
answer. Also, some of them provided documents and websites where complementary 
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information was found. Furthermore economic and social indicators have been used, which 
come from national data bases of INEGI. 
Coordination and cooperation with upper government offices can be essential when 
launching local policies and investment attraction. According to the documental research, 
there should be different channels to access funds and to ease governments’ management. 
Nonetheless, in a highly political environment and with the likely presence of pork barrel 
politics, it is also important to find to what extent political decentralisation allows local 
governments to effectively push their own policies and support local firms. Furthermore, 
bargaining from economic sectors or power encounters among key actors could also lead 
to delay in policies and could even increase their implementation costs. Therefore, the 
interviews served as an instrument to get to know the way key actors interrelate within the 
city as well as with upper administration spheres.  
Among the interviewees are the representatives of the local and foreign manufacturing 
firms; the authorities of local and state economics departments; the regional representative 
of ProMexico in Hermosillo, which is the federal department for foreign investment 
promotion; and one academic researcher in each city. In case of public officers, the aim of 
the questionnaire was getting to know the policies being implemented to foster economic 
growth in the city. As for private representatives, the questions had the goal of knowing the 
kind of support received from the government, the bargaining process, as well as the main 
problems in the sector. Given that both cities are highly specialised to the industrial sector 
and most of incentives programs target for foreign firms, only the representatives from 
both, the foreign and the national industries, were interviewed. 
From the academics, it was intended to have the opinion from experimented researchers in 
the region about the policies implemented and the possible reasons for success or defeat of 
such policies. Unfortunately, only two researchers accepted to attend the interview, one in 
each city. Still, both researchers have been working and living in the city for more than 15 
years. In consequence, their contribution was very valuable to have a long-term view less 
biased, since they are not directly involved in politics. It is important to remark that given 
the different institutional organisation, the officers and representatives contacted do not 
correspond to the exact counterpart in the other city. The full listing of people and the 
organisation they represent is in the annex.  
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The interviews undertaken are limited yet very rich. They allowed getting information on 
public policies, bargaining processes, and the ongoing social framework. In addition, the 
information provided has been verified and completed with documents provided by public 
officers, newspapers, official publication and official databases. All together helped 
drawing relations with the outcomes achieved in these cities 
6. Features of Mexicali and Hermosillo. 
6.1 Geographic location and population 
Mexicali and Hermosillo are situated in the US-bordering region of Mexico. Mexicali is 
one of the most important US-bordering cities. Hermosillo is about three hour drive from 
the nearest bordering city, that is, Nogales in Sonora. Nonetheless, its geographic position 
can be considered advantageous for firms willing to sell their products in the US. Both 
cities have a near harbour, which is also important in terms of transport means, especially 
for the Automotive and Aerospace industries, existing in both cities. The nearest harbour 
from Hermosillo is Guaymas, about one hour-and a half drive; the nearest from Mexicali is 
Ensenada, situated about three hour drive. 
 
Mexicali City, is considered a metropolitan area, and in the 2010 census it had 936, 826 
inhabitants, while Hermosillo had 715, 061 inhabitants. Both cities are the political capital 
in their State, Mexicali in Baja California and Hermosillo in Sonora.  It is important to 
highlight that the capital generally concentrates major production and population, yet in 
Baja California, Tijuana has remained as the most important economic and population 
centre. 
6.2 Economic growth 
In this section, growth ratios and the production levels are discussed. Given the context of 
economic transformations, many cities in the bordering region are in similar position to 
seek investments and improve their position in the national game. Therefore, some 
indicators are compared to other cities located in the US-bordering states, as well as to 
other cities in the OECD countries in order to provide a reference point. It is important to 
mention that the statistics at municipal level are difficult to find. Some information is not 
available for long-term periods, or it is not updated often. Therefore, although the 
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interviews were undertaken during December 2012 and January 2013, the information 
presented here varies in dates.  
Data on economic product is only available every five years, which is when the Economic 
Censuses were carried on, that is in 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008. For production indicator it 
is used the Total Gross Production
14
 –TGP- in the municipality. It is necessary to clarify 
that most Mexican municipalities have at least a small proportion of agriculture, and other 
commodities production due to the geographic inclusion of rural areas. Intending to 
account only for the cities´ production primary economic activities, mining and electricity 
have been excluded when adding the total. 
The raking of the database on 264 metropolitan areas from the OECD is also discussed 
(OECD). The data does not match exactly with the data used from Economic Census 
because the OECD has implemented its own methodology and definition of metropolitan 
areas, and it estimates GDP. Yet, given that the same methodology is used for all countries, 
it is comparable and it has the advantage of yearly availability from 2003 to 2010 for 
Mexican cities.  
 
To begin with, economic growth rates for total and per capita product are shown in table 
4.2. The rates are estimated using two different sources, the OECD and the INEGI. As 
mentioned before, the periods are not the same, and they are not comparable given the 
methodology employed. In case of the Economic Censuses from INEGI, the annual 
average growth rates are estimated per period. Meanwhile, for the OECD data, the rate is 
estimated for the whole period, that is 2003-2010. 
According to the Economic Censuses, both cities achieved similar annual rates in total 
TGP for the whole period –column 4-. Nevertheless, Hermosillo showed dramatic 
decreasing rates during 10 years from 1993 to 2003 –column 2 and 3-. And after that, the 
recovering of the economy has been impressive. Mexicali also showed negative growth 
during 1998-2003, although it was less severe than Hermosillo. It recovered the following 
period, yet with much lower rates than Hermosillo.  
 
                                                     
14
 In Spanish: Producción Bruta Total, this is not comparable with GDP from the National Accounts, owing to 
the methodology. Source: Economic Census, various years.  
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In the OECD data, the annual average growth rate of total GDP is much smaller for 
Mexicali –column 5-. Indeed, after 2008 Mexicali showed negative growth of the total 
GDP, with a year average of -2.8% in 2008-2010 years. Still, its period average was higher 
than Tijuana, the biggest economy in the state. Meanwhile, Hermosillo was the 4
th
 in the 
country, by this indicator.  
 
As regard with TGP per capita, both cities showed negative growth when accounting for 
the period 1993-2008 –column 9-. This could be explained by high immigration rates to 
the bordering cities, which causes that even if the total production grows, the per capita 
average does not (Calderón and Martínez, 2005). Nevertheless, according to INEGI, the 
decrement was smaller in Mexicali –column 9-. Once more, Hermosillo showed bad 
performance during 10 years and a big recovery after 2003. Within the same period most 
bordering cities showed positive total TGP growth during 1993-2008, yet very few 
increase their income per capita as well. It is worth noting that according to OECD data 
most Mexican cities showed negative GDP per capita growth after 2008, which is highly 
related to the US crisis that also affected Mexican economy. Hermosillo grew in almost 
1% per year when accounting for the whole period –column 10-.   
Table 4.12 Annual average growth rates per period, for total production and production per capita 
  Total Gross Production Total Gross Production per capita 
City INEGI** OECD* INEGI** OECD* 
1993-
1998 
1998-
2003 
2003-
2008 
1993-
2008 
2003-
2010 
1993-
1998 
1998-
2003 
2003-
2008 
1993-
2008 
2003-
2010 
National 
average 
2.93% 2.47% 3.66% 3.02% 2.42% 1.37% 1.19% 2.73% 1.76% 1.02% 
Mexicali 2.43% -2.71% 5.61% 1.72% 0.80% 0.09% -3.96% 2.93% -0.43% -1.90% 
Hermosillo -2.63% -5.76% 15.13% 1.85% 3.50% -4.45% -6.69% 10.18% -0.71% 0.90% 
Source: INEGI, Economic Census. OECD Regions and Cities. Metropolitan areas. 
*Gross Domestic Product  
**Total Gross Product 
 
To give an idea of the income per capita of the cities, the levels published by the OECD 
are discussed and compared to the rest of the MA. In 2003 Hermosillo GDP per capita was 
$20, 644 USD, and occupied the 212
th
 place compared to other 264 metropolitan areas 
within the OECD countries. It was below other Mexican cities such as Chihuahua -192
th
-, 
Monterrey -198
th
-, Centro -204
th
- and Saltillo -208
th
. Yet, it was over the country average 
of Check Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Poland.  
 
By 2010 Hermosillo GDP per capita was $21, 932 USD, and it occupied the 211
th
 position. 
It was above the country average of Portugal, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
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Chile. Compared to other Mexican cities it was just below Centro
15
 with $35, 142.48 USD, 
at 106
st
 place; and Monterrey with $23, 887.98 USD, at 204
th
. It improved its relative 
position to Chihuahua -212
th
-, Saltillo -219
th
-, and Tijuana -254
th
-. This indicates that 
during those 7 years, it increased its GDP per capita more than most cities in the country.    
 
In 2003 Mexicali’s GDP per capita was $14, 504 USD, it occupied the place 240th of the 
total raking, and it was in position 16
th
 compared to the 34 Mexican cities. By 2010 the 
GDP per capita was $12, 715.87 USD and occupied the 253
th
. In fact, compared to the rest 
of Mexican cities, it fell down 7 positions, but it was above other bordering cities such as 
Tijuana -254
th
-, Reynosa -256
th
- and Juarez -258
th
-. Even after this reduction, Mexicali 
GDP per capita was over the Mexican average ($12, 010 USD), and other cities such as 
Valparaiso y Concepcion. Still, in 2010 its GDP per capita represented about 30% of the 
Hermosillo’s. In sum, according to the OECD data, Hermosillo had been one of the most 
successful Mexican cities in economic performance, while Mexicali had been above the 
national average and other cities in the state, yet behind other bordering cities.   
6.3 Economic structure 
Hermosillo relies to a large extent on the automotive and metallic products, which has 
increased its importance through the years. In the table 4.3 the contribution by economic 
activities to the TGP per city are shown. The industrial activities are disaggregated.  
The production grouped in sub-sector 38 is highlighted, since it refers to the automotive, 
aerospace, and some electronics production. In Mexicali by 1993 the 38 contributed with 
only 12.7% of TGP, while trade was 55.7%. By 2008 the 38 share of TGP was 36.6% and 
trade diminished until 15.5%. In Hermosillo by 2008 more than 50% of its production 
came from the 38 industry. 
Beyond its relative contribution to the municipal TGP, the manufacturing production of 
Mexicali compared to the national product has significantly increased.  In 1993 Mexicali 
used to contribute with only 0.15% of total manufacturing production in the country, while 
Hermosillo contributed with 1.35%. In 2008 given the increments of the 38 sub-sector, 
Mexicali increased its share to 1.01%, and Hermosillo to 1.58%. in addition, from the total 
                                                     
15
 Centro GDP per capita is well above the average of other Mexican cities, given the oil production.  
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manufacturing production in Mexicali from 1993 to 2008 the 56% was produced by firms 
with foreign investment, while a similar share was shown in Hermosillo, with 43%. 
Table 4.3 Contribution to the Total Gross Production per economic activity. 
Code Activity 1993 1998 2003 2008 
Mexicali  Hermosillo Mexicali  Hermosillo Mexicali  Hermosillo Mexicali  Hermosillo 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 8.0% 8.4% 11.8% 7.4% 10.4% 14.7% 10.8% 9.1% 
32 Textiles, clothing and leather 
industries 
0.4% 1.0% 1.5% 1.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 
33 Industries of wood and wood 
products. Includes furniture 
0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
34 Paper and paper products, 
printing and publishing 
2.6% 0.9% 3.8% 0.6% 4.7% 0.6% 5.1% 0.3% 
35 Chemical substances, products 
derived from the oil and from 
the coal, from rubber and 
plastic 
3.0% 1.2% 2.8% 3.3% 3.0% 2.4% 2.7% 5.7% 
36 Non-metallic mineral products, 
excluding petroleum and coal 
products 
4.1% 3.9% 4.6% 5.0% 4.5% 7.4% 4.5% 4.0% 
37 Metallic basic industries 0.6% 0.0% 3.4% 0.0% 4.3% 0.1% 3.7% 0.0% 
38 Metal products, machinery, and 
equipment. Includes surgical 
and precision instruments 
12.7% 32.5% 34.6% 50.0% 35.0% 32.4% 36.3% 56.0% 
39 Other manufacturing industries 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 0.4% 2.1% 0.4% 3.6% 0.2% 
82 Services of rent and 
administration of real eState 
and Services of rent of personal 
property 
1.1% 0.5% 1.3% 1.3% 2.5% 3.3% 1.5% 1.1% 
61-62 Trade 55.7% 43.5% 20.8% 20.9% 20.5% 23.5% 15.4% 12.9% 
91-97 Other services* 11.2% 7.8% 10.3% 9.2% 12.4% 14.5% 15.7% 10.2% 
*Includes: Letting and administration services of real estate and Letting services of personal property; Educational, research, medical, 
social assistance and partnership services; Restaurants and hotels; Recreational, cultural, recreational and sports services; Professional, 
technical, specialised, and personal services (includes loans to enterprises); Other services except Government activities. 
In Hermosillo within the sub-sector 38, apart from Ford’s production and its supply chain, 
it also accounts for other items such as computers and electronic devices, but they 
contribute with less than 8%. Therefore, it could be said that Ford plant and its related 
industries directly produced about 22% of Hermosillo’s TGP in 1993 and 40% in 2008. 
Certainly, according to the local interviewees, Ford plant brought a completely different 
economic dynamism into the city. Even though, when it was opened in 1986 the 
technology level of the processes undertaken was relatively low, compared to the current 
plant. Nowadays, Ford plant in Hermosillo is one of the most efficient and with highest 
technology among all Ford’s. 
Given such high dependence on the automotive, any shock to the industry and the 
company, considerably affects Hermosillo. According to the local authorities and 
entrepreneurs, around 1998 or even before, there were some rumours of Ford closing 
down. One explanation could be the reduction in market share by Ford company, as well as 
efficiency losses (Contreras et. Al, 2010). In consequence, the expectative from investors 
were not any good. This considerably affected the new investments undertaken in those 
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years. Nonetheless, by 2002 Ford announced the new investment from 2003 onwards. This 
could be the most determinant reason for the TGP contraction from 1993 to 2003, and 
impressive recovery after 2003, with an industrial production growth of more than 100% in 
total from 2003 to 2008, which is also in line with the good results according to the OECD 
data.   
In addition, it has been documented the presence of significant spillovers from Ford 
Company to local SME’s firms. Contreras (2010) finds that there have been mainly three 
channels: 1. knowledge acquired by engineers that were former employees, and have 
become suppliers. 2. The socio-professional networks and market relations. The higher 
presence of local intensive suppliers and their professional interactions, allows other firms 
to get technological transfers. 3. Vertical backward spillovers. That is, the transfer process 
in which the transnational helps to their suppliers to improve their efficiency given the 
benefits obtained. Hence, this might have fostered a very competitive environment, with 
tacit knowledge, that is, specific to the region increasing its stickiness in words of Cheshire 
and Magrini (2009); which reduced Ford’s cost and increased its global competitiveness 
(Contreras et. al 2010).  
In Mexicali, the automotive production is less important; sub-sector 38 is mainly 
constituted by electronics devices as well as computers. Nevertheless, it is important to 
mention the increasing importance of the aerospace. In 1998 the aerospace contributed 
only with 2% of total manufacturing production in Mexicali. Yet, it was the 98% of the 
total production in the country, whereas the other 2% was localised in Tijuana. By 2003 
Chihuahua City produced the highest production share in the country -46.36%- within this 
industry. This is shown in table 4.4. Also, in that year Saltillo as well as some other cities 
with less importance had also started to contribute to the industry.  
The aerospace production changed its geography, and by 2008 it had been distributed to 
other cities, most of them in bordering states. Definitely, state and municipal governments 
realised that the aerospace was a new opportunity to bring high technology industry to their 
cities, instead of textiles and electronics. Therefore, it seems to be a competition among 
some cities to attract more companies, but also to constitute an aerospace cluster. Local 
officials also talked about this competition, because Mexicali is no longer the main 
producer in the country. 
151 
 
Stakeholders in Mexicali have strived to consolidate this industry since it is more 
profitable than the automotive and the electronics, owing to the high technology profile. 
Indeed, according to the office for investment attraction and marketing at the federal level, 
ProMexico
16
, currently the aerospace in Mexicali and Tijuana are specialised to provide 
services with high value added called Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO) not only to 
the aerospace but also for defence. Besides, according to the FEMIA (2012), the most 
developed cluster in the Mexican aerospace industry is the existing in Tijuana and 
Mexicali. 
Table 4.4 Contribution to the national aerospace industry per city 2003 and 2008. 
State City Region 2003 2008 
CHIHUAHUA CHIHUAHUA Bordering State 46.36% 18.84% 
BAJA CALIFORNIA MEXICALI Bordering State 32.55% 12.39% 
COAHUILA DE ZARAGOZA SALTILLO Bordering State 11.39% 11.04% 
BAJA CALIFORNIA TIJUANA Bordering State 6.16% 4.12% 
YUCATÁN MÉRIDA South 1.29% 1.11% 
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ SAN LUIS POTOSÍ Centre 1.18% 0.86% 
SONORA EMPALME Bordering State 0.14% 4.19% 
QUERÉTARO COLÓN Centre 0.00% 14.56% 
SONORA GUAYMAS Bordering State 0.00% 12.87% 
NUEVO LEÓN SANTA CATARINA Bordering State 0.00% 9.82% 
QUERÉTARO EL MARQUÉS Centre 0.00% 8.47% 
SONORA NOGALES Bordering State 0.00% 0.95% 
SONORA CAJEME Bordering State 0.00% 0.42% 
CHIHUAHUA JUÁREZ Bordering State 0.00% 0.32% 
SINALOA CULIACÁN North 0.00% 0.02% 
DISTRITO FEDERAL MIGUEL HIDALGO Centre 0.00% 0.01% 
DURANGO DURANGO North 0.00% 0.00% 
HIDALGO TEPEAPULCO Centre 0.00% 0.00% 
Given that the aerospace is classified as a high technology industry, it has been defined as 
a national priority. In 2007 it was created the Mexican Federation of Aerospace Industry 
(Federación Mexicana de la Industria Aeroespacial; FEMIA) with the aim to organise and 
improve the competitiveness of the industry in the country. In the same year, it was created 
the Mexican Council for Aerospace training (Consejo Mexicano de Educación 
Aeroespacial; COMEA) in order to coordinate with educational centres and universities to 
create professionals and technical carriers to prepare qualified labour force with the 
required skills within the sector. Especial attention has been given from the federal 
government to develop this industry. The clusters are being developed to produce different 
parts of the aircrafts across the country and lot of opportunities have been identified within 
the global production chain in the industry (FEMIA, 2012). 
Nowadays in Hermosillo the aerospace have also started, unfortunately the data on 
production is not available. Yet according to FEMIA (2012), the importance of its cluster 
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 Source: http://promexico.gob.mx/en_mx/promexico/Aeroespacial 
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is intensifying. The state government is working to gather more enterprises within this 
industry to ensure the consolidation of the cluster, in order to be able to make a whole 
turbine in Guaymas, and stop importing the components. Some firms have been 
encouraged to settle in Hermosillo given that Guaymas is a small city -113, 000 inhabitants 
in 2010-, thus its capacity to growth is limited. Nonetheless, the most important industry in 
Hermosillo is still the automotive, especially because Ford has continued increasing the 
investment in the city. For instance, on March 2012 it was announced a new investment for 
1,370 USD millions. It might be as a result of the significant incentives received, for 
instance, for the period 2011-2013 Ford Motor Company in Hermosillo and Chihuahua has 
received about 10% of the total incentives granted by ProMexico.  
6.4 Social conditions and wellbeing  
In this subsection, given the availability of information, some data is presented at state 
level. First, it is important to remark that bordering states have low poverty levels. 
According to the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies 
(Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social; CONEVAL), 
although after the 2008 crisis, the percentage of poor people increased in most states, in 
Baja California and Sonora the people in extreme poverty diminished. CONEVAL presents 
a group of indicators to measure poverty conditions of population. By 2012 in both states, 
people leaving in extreme poverty were about 5%, while the country average was 11%. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that 65% of Sonora inhabitants have access to social 
security, 45% in Baja California and 39% is the country average. This is a hint of the wider 
presence of formal firms providing social security to their employees.  
Meanwhile, Baja California has major coverage of basic housing services, 95% vs. 88% in 
Sonora, and 79% in Mexico. One reason for lower percentages in Sonora is the big land 
extension, and lot of small rural communities, which makes difficult to provide basic 
services. Although this information is at the state level, it helps to give an idea of the social 
context regarding to wellbeing conditions.  
Concerning with the education level of the population, in 2010 Hermosillo had 10.4 
average years of schooling for population over 15 years, while Mexicali had 9.6. The 
national average was 8.6. In other words, the Mexican average individual does not even 
complete secondary education. While in these municipalities, have at least one more year 
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of education. There are other municipalities with higher average, such as Benito Juarez 
delegation in Mexico DF with 13.5, and San Pedro Garza, Nuevo Leon with 12.1. The 
lower averages were in rural areas in Oaxaca with just 2 years.  
Some municipal data is presented in the table 4.5, allowing for comparisons over the time. 
First, as another indicator for education, it is the share of matriculated students in medium-
high and professional education over the total working population. According to Cheshire 
and Magrini (2009), high shares would indicate higher education levels of those entering to 
the labour market. Also, it could indicate that the city have high enough salaries to sustain 
lot of economic inactive population. It can be observed that although both municipalities 
increased the average years of schooling, the indicator proposed by Cheshire and Magrini 
has diminished over the time, while the country average increased. One possible reason 
would be immigration of working population to these municipalities, from which a high 
proportion holds a degree, decreasing the ratio students/working population.  
From the Economic Censuses, it has been calculated the average remuneration to working 
population. It includes all expenses paid to social security. Both municipal averages are 
higher than the national. Yet, averages have diminished considerably, 26% in Mexicali and 
22% in Hermosillo, while the national average increased.  
For infrastructure indicator
17
, it has been built an indicator for the most important 
metropolitan areas in the country. Given the scarcity of data on physical endowments in 
municipalities, most researchers use number of landlines, or number of hospital beds. I 
have built an indicator comprising several endowments per capita, listed in the table notes. 
Given that it has been used to compare those cities, no average at the country level is 
presented. In this indicator Mexicali is above than Hermosillo, which is due to the higher 
number of Km of roads per municipality area in Km
2
, which according to IMCO, this is the 
best competitive advantage of Mexicali. 
The infant mortality rate shows better conditions than the national average. This might be 
also related to larger access to social security and basic housing services, and low 
deprivation levels. The deprivation index in 2010 published by the National Council for 
Population (Consejo Nacional de Poblacion; CONAPO), placed Mexicali in position 2405 
out of 2456 municipalities. That is, there were 51 municipalities with lower indexes. While 
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 This is the variable used in the other two chapters. 
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Hermosillo had an index slightly lower, staying in position 2410, only 5 places higher than 
Mexicali. Both indexes are considered very low according to CONAPO standards. 
Table 4.5 Wellbeing indicators 
Variable Mexicali  Hermosillo   National average  
1993 2008 1993 2008 1993 2008 
Share of matriculated students in medium-high  
and professional education over working population 
0.34 0.31 0.50 0.37   0.10 0.13 
Average wage (MXN)* $72.61 $53.51 $58.44 $45.61  $38.92 $53.37 
Infant mortality rate 17.7 13.06 18.5 12.29  30.40 15.2 
Infrastructure** 35.36 28.90 31.73 26.41  - -  
*Total remunerations over total working population Economic Census (MXN thousands per worker in a year). Corresponds to 1998. 
Primary activities and mining is not accounted. 
** This an index built for urban municipalities includes: per inhabitant number of sewage, water feeds and electrical power supply. In 
addition, number of flight passengers and km of roads by area. 
Source: Own calculations with various INEGI databases. 
In sum, the health conditions as well as the schooling years for population over 15 years 
old are higher than the national average. Nevertheless, the wages showed a decreasing 
trend. Contrary to what should be expected given the higher technology profile of jobs in 
some industries. In some indicators Mexicali seems to be better than Hermosillo, and vice 
versa. It cannot be said that one showed considerably better living conditions than the 
other. Even in deprivation indexes, they showed similar positions, and they are among the 
best in the country.  
In addition, according to some national competitiveness indexes, both cities are qualified 
as very competitive with good social conditions (Sobrino, 2006). In the last publication of 
the competitiveness index by IMCO in 2012
18
, for the total index Mexicali was in position 
10
th
 and Hermosillo 12
th
 out of 77 cities. The most outstanding feature for Hermosillo was 
the social conditions Hermosillo in which it was in 3
rd
 position out of 100 cities. For 
Mexicali, the best qualification was obtained regarding to infrastructure, in line with the 
results showed by the index in Table 4.. 
7. Changes in local policies towards 21st century. 
This section contains the information obtained out of the interviews. Based on them, this 
section depicts the local framework, good practices and policies implemented that are 
outstanding different from other municipalities in the country, which might have 
influenced on their economic performance. 
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 Consulted in June 2014, available at: http://porciudad.comparadondevives.org/ciudades/3  
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A box with a synthesis of the most outstanding actions undertaken in response to local 
problems and its related results is in Box 1 of the annex.  
 
7.1 Mexicali 
As mentioned before, given the three-year political term in Mexican municipalities, it is 
hard to have long-term planning at this level. However, in order to implement policies that 
increase competitive capacities, there is a need of long-term planning, since improvements 
cannot be achieved within three years periods.  
 
Moreover, it is frequent that most public servants and officials change each term, which 
entails high training costs and uncertainty for private investors. According to the World 
Bank, as part of the project Enterprise Surveys 2006
19
 and 2010
20
, one of the most 
important problems identified by the firms in Mexico was the uncertainty in policies. 
Likewise, the representative from the maquiladora sector in Mexicali, Mr. Mario Martija, 
asserted that firms do not need incentives from governments, since they might represent 
very little proportion from their income. Instead, it is more useful to have certainty in fiscal 
and economic policy, because every year they have problems with fiscal policies, and 
every starting term, there is uncertainty in policies continuation, especially at the federal 
level. It is also frequent the uncertainty with local policies, nonetheless in Mexicali the 
plan has been consented and most stakeholders know it, helping to reduce this uncertainty.  
 
Mexicali created a council for economic development that is public-private, and has a 
defined plan to follow until 2020. Such council is called CDEM, that is, Council for the 
Economic Development of Mexicali (Consejo de Desarrollo Económico de Mexicali). As 
documented by Topal (2012, 2013) there is a foregoing institute in Chihuahua with similar 
structure, called DESEC.  
 
CDEM was created in 1993, and 5 years later Tijuana created a similar institute, which was 
also followed by the other municipalities in the state. CDEM is directed by entrepreneurs; 
nevertheless, on its direction board are included public and private representatives. Among 
them are the municipal president, the undersecretary for economic development of the state 
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–that is from the Secretariat of Economy, in the state-, the representative from the Business 
Coordinating Committee (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial; CCE), as well as other 
representatives from the federal government, and the delegates in charge of the projects 
undertaken. It is also important to mention that the previous municipal president is part of 
the direction board, to also make sure there is continuity in policies implementation.  
 
As regards with the delegates, they have to be CDEM members and they need to pay a fee, 
depending on their income. Such structure, similar to DESEC in Chihuahua City, might 
allow entrepreneurs to gain power and make policies only to their favour. However, the 
president Rene Acuña assured citizens contribute even when they might not get directly 
benefited, in sake of Mexicali’s higher development in the long-term.  
 
Such statement, though should be pondered, it cannot be expected that citizens would 
invest money if they do not get something out of it. And in fact, some groups will be 
underrepresented. On the other side, this open and diverse participation non-existing 
somewhere else, is also likely to increase resistance among public and private 
representatives, which might lead to less concentration of benefits in few hands. The social 
conditions existent in Mexicali validate that benefits are spread to a good extent.  
The main purpose of CDEM is formulating local policies for the long-term. The president 
of the institute interviewed remained about 13 years in the position, and he has now been 
removed. He highlighted that he had been working together with the same people in 
different positions, which allowed them to keep the same plan and achieve the goals they 
settled around 2000, when the plan Mexicali 2020 was started. To do this plan, the council 
evaluated the socioeconomic status of Mexicali and, based on its weaknesses and strengths, 
formulated a plan for the following 20 years, and it was settled as a law. They visualised 
their objectives as a city and planned what needed to be done in order to reach those 
objectives. The working committees are based on the main needs identified at that time.  A 
new plan for 2050 is underway, and big labour to get citizens aware and involved is being 
undertaken.  
According to the CDEM there have been some disagreements with politicians due to some 
divergent opinions. However, CDEM is already consolidated as the leader and it has great 
influence on policymaking and good relationship with the public officers from all levels, 
since they represent a general vision rather than the needs from one industry or 
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entrepreneurial group. This was also confirmed by Mr. Guillermo Chacon, the secretary of 
the municipal president, since the municipal administration does not attend any economic 
planning, but local services to citizens. For instance, Mario Martija, the representative from 
the National Chamber of Transformation Industry (Camara Nacional de la Industria de la 
Transformacion; CANACINTRA), and Franciso Rodriguez, the representative from CCE 
(Business Coordinating Committee), expressed different points of view about the best 
policies to be followed. To some extent they can influence, but no change the policies, 
since CDEM follows objectives previously settled.  
As a bordering city, Mexicali could attract immigrant labour force that is just waiting to go 
to the US, generating a problem of high staff rotation within enterprises, lowering the 
competitiveness of local labour force.  
When Mexicali 2020 plan was formulated, it was identified that the labour force was one 
very weak point in the city, given the high turnover and emigration of people. In 
consequence, public officials endeavoured to develop social capital in the city. There have 
been created cartoons characters to promote values in working population, as well as to 
inform people about the best achievements of the city, in order to foster proud and 
attachment. Among the values promoted is personal growth, that is, to continue studying to 
be promoted within the firm; which is highly supported by firms. By these means, they 
strived to create an environment in which the people commit more with their work and 
somehow get aware of the good results the city has attained, but especially that the city 
competitiveness relies on their work.  
Nowadays, all authorities and entrepreneurs representatives agreed that the local labour 
force is so committed with their work, and have better skills. For instance, Honeywell 
director assured that Mexicali’s labour force is one of the most productive and efficient 
amongst their world employees. Additionally, a plan to sell Mexicali to the externals and 
increase pride has been running on behalf of CDEM, according to them this has increased 
the efficiency and commitment of labour force. This is indeed critical to build up social 
capital (OECD, 1995).  
As regards with the universities and education centres, one of the most important programs 
developed by CDEM is the commission for “linking firms & schools.” In 2000, CDEM 
also realised that there was a generalised complaint on behalf of the private sector that the 
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research being undertaken at the universities was useless for them. Furthermore, the 
qualification of labour force was not according to the firms’ needs. In consequence, CDEM 
started working to diminish this gap. As a result, the local universities have changed some 
courses, and increased the technical training on machines used by firms. Finally, owing to 
the increasing demand for some technical skills, in 2009 some new professional carriers 
were opened. That is, Bioengineer, Aerospace Engineer, Engineer on Renewable Energy, 
and Engineer in Semiconductors and Microelectronics. Besides, CDEM started running 
adverts to encourage young people to do any kind of engineer studies rather than the 
traditional ones such as law, business administration, and informatics, which were the 
carriers with higher enrolment by 2000. In that year, 15-18% of total university students 
were enrolled to engineering careers, and this share went up to 31% by 2009.  
Moreover, among the decentralisation policies, innovation in regional research centres and 
within firms had been highly encouraged by different means, such as funds from the 
National Council for Science and Technology, CONACYT. Among the requirements to 
get the funds is to include students on the projects. As a result, there is an increasing 
participation from students, and research centres in applied research that is narrowed to 
attend the demands from the private sector. Namely, the Honeywell president in Mexico, 
affirmed that Honeywell is a successful case of innovation in which due to the research 
undertaken in the firm supported by the CONACYT, the firm would improve the design of 
Boeings and Bombardiers. All the designs are done in Mexicali, by Mexican engineers
21
. 
This confirms might indicate the existence of a local environment that is difficult to 
replicate anywhere else, increasing the attachment of firms, in this case, Honeywell, to the 
city.  
Other particular feature of Mexicali is that the office in charge to promote the city, and 
attract and/or retain investment -especially foreign- is financed half from the private sector 
and half from the public money. It is called Industrial Development Commission 
(Comision de Desarrollo Industrial; CDI). Given that they finance part of the expenditures, 
local entrepreneurs ensure higher efficiency with the resources spent. The economic 
activities to be encouraged are clearly defined, entrepreneurs closely supervise that the 
resources are spent only in attracting firms within the economic activities set as priority. 
They identify the firms that need to be attracted in order to complement production chains. 
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Furthermore, frequently a group of entrepreneurs travel together with the people from the 
commission, in order to face the prospect investors with the entrepreneurs who would 
become their business associates. Also, industrial-parks builders participate in the 
promotion of the city providing specific infrastructure capabilities, and thus playing an 
essential role for investment attraction.  
With regard to with incentives from the local level, the secretary of the municipal president 
stressed the scarcity of resources. He pointed that there are few possible ways to spur 
economic growth unless lobbying for state and federal resources. They cannot do a lot 
even with the untagged resources, thus they have to seek the financial support from upper 
levels to undertake projects. This is the mean to support CDEM and CDI efforts. In 
addition, municipal governments usually offer exemptions on construction permissions and 
land use, which can reach up to $20 USD per employees, very low compared to upper 
government levels.  
It is noticeable that most of attention is focused to foreign firms. And although they have 
significant role for regional income, local firms should be also attended. According to, 
CANACINTRA, and CCE the programs to give incentives to local firms are not helpful 
enough. The paperwork to access such incentives is problematic, and it may take even a 
year. As a result, even when firms take the time to go for it, they may receive the incentive 
after one year. Besides, CANACINTRA estimated that the cost of administrative work for 
domestic firms may represent up to 30% of their income, given the requirements from 
governments. Hence, firms do not ask for cash incentives, since they are not representative 
of their total cost. They want to have simpler rules and make governments attend the 
general sector problems, such as electricity costs, or shortcuts. This is, in fact in line with 
the results obtained by the World Bank surveys, mentioned before, and the results by 
Salgado Banda and Bernal Verdugo (2011) showing that poor electricity supply in Mexico 
hampers productivity of manufacturing firms.   
Furthermore, the maquiladoras are allowed to import without paying taxes, which fosters 
buying inputs outside the country. National entrepreneurs demand governments to enhance 
that foreigners buy national inputs, which may lead to local spillovers (Smarzynska 
Javorcik, 2004). Yet, according to the maquiladoras representative, Mr. Mauricio Rivas 
from AMMAC it might hamper their competitiveness. Successful business might occur 
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when ex-workers in foreign firms have become suppliers. Nevertheless, this has not been 
frequent, which might indicate low spillovers effects by this mean.  
Differently to Tijuana, the cross-bordering cooperation in Mexicali is not that important, 
but only about the water theme. Furthermore, it does not coordinate greatly with Tijuana, 
thus Mexicali performance has been achieved by attracting foreign investment, while 
strengthening their labour force and infrastructure endowments. According to Dr. Noe 
Fuentes, Tijuana has the advantage of an older business class that is more organised, risk 
takers and it is working together with the US. The business opportunities they have due to 
their close relation with San Diego are more profitable owing to the production size of 
California. On the contrary, Mexicali has been working almost alone, with little 
coordination with the cross-border partners. Besides, Tijuana economic structure is similar, 
which also intensifies competition and hampers the investments flows to Mexicali.  
In sum, among the most outstanding characteristics of Mexicali is the crucial role played 
by local entrepreneurs to spur economic growth; the long-term vision; the 
institutionalisation of the general plan; and public officers and entrepreneurs’ 
representatives working on their positions for longer periods, decoupling policies of the 
political cycle to a good extent. Also, according to the interviewees, the fact that some 
public officers used to be entrepreneurs representatives and have been involved in the plan 
Mexicali 2020 during several years, helped to have better understanding about the needs 
from the private sector.  
Finally, it can be said that Mexicali has implemented some of the policies listed before in 
section 2.2, such as long term visioning, the participation from public and private sectors, 
and the institutionalisation of the process by means of the CDEM and CDI structures, 
giving special empowerment to CDEM by making a law the general plan formulated. The 
formal and informal institutions allowed Mexicali to make more efficient plans with higher 
accountability as recommended by Lorens et al. (2002) and Rodríguez-Pose (2013). 
Moreover, Mexicali strived to specialise in few industrial activities as recommended by 
various academics (Johansson, 2000, Kresl and Balwant, 1999, Potter, 2009), and they also 
attempted to improve strategic determinants of competitiveness.  
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7.2 Hermosillo 
In Hermosillo, local authorities have also realised the need to become active participants to 
foster economic growth, given the fierce competition for mobile capitals. Especially since 
China became less competitive, on labour force costs.  
The participation from local entrepreneurs has been less active than in Mexicali. The 
entrepreneurs with better bargaining position are the foreigners, although they are not well 
organised. The Association of Maquiladoras is still young, it was funded only 6 years ago, 
it did not have a website and getting information about it was difficult. The interviewee, 
Mr. Jesus Gamez, is a former president because it was hard to find the current. The lack of 
organisation compared to their counterparts in Mexicali or Nogales, was remarked by Mr. 
Jesus. Given the dominance of few entrepreneurs and their economic importance, shown 
before, they have huge bargaining position and bargain by their self with the local 
authorities. In other cities entrepreneurs bargain together and get better results; yet good 
efforts are being undertaken to act as a group, but high resistance is found. 
The policymaking structure followed by the municipality has been the same as the national 
trend, namely, with plans for every political term and limited continuity, owing to the 
differences among parties. Nonetheless, with the aim of promoting the state and targeting 
investments, in 1997 the state government created a promotion office, that is the Council 
for Economic Promotion of Sonora (Consejo Para la Promocion Economica de Sonora; 
COPRESON). It is part of the Secretariat of Economy of Sonora. In 2000 higher autonomy 
was granted to COPRESON in order to make its own plans, and its own budget was 
designated. Still, since COPRESON is an extension of the Secretariat of Economy, its plan 
is defined every 6 years, together with the state government, as well as its president. 
COPRESON has been working in a similar way than the CDI in Mexicali. That is, based 
on the needs expressed by entrepreneurs already settled, specific firms are targeted in order 
to attract them for completing supply chains, increasing efficiency in production processes, 
and reducing transports cost. They have a wide range in the kind of incentives given to the 
foreign firms.  
One frequent complaint from enterprises is the lack of technical training taught at 
universities and educational institutions. Therefore, one of the most important incentives 
given is the employees training funding. COPRESON hires teachers and, with the 
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machines provided by enterprises, teach the management of them. Also, CANACINTRA 
has CANACINTRA University, which name is given to training courses offered by 
CANACINTRA opened just on demand.  
In addition, owing to the standards and certification required to be part of the supply chain 
for the automotive and the aerospace, COPRESON also offer grants to pay such licences. 
Moreover, given Hermosillo disadvantage in geographic location, compared to other 
bordering cities; COPRESON also provide consulting on transports logistics, to find out 
the best transport means for firms’ production.  
It is important to highlight that, COPRESON director is removed each political term with 
the state governor, yet some public servants have been there for longer periods to keep 
continuity when attending firms, and lower training costs. The employees are designated to 
attend or approach to specific firms to complete the attraction, settlement and follow up. 
The relationship is kept in the long term. COPRESON director highlighted that, given their 
targeted incentives packages, their intervention prevented Ford plant closing. Instead, they 
decided to re-invest, which was announced by 2002, and more recently by 2012. If as 
suggested by Contreras (2010) the reasons regards with competitiveness, Mexican 
authorities are subsidizing inefficiencies, yet Ford closing would have been a disaster for 
the city.  
To attend domestic firms, the municipal government created the Municipal Bureau for 
Economic Promotion (Comision de Fomento Economico del Municipio de Hermosillo) in 
1997. The director of the Bureau is also renewed every three years, and it is designated by 
the municipal president. Yet, there are some public servants that have remained for longer. 
Namely, the interviewees, Veronica Yanez Cordova had more than 6 years of experience, 
they showed deep knowledge and enthusiasm with the whole project, while the director 
had just started when the fieldwork was undertaken, and showed little familiarity with the 
project.  
The bureau works with domestic firms, mainly SME’s, helping with the paperwork, 
training on administrative topics, and facilitating loans with lower interest rates than banks. 
One of its main targets is to reduce the opening time for an enterprise, by means of 
simplifying the paperwork and creating a “one stop shop.” The bureau was recognized by 
the World Bank project Doing Business in 2009 for being the second fastest office to 
163 
 
approve construction permits. Furthermore, it is important to remark that according to the 
representatives interviewed, the project from the Wold Bank has fostered competition 
among local Bureaus for economic development, in order to facilitate doing business in 
Mexico. On the word of the last report, Mexico reduced the average time to open new 
business from 58 days in 2004, to 7 in 2014.  
Concerning to fiscal incentives, depending on the case, there could be granted from 25% to 
100% exemptions on some local taxes such as land property; transfer of ownership of real 
estate; construction license and land use permit; safety advice and occupation in civil 
protection.  
As said by the undersecretary Mr. Lorenzo Galvan, the Secretariat of Economy of the state 
gives emphasis to help local firms developing marketing, branding and merchandising, 
especially for the agro industry. This is linked to the Research Centre for Food and 
Development –CIAD-. It produces nutritional tables and researches to increase products 
fresh-life when possible, which is partially financed by the Secretariat.  
The creation of the offices at state and municipal administrations seems to be congruent 
with the time in which the economy could have started to recover. Yet, the leadership 
comes from state administration, with federal resources given through ProMexico. Still, the 
support to SME’s and efforts towards easing paperwork for domestic firms are solid and 
are in line with LED strategies given that their aim is to increase employment and 
economic growth for locals. 
In sum, in Hermosillo the state has implemented competition strategies pursuing foreign 
investment increases, by targeting firms and offering specific incentives, in line with top-
down approaches. Nevertheless, the work carried out by the Municipal Bureau for 
Economic Development, could be considered within the strategic determinants by pointed 
out Kresl (1995) given that they have the aim to simplify bureaucracy; as well as within 
LED strategies since they attempt to increase employment. The efforts to support SME’s 
are similar to those undertaken in other cities, that is, helping the access to loans and 
training, which is actually a policy guidelines from federal government.  
Finally, the political cycle still has a larger influence on policymaking, and the local 
policies still lack of long-term visioning. For instance, the formal institutions do not allow 
enough flexibility for local policies given the dependence on higher state-government 
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plans and the political arrangements come through it. In addition, it seems that the 
managers or owners from big entrepreneurs have very good bargaining position, while the 
domestic firms do not have big chances at this matter. For instance, CANACINTRA 
representative, Octavio Sanchez, showed higher engagement in the work made by 
COPRESON with foreign or big firms, rather than with the needs of the domestic industry. 
In consequence, although the policies are focused to increase employment and economic 
growth rates, it is heavily targeted on one sector, in line with traditional development 
policies rather than LED strategies, thus, it can be said that less LED components are 
found in Hermosillo case.  
8. Discussion. Competition strategies and the participation of local actors 
Both cities have found their way toward specialisation by targeting firms within few 
economic activities with high value added. As pointed out by various authors within the 
competitiveness literature, specialisation might be the best competition strategy to gain 
ground in the production chain in the globalised economy (Johansson, 2000, Capello and 
Camagni, 2005, Kresl and Gappert, 1995).  Still, when the city is highly dependent on one 
economic activity, especially in one firm such the case of Hermosillo; it is risky to fall into 
an economic depression when such firm is in crisis. Competing for foreign investors has 
been the main strategy from both cities. Nevertheless, according to the information 
published by ProMexico, more incentives have been granted to Ford Motor Company 
Hermosillo, than to other companies located in Mexicali, at least in the period published.  
Both cities have increased their participation to pursue better economic performance. 
Mexicali has taken advantage and designed its own growth plans, with a great extent of 
independency even from the state government, increasing flexibility and accountability, 
highlighted before as advantages of LED policies. Nevertheless, perhaps the lower growth 
rates in Mexicali can be also explained by the few support from federal and state 
governments in this case. Meanwhile the income per capita in Hermosillo is vastly greater, 
with high economic growth rates and benefits from state support and federal incentives to 
its firm constituting its main economic basis.  
In Mexicali other institutions such as the CCE, and CANACINTRA showed high 
engagement with planning activities, and ideas about better paths. There was a proposal 
document published by CCE. This is not harmful for planning, quite the opposite, it has 
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been very beneficial, since it is noticed an environment in which local stakeholders 
intensively participate and give opinions, fostering consented decisions, rather than 
deterministic plans produced by fewer people.  
Differently, in Hermosillo the most determinant actions had been undertaken to keep the 
automotive and provide incentives to it. The incentives are much targeted and there are no 
wider efforts to increase labour force skills, but only those specific to firms, failing to a 
traditional sectorial development approach. On the other side, Hermosillo population has 
higher schooling level, thus this is not a concern for the authorities. Also its industry is 
more solid and attracts more skilled labour force; by 2010 29% of immigrants had superior 
education, vs. 20% in Mexicali.  
 
However, Sonora provides more support to SME’s. In Mexicali, CANACINTRA, CCE 
and CDI representatives, discussed about the incentives and support given to SME’s. It 
seemed less continuous, and systematised, however. In Mexicali most efforts are being 
carried out by the regional office of the Secretariat of Economy at the federal level.  
 
As regards with expenditures on economic policies, there are significant differences. In 
spite of scarce resources available in the municipal administrations, the more they spend, 
the more they might be able to get from state and federal administrations. Especially 
regarding to infrastructure construction, which is a shared responsibility. In 1993, their 
expenditures per capita used to be similar. In that year Hermosillo spent about 25% more 
than Mexicali and the quantities varies through the period. Nonetheless, the differences 
started to be bigger after 2008, and by 2012 Hermosillo spent about the double amount per 
capita than Mexicali, which might have also influenced its better economic performance in 
recent years. 
Meanwhile, in Mexicali, in spite of the less financial support, and its close competitor, the 
institutional framework has been determinant to transform the economic profile. Higher 
growth could be achieved if the domestic firms receive more attention. Perhaps larger 
spillovers such as those documented in Hermosillo are just matter of time. For instance, 
enterprises founded by former employees in foreign firms were highlighted by the 
AMMAC representative in Mexicali, but those are still limited. This is what is called by 
Contreras et al, (2010) market-professional spillovers, which might increase later when 
there is more abundance of foreign entrepreneurs, as documented in Hermosillo.  
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In sum, within the context of fiscal and political decentralisation, it is clear that in both 
cities significant efforts have been undertaken to attend local problems. Even whether they 
seek for the support from upper government levels, the initiatives to call the attention to 
their particular problems have played a significant role. Furthermore, the greater 
engagement from local/state stakeholders seems to be contemporaneous with those 
decentralisation policies depicted in the second section, especially after 2000. 
Nevertheless, the representative from CCE in Mexicali remarked that more political 
decentralisation is needed.  Since decision making is still highly centralised and there is no 
a constant channel to communicate the legal framework and policies needed locally. 
Particularly, deputes do not visit often the state; hence they cannot recognize local 
problems and their priorities differ. For instance, the Especial Economic Zone project, 
which might enhance trade relations with San Diego, California, has been frozen for more 
than 3 years now, because federal deputes have other themes as priority. 
9. Conclusions 
Mexican municipalities have ever more shared responsibilities to pursue economic growth. 
The institutional framework has been changed, demanding more proactivity from local 
administrations. Better performance is rewarded with federal-states investments and 
sometimes with federal transfers. That is, there are more resources given to administrations 
with higher economic growth, and tax collections.  
Nevertheless, such decentralised resources are still insufficient and municipalities need to 
get more resources from state and federal administrations, preventing the presence of Pork- 
barrel politics and diminish the effects of differences among parties. Municipalities should 
be able to undertake big infrastructure projects or to give significant incentives that can 
actually matter for firms, rather than only grant local taxes exemptions. As pointed out by 
Thomas (2013), local administrations, especially in non-wealthy places, tend to give 
exemptions rather than cash incentives.  
In this context, the fieldwork undertaken researched on economic performance and 
institutional framework in two cities located in the northwest region of Mexico. In the case 
of Hermosillo, more than a development strategy with long-term visioning, the policies 
followed are quite traditional as they have been focused to maintain the Ford Motor 
Company and attract the aerospace industry, while the main actor is the state office 
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COPRESON. Its success is greatly based on targeted incentives and financial support from 
the federal government, in a more traditional top-down approach. Still, the local and state 
offices, coordinated with CIAD, support domestic firms, which is more systematic and 
solid than in Mexicali. Furthermore, the local Bureau for Economic Development in 
Hermosillo even got an award due to its management, and they showed themselves very 
committed with the Doing Business project. These actions are in line with the LED 
strategies, this is, to strengthen local entrepreneurship, increase local employment and 
create an institutional framework that can take advantage of the decentralisation. In this 
case, those institutes providing bureaucratic and financial support for firms are taking 
advantage of the national decentralisation policies. The total outcome of these policies is 
that Hermosillo is one of the most successful cities in the country. Particularly after 2003 
according to competitiveness indexes, INEGI data, as well as the OECD. 
Mexicali conditions used to be very different in 1993 when its development council, 
CDEM, was created. The most significant actions started some years later, about 2000, 
when the plan for 2020 was formulated. It shows the resistance occurred at the local level, 
to have an agency like this. That is, it took about 7 years to get things functioning and 
define a long-term plan. In fact, a similar plan has been published for the state, which to 
some extent was inspired in the Mexicali plan. Such plan was still a draft by December 
2013. It should be highlighted that the plan Mexicali 2020 was based on a thoughtful 
assessment of the city and clear objectives were defined. That allows evaluating the 
outcomes per committees and following up in the long term, which is not usual in Mexico.  
The local networking in Mexicali between entrepreneurs, public officers and 
entrepreneurs’ representatives was very clear while undertaking the fieldwork, which is 
one of the keys in Mexicali’s success. The greater engagement from local stakeholders 
seems to be in line with those decentralisation policies depicted in the second section, 
especially after 2000. Nevertheless, the policies are importantly focused to foreign firms, 
which prevent enhancing local entrepreneurship which might assure better economic 
development in the long term. As said by Dr. Noe Fuentes, the businessmen are 
inexperienced, thus Mexicali stakeholders have endeavoured to increase labour force skills 
but no entrepreneurship. Mexicali economic growth has become less dynamic, especially 
after 2008. Meanwhile, the local actions combined with state and federal support allowed 
Hermosillo to remain as one of the biggest economies in the border, and the third highest 
GDP per capita in the country, according to the OECD. This indicates that the lack of 
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support and lesser relationship with the state and federal administrations have a significant 
impact in Mexicali situation. Still, as pointed out before, some actions are in line with LED 
strategies, this is long-term vision, employment creation, social capital enhancement, and 
institutionalisation of the process that is actually in charge of non-government people, but 
local entrepreneurs, with high participation from different sectors as well as the 
universities.  
In sum, from the two cases documented, the results cast doubts over the development 
model to be enhanced. The model of Mexicali has led to a positive but limited economic 
growth, with little support for domestic firms, even though the transformation of the city 
has been significant. Mexicali initial conditions were more similar to other Mexican cities 
and its model of long-term planning, continuity of policies and systematic evaluation could 
be highly advised, since it would greatly diminish the cost of political cycles. 
Unfortunately, foreign investment is likely to continue flowing mainly to the bordering 
region, to the centre region, and to some touristic destinations. These results are in line to 
those cases documented by Palavicini-Corona (2012) in which engagement from local 
stakeholders were a key for success, but their economic growth yields upon foreign 
investment owing to their geographic location –Tlaxcala, near Mexico City- allows that.  
Other cities cannot thus follow the same path, but similar initiatives to take advantage of 
decentralised resources and to create long-term plans base on local needs and potentialities 
aiming local development not only investment attraction. 
Hermosillo on its part is highly dependent upon one firm, that is, Ford Motor Company. 
Still, there are larger spillovers documented (Contreras et al., 2010), and the local 
entrepreneurs receive more attention from the municipal officers, at least in paperwork, 
which should be encouraged in other cities. Nevertheless, its high GDP growth rates are 
mostly due to the economic incentives received by the Automotive, granted by federal and 
state governments, going back to the top-down economic model. Such model should not be 
followed, as it fosters regional inequalities.  
In consequence, there have been identified practices that could be more recommended than 
others. Undoubtedly greater engagement from local stakeholders, that is, public and private 
representatives, citizens and universities leads to long-term improvements of economic 
development. However, economic growth will be boosted only if there is enough support 
from upper government levels. It does not mean that they should provide huge amounts of 
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money, but definitively municipalities benefit from their backing. That is absolutely a daily 
basis relationship and engagement, in words of the different local officer and businessmen 
representatives, which conclusively increase the potential outcomes of local policies; 
namely, political support. Exploitation of external investors cannot be guaranteed for all 
cities, thus not all cities might achieve fast economic growth, yet local economic and social 
conditions would be definitively improved with maintenance of bottom-up policies, 
without exacerbation of regional disparities. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
1. Introduction 
There are no rules about the way of writing a conclusion chapter. This one does not seek to 
repeat the aims and a conclusion of each chapter given along the whole dissertation, 
because I think it is repetitive. I rather tried to remark further discussion that can be 
achieved once the whole project is revised. This chapter also identifies some limitations 
and stress policy implications.  
2. Concluding remarks of each chapter 
When putting together all the findings it is possible to make a broader analysis of the 
whole empirical and qualitative work. In the second chapter, the empirical model allowed 
finding different investment drivers, in terms of regional features and public policies 
implemented. In spite of the fewer resources available in municipalities, it was clear their 
influence on private investment growth. Moreover, it was also showed that manufacturing 
firms seek for different amenities, as well as the foreign firms.  
The US market potential variable showed that foreign investment will continue growing in 
the bordering area given the proximity to the US, which may fosters exacerbation of 
inequalities. Thus, other regions of Mexico should try to support domestic firms and 
enhance their growth, rather than focus on external investors.  
As regards with competition, the correlations found vary a lot, depending on the group of 
firms analysed, and the field of competition, that is, geographic or by economic 
specialisation. When the cities spend more than their competitors in public infrastructure, 
the effects of competition for all firms, this includes both, geographic and economic 
specialisation variables. Meanwhile, spending on Economic Fostering and Subsidies 
showed positive correlation for geographic variable, while it was not significant for 
economic specialisation. It is interesting that when estimations are separated into domestic 
and foreign-joint venture firms, competition variables are more important for the later 
groups. Nevertheless, the variables are not statistically significant all times, which reveals 
limited capacity to influence on investment decisions by competition. In other words, if 
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governments starts spending more than their geographic or economic partners, this is not 
likely to have significant influence on firms decisions.  
This little influence shows that Mexican cities cannot actually engage in competition, or 
perhaps they are not even aware of it. It is most likely that only those cities that are 
capturing foreign investments are actually engaged in competition, either geographically or 
by economic specialisation. Namely, those cities located in the centre region, Jalisco and 
the US-bordering. Nonetheless, as said along this work, investors may concede higher 
weight to other regional features and the availability of labour force, rather than the 
differences in local expenditures compared to other possible places to invest. 
 The competition at state level could be more important. Yet it is more difficult to measure 
given all the assumptions that should be made to construct a similar variable at states level, 
thus it has not been considered as part of this research.  
In the third chapter it was found that local governments in big cities have very little 
influence on firms productivity, while in the national average, municipalities are capable to 
foster productivity by means of infrastructure construction. Some researchers highlight that 
governments can influence in firms decisions, but they generally would foster 
inefficiencies, thus their effect on productivity could be negative (Thomas, 2011), and 
other empirical works had similar findings (Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011, Criscuolo et al., 
2012). In the Mexican case, this happened for big cities, that is, in average their 
expenditures in economic policies are positively related to investment growth –results in 
chapter 2-, while they have a null or even negative relationship with productivity. The 
effects are particularly negative for foreign firms, which could be related to competition 
with domestic firms, as well as inefficiencies.  
It is of special interest the fact that PII showed negative or null correlation with domestic 
firms, while it was positive regarding to foreign ones. This is indeed worrisome, since 
public infrastructure projects might be aimed to needs of foreign firms, such that domestic 
ones are negatively affected.  
A central contribution of these models is the competitive relationship identified between 
national and foreign firms, always with less effect for the manufacturing sector. More 
importantly, the presence of domestic firms with higher productivity is more harmful for 
foreign firms. It can be also interpreted as competition for economic resources. They might 
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not compete in the same final market, but they compete for skilled labour force, political 
support, and other local endowments. Moreover, given that spillovers occur from foreign 
to domestic firms, many of the later can be benefited from higher productive foreign firms, 
but not the other way round.  
At state level, government expenditures in both EF&S and PII have positive effects in 
productivity. Likewise, the federal physical investment is clearly influential in productivity 
increases. It is of essential interest the impact of corruption in the productivity of firms. 
The model showed that government corruption has a negative sign and its effects can be 
even similar to EF&S expenditures from the base model. In this way, the reduction of 
corruption becomes a highly significant issue to tackle when formulating economic 
policies plans. The simplification of procedures to open a new firm might help to this aim, 
to some extent, since the index attempts to measure the corruption level in public offices 
which in order to make use of a public service it is necessary to offer a bribe, for people 
and firms. Nevertheless, according to the World Bank surveys (Bank, 2007), bribes is part 
of the operating system when opening new businesses in Mexico, which might impact 
more significantly to SME’s firms.  
In the fourth chapter, it was confirmed that cities are places of flows and networking within 
the space, and the local organisation can play a determinant role in the economic 
performance. It was found that different models can serve to foster economic growth at the 
local level. Yet, federal and state support is critical for success. When there is not enough 
support, politically and financially from upper level institutions, the local policies cannot 
transcend or their results will be limited.  
In the case of Mexicali, they have achieved significantly large growth ratios, but from 
2003-2010. Hermosillo has accomplished higher rates, and above the national average, it is 
a result of a top-down policy, accompanied of larger amount of funds to the automotive. 
Still, there are some good practices in both cases, perhaps the most important could be the 
long-term visioning in Mexicali, and the support for domestic firms, especially SME’s, in 
Hermosillo. Some policies could be identified with the LED strategies, particularly in case 
of Mexicali, given that the process belong to the people rather to the authorities, and the 
planning do not depend on the political cycle alike most of Mexican municipalities 
including Hermosillo. Still, in Mexicali the policies aim to increase labour force skills and 
foreign investment, while domestic firms have received less attention. Meanwhile 
178 
 
Hermosillo focuses to develop two industries, these are, the automotive and aerospace, 
which is a very traditional development approach, yet more attention to local enterprises is 
given from the state and municipal governments. 
In sum, this thesis work provides information about local and state economic policies and 
the resources spent with those aims. It showed the importance of some regional features for 
investment and productivity such as domestic market potential, US market potential, 
economic specialisation/diversity, health, public infrastructure stock, and share of 
manufacturing employment. It has been of particular interest the fieldwork undertaken to 
understand the daily life in the local administrations and their relationship between local 
stakeholders, the behaviour of local and foreign firms, as well as the rationale behind the 
economic performance of places and the kinds of policies followed.  
3. Limitations of this work  
There is a rich database in Mexico at the firm level, unfortunately given confidentiality 
problems it is not possible to work at this analysis level. In this research it has been chosen 
to work at city and state levels, but it could be also possible to build analysis for economic 
activities. Cities are not the common subject of study in Mexico, even when federal 
government and other institutions have started to monitor their role as planner of the 
economic life in the country. In consequence, although it could be too broad to use cities 
and state levels to measure productivity and investment growth, given that the information 
of expenditures cannot be disaggregated, I considered more important to find the average 
influence in the local and regional economies. 
As regards with the statistical model chosen, as explained before, given the availability of 
the data and the city-region approach, it was considered that using a model with FE and 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to account for spatial dependence, was the most 
appropriate. For instance a different study can be undertaken if using multilevel modelling 
employing the economic activities as nested entities within the cities and the cities within 
the regions or states. Further work with this methodology would be interesting, since it 
allows counting effects at different levels at the same time. That is valid, but it was shown 
that the results of this research are consistent. 
There could be others claiming that spatial econometrics could be more adequate for cities 
and regions. Nonetheless, the cities in the sample are not neighbours, especially in the 
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north region where cities are spread. Spatial models could be used when analysing the 
centre and south region of Mexico, where closeness of cities may influence to a larger 
extent the economic performance of the neighbours. Also, there is more information for 
regional entities smaller than municipalities that in populated areas makes sense, but not in 
spread populations.    
Another important limitation would be the number of years available in the data. With the 
number of municipalities in the sample data for 10 continuous years would have been 
much better, but this is simply a data limitation. Still, the models showed consistency in 
different methods used, FE, FE with Driscoll and Kraay Standard errors, and Difference-
GMM. There were also excluded potential outliers, to increase efficiency.  
4. Policies implications 
This work has been undertaken with the sponsorship of the Mexican government through 
the Federal Department for Science and Technology, CONACYT. Thus I feel committed 
to mention some policy implications in Mexico given the results obtained.  
Undoubtedly, fiscal and political decentralisation has been beneficial to local and regional 
administrations. It has increased the capabilities at local and regional levels to pursue 
economic success. This is not an adventurous conclusion even if I do not compare two 
periods and I will explain why. Before the period of study the local finances were simply 
very limited, as shown on Figure 3.1 this work do not compare the expenditure capabilities 
before and after the major reforms were done simply because the budgets were much 
smaller and most programs were in charge of the federal government as mentioned through 
the chapters. Additionally, it was the time when the top-down approach was prevailing in 
policymaking, thus local and municipal authorities had little participation. Their 
participation has been increasing through the time, but without the resources, actions were 
not fully in charge of locals, even now there is partnership which does not allow local/state 
governments to act on their own in most aspects.  
However, as the expenditures chapters revised here have increased given the growth of 
federal transfers, which is a result of decentralisation in Mexico, it can be said that 
decentralisation has endowed municipal and state governments to pursue economic growth 
and undertake investment projects of diverse nature as described along this thesis. Yet, it 
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should not be neglected that federal investment is still a significant driver for productivity 
increases, thus no conclusion can be made about compared efficiency.  
According to the results, some municipal expenditure could negatively impact 
productivity, while it was always positive for federal and state investments. This could cast 
doubts about municipal efficiency in expenditures, but as mentioned in the corresponding 
chapter, this is not a justification to stop but to increase efficiency in some areas. 
Moreover, this was true for larger cities but no for the total municipalities. In consequence, 
even if the results of the models vary depending on the group analysed, the averages 
showed that spending chapters might have positive influence over investment and 
productivity. More importantly, from the fieldwork, it was confirmed that decentralisation 
is not only about the resources but the opportunities that this represent for local grounded 
policies which could boost economic development and this is very different all along the 
country. 
In addition, the changes in the distribution formula of federal transfers have reduced the 
difference in funds per capita received by wealthier municipalities. That is, at the 
beginning of the period, the wealthier municipalities received larger resources than poorer, 
but this difference has diminished over the time. However, there are still lots of limitations 
to undertake projects at local levels. This opens the channel for Pork-Barrel politics and 
favouritism; since the support from federal and state governments are essential for success, 
as shown with the case studies. I do not suggest to increase deliberately the resources to 
local levels, but to support and encourage them to compile their own planning built upon 
consented plans with clear aims.  
In this context, emerge the recent problems in local and state administrations in Mexico 
that have recurred to significant loans from the banking sector. On the one hand, it could 
be related to corruption and mismanagement, that is, they borrow money because they 
waste a significant proportion of the funds available. As mentioned in the third chapter, 
about 50% of local outflows are exerted on current expenditures, which some might 
consider mismanagement. On the other, most times these resources are borrowed to build 
public infrastructure, given the lag at this regard in lot of Mexican cities and states. 
Clearly, infrastructure works are tasks in which corruption could be more easily 
undertaken (Straub, 2008), yet it was found that their expenditures have been beneficial for 
investment and productivity growth, especially at the state level. It is also true that physical 
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investments are among those actions that can be easily judged and linked with one party or 
politician, so they might seek for investing in such tasks (Mäding, 2006), but Mexico is not 
yet in the point of decreasing returns to infrastructure (Fuentes, 2003).  
Consequently, increasing the public infrastructure stock is certainly related to increments 
in quality of life and productivity, but since municipalities and states it is certain received 
more liberties to take loans, many of them have used that right and it does not need the 
approval of the national parliament, but the state. Indeed, this can foster corruption, 
because less accountability is possible when this is the case. Hence, seeking for funds 
outside of the fiscal systems opened a channel for corruption, which was not frequently 
used before. Therefore, it is clear that the provision of larger resources to municipalities 
and states could improve their position to pursue economic development, and would allow 
for evaluation of policies, that is not possible when the loans come through the financial 
system.  
 Finally, corruption showed to be a significant obstacle for productivity, which although it 
has been only assessed at the state level, it is present in all government levels. The results 
of this research validate once more time, the need of greater efforts to reduce corruption 
which might benefit firms and citizens to a very great extent.   
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Annexes 
A.1 Estimation method for infrastructure variable 
In Mexico, it is common to find researchers that only use the number of landlines per 100 
inhabitants as an infrastructure indicator. The indictor constructed here is more 
comprehensive. It includes indicators for communications and transports, and energy 
supply. The variables are the following: 
- Communications and transports:  
 Number of flight passengers over total of population in the Municipality. This is an 
indicator for air traffic and the airport capacity. Of course this also indicates the 
demand level of the city and the touristic places have larger amount of people 
coming, still some places could be small or there could be so few number of flights, 
so people travel by bus from near cities better connected. Therefore this is taken as 
an indicator for installed capacity for transports.  
 Kilometres of main roads over the total Municipality area (Km2). 
- Energy supply: 
 Total of water feeds over total inhabitants in the Municipality. 
 Number of power points over total inhabitants in the Municipality. 
- Basic infrastructure. 
 Number of drainage feeds per inhabitant. 
It is worth noting that the information on endowments encompasses the whole 
municipality, therefore as a weighting indicator it have been taken the total inhabitants in 
the Municipality and the total area (Km
2
) rather than only the city. The information was 
obtained from the statistics annual books published by INEGI 
The values of these four variables were normalised, taking the maximum value equal to 
100. The variables within the same category are averaged. And the total index is estimated 
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using the geometric mean of all categories. For more information about this method see 
Delgado and Alvarez (2001). 
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A.2 Tables 
 
A.Table 1Metropolitan Areas and cities included in the sample. 
Code 
MA/city 
 Name Population in 2010  Code 
MA/city 
Name Population in 2010 
21 MA de Guadalajara               4,434,878.00  46 MA de Tlaxcala-Apizaco                  499,567.00  
31 MA de Monterrey               4,089,962.00  1110 Celaya                  468,469.00  
34 MA de Puebla-Tlaxcala               2,759,383.00  201 Ensenada                  466,814.00  
24 MA de Toluca               1,846,116.00  2518 Mazatlan                  438,434.00  
2 MA de Tijuana               1,751,430.00  29 MA de Cuautla                  436,318.00  
14 MA de León               1,609,504.00  2516 Ahome                  416,299.00  
11 MA de Juárez               1,332,131.00  50 MA de Orizaba                  410,508.00  
4 MA de La Laguna               1,215,817.00  2619 Cajeme                  409,310.00  
36 MA de Querétaro               1,097,025.00  45 MA de Nuevo Laredo                  384,033.00  
38 MA de San Luis Potosí-Soledad 
de G. S. 
              1,040,443.00  22 MA de Puerto Vallarta                  379,886.00  
55 MA de Mérida                  973,046.00  51 MA de Minatitlán                  364,311.00  
3 MA de Mexicali                  936,826.00  52 MA de Coatzacoalcos                  347,257.00  
1 MA de Aguascalientes                  932,369.00  2823 Ciudad Victoria                  341,773.00  
28 MA de Cuernavaca                  876,083.00  8 MA de Colima-Villa de 
Álvarez 
                 334,240.00  
17 MA de Acapulco                  863,431.00  708 Tapachula                  320,451.00  
42 MA de Tampico                  859,419.00  6 MA de Monclova-Frontera                  317,313.00  
2517 Culiacan                  858,638.00  53 MA de Córdoba                  316,032.00  
12 MA de Chihuahua                  852,533.00  1614 Uruapan                  315,350.00  
5 MA de Saltillo                  844,918.00  56 MA de Zacatecas-
Guadalupe 
                 298,167.00  
25 MA de Morelia                  807,902.00  35 MA de Tehuacán                  296,899.00  
47 MA de Veracruz                  801,295.00  1112 Salamanca                  260,732.00  
2620 Hermosillo                  784,342.00  302 La Paz                  251,871.00  
43 MA de Reynosa-Río Bravo                  727,150.00  26 MA de Zamora-Jacona                  250,113.00  
37 MA de Cancún                  677,379.00  2315 Othon Blanco                  244,553.00  
48 MA de Xalapa                  666,535.00  1213 Chilpancingo de los Bravo                  241,717.00  
10 MA de Tuxtla Gutiérrez                  640,977.00  303 Los Cabos                  238,487.00  
44 MA de Matamoros                  600,852.00  2621 Nogales                  220,292.00  
32 MA de Oaxaca                  593,658.00  706 Ocosingo                  198,877.00  
1009 Durango                  582,267.00  707 San Cristóbal de las Casas                  185,917.00  
1111 Irapuato                  529,440.00  2622 SLRC                  178,380.00  
49 MA de Poza Rica                  513,518.00  30 MA de Tepic                    98,204.00  
18 MA de Pachuca                  512,196.00  30 MA de Tepic                    98,204.00  
   30 MA de Tepic                    98,204.00  
 
Source: Metropolitan Areas defined by CONAPO in 2005. 
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A.Table 2 Economic activities included in the data base. 
Code Activity Number of cities specialised on each 
economic activity 
1993 1998 2003 2008 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 30 24 25 7 
32 Textiles, clothing and leather industries 1 0 0 0 
33 Industries of wood and wood products. Includes furniture 1 2 0 0 
34 Paper and paper products, printing and publishing 0 0 1 0 
35 Chemical substances, products derived from the oil and from the 
coal, from rubber and plastic 
7 7 8 1 
36 Non-metallic mineral products, excluding petroleum and coal 
products 
0 0 0 0 
37 Metallic basic industries 2 2 2 2 
38 Metal products, machinery, and equipment. Includes surgical-and 
precision instruments, and the automotive. 
19 24 22 12 
39 Other manufacturing industries 0   0 
61 Wholesale Trade 0* 0* 0* 0* 
62 Retail Trade 0* 0* 0* 0* 
82 Services of rent and administration of real estate and Services of 
rent of personal property 
0 0 0 36 
92 Educational, research, medical, social assistance and partnership  
services 
1 0 0 0 
93 Restaurants and hotels 5 7 9 7 
94 Recreational, cultural, recreational and sports services 0  0 0 
95 Professional, technical, specialised, and personal services. includes 
loans to enterprises 
1 0 0 2 
96-97 Other services except Government activities 0 1 0 0 
Note: Some activities such as transports, communications, and financing services were excluded because there was no information for all years. The activities are classified 
according to the Mexican Catalogue for Productive Activities (CMAP). 
* Since cities are important distribution centres, it was considered specialisations other than trade, that is, products in which cities could be competing with any other. 
 
 
 
A.Table 3 Metropolitan Areas and Cities by region. Functional classification by SEDESOL (2001). 
Region Cities/MA 
Northwest Metropolitan Area/City, MA de Tijuana, MA de Mexicali, Ensenada, La Paz, Los Cabos, Ahome, Culiacan, Mazatlan, 
Cajeme, Hermosillo, Nogales, SLRC.  
North-Centre MA de Juárez, MA de Chihuahua, Durango. 
Northeast MA de Saltillo, MA de Monclova-Frontera, MA de Monterrey, MA de San Luis Potosí-Soledad de G. S., MA de 
Tampico, MA de Reynosa-Río Bravo, MA de Matamoros, MA de Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Victoria. 
Centre-west MA de Aguascalientes, MA de Colima-Villa de Álvarez, MA de León, MA de Guadalajara, MA de Puerto Vallarta, 
MA de Morelia, MA de Zamora-Jacona, MA de Tepic, MA de Zacatecas-Guadalupe, Celaya, Irapuato, Salamanca, 
Uruapan, MA del Valle de México. 
Centre MA de Acapulco, MA de Pachuca, MA de Toluca, MA de Cuernavaca, MA de Cuautla, MA de Puebla-Tlaxcala, MA 
de Tehuacán, MA de Querétaro, MA de Tlaxcala-Apizaco, MA de Veracruz, MA de Xalapa, MA de Poza Rica, MA 
de Orizaba, MA de Minatitlán, MA de Coatzacoalcos, MA de Córdoba, Chilpancingo de los Bravo. 
South MA de Tuxtla Gutiérrez, MA de Oaxaca, Ocosingo, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Tapachula. 
Southeast MA de Cancún, MA de Villahermosa, MA de Mérida, Campeche, Carmen, Othon Blanco. 
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A.Table 4 List of interviews undertaken by person, charge and organisation in Hermosillo 
City Name Organisation Charge Organisation functions/role 
Hermosillo Verónica 
Yanez Córdova 
Municipal 
Bureau for 
Economic 
Development 
of Hermosillo 
Director of 
regulation 
improvement 
It was created in 2007 in order to contribute and foster the 
economic development of Hermosillo. The services offered 
are directed to three kinds of costumers: 
- Entrepreneurs. Those who want to open an enterprise. 
- Employers. Those who already have a business running but 
they want to expand it. 
- Investors. Those who want to invest in the city. 
The centre offers business advisory and training. It offers 
guidance with Federal, State, and Municipal paperwork. In 
addition, it offers financing, provides some socioeconomic 
information that helps on the decision making for 
entrepreneurs, and grant local tax exemptions to those ones 
eligible.  
Hermosillo Jesus Gámez AMS 
(Maquiladoras 
Association of 
Sonora) 
chapter 
Hermosillo 
Ex-director Provide an environment of mutual support among the 
Associates that ensures good relations among the different 
companies operating in the region with the goal of unity and 
well-being. 
 Facilitate representation of the interest of the Maquiladora 
Industry before diverse forums, principally the three levels of 
government. 
 Heed, analyse and seek solutions to the problems that affect 
the Maquiladora Industry, promoting measures that favour 
the membership.  The Hermosillo section is only 6 years old. 
Hermosillo Octavio 
Sánchez 
CANACINTR
A (National 
Chamber of 
the 
Transformatio
n Industry) 
Chapter 
Hermosillo 
Treasurer Its essential function is to represent the interests of their 
members, promote governmental actions and other business 
organisations to foster industrial activity and defend the 
members from government policies and measures at the 
Federal, State and Municipal that affects industrial activity in 
the country. The chamber has delegations all around the 
country to organise and represent the industrial activity. 
Hermosillo Lorenzo 
Galván García 
Secretariat of 
Economy 
(state level) 
Sub-secretary of 
merchandising 
This is the bureau for economic development and growth at 
the State level. It has the aim to implement policies to foster 
employment, investment, and production increment. 
Hermosillo Enrique Ruiz COPRESON 
(Council for 
Economic 
Promotion of 
Sonora) 
General director The Economic Development Council for Sonora has its 
origin in the State government period 1997-2003; it was 
created by Executive Decree. This organism emerged as a 
response of the State Public Administration to formalize a 
firm and lasting alliance with the various economic sectors of 
the entity, with the fundamental and special vision of 
proposing joint strategies to respond efficiently and 
effectively to the challenges, threats, weaknesses and 
opportunities presented to Sonora nationally and 
internationally. 
It offers business advisory in aspects such as labour force 
availability, supplier chains, cost of living, instalment cost, 
law and incentives, as well as international regulations and 
requirement for those willing to export. They also have 
offices around the State in order to give some personalised 
support in different cities. 
Hermosillo Marco Antonio 
González 
Cubillas 
CANACOPE 
(National 
Chamber for 
Small Firms 
on Retail 
Trade, 
Services and 
Tourism) 
Sonora chapter 
President and 
coordinator of 
the 
entrepreneurial 
organisations in 
Hermosillo 
 CANACOPE is the National Chamber of small firms in 
trade, services and tourism. This is the branch in Hermosillo, 
that also includes the south region in the state.  It helps the 
small firms to get some financing from the programs running 
by the Economic Development departments at the Municipal 
or State levels. They also provide some administration 
assistance and information with some paperwork. 
The interview was aimed to hear about his role as coordinator 
from the other entrepreneurial organisations. 
Hermosillo Rigoberto 
Yáñez Germán 
ProMexico  Director of 
Sonora chapter 
Is the Federal bureau to promote the attraction of direct 
foreign investment and the export of goods and services, as 
well as the internationalization of Mexican companies in 
order to contribute to Mexico's economic and social 
development and strengthen the country's image as a strategic 
business partner. 
Hermosillo Dr. Pablo 
Wong Gozález 
CIAD 
(Research 
Centre for 
Food and 
Development) 
Director It is a research centre and offers postgraduate programs in 
food technology as well as in regional and development 
studies. Dr. Wong is part of the National Researchers System 
from CONACYT, and has worked with development and 
regional economics for more than 15 years. 
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Hermosillo Lic. Mario 
Cuén Aranda 
Treasury. State 
level 
Secretary It is the treasury department at the State level. He has been 
public officer for long time, even a Municipal president in a 
small city. Therefore it was also interesting to hear its point 
of view 
 
 
A.Table 5 List of interviews undertaken by person, charge and organisation in Mexicali 
City Name Organisation Charge Organisation functions/role 
Mexicali BA Mario Iván 
Martija 
CANACINTRA 
(National 
chamber of 
transformation 
industry) 
chapter 
Mexicali 
Director Its essential function is to represent the interests of their members, 
promote governmental actions and other business organisations to 
foster industrial activity and defend the members from government 
policies and measures at the Federal, State and Municipal that 
affects industrial activity in the country. The chamber has 
delegations all around the country to organise and represent the 
industrial activity. 
Mexicali BA Francisco 
Rodriguez 
CCE (Bussines 
coordinating 
committee) 
Manager It represents and groups the Mexican private sector. Its main goal is 
to coordinate policies and actions of business organisations, and 
identify strategic positions with specific solutions that help  to 
design policies to boost economic growth and the competitiveness 
of both companies and the country. 
As a representative and interlocutor of Mexican entrepreneurs, the 
CCE works to promote the free market, full democracy, social 
responsibility and equality of opportunity for people 
Mexicali BA René 
Xavier Acuña 
 CDEM 
(Council for the 
Economic 
Development of 
Mexicali) 
Executive 
director 
The Council for the Economic Development (CDEM) in Mexicali is 
a citizen organism created in 1993. Among its main tasks are the 
following: 
- Create and track economic development strategies for Mexicali. 
- Make economic, financial, social and cultural studies. 
- Encourage educational programs to prepare and develop 
knowledge and skills employers and employees, educators and 
students. 
- Promote, manage and obtain public and private resources, to make 
and maintain these programs. 
Mexicali  René Mauricio 
Marín Rivas  
AMMAC 
(Maquiladoras 
Association of 
Mexicali) 
Director  It is an enterprise department founded by the export maquiladora 
industries in Mexicali in 1978, which membership is volunteer. 
They offer consultancy in Custom, migration, social security, 
housing, environment issues, maquiladora programs and 
permissions, labour issues, fiscal issues, Transport. 
Mexicali BA Guillermo 
Chacón Stratta 
Municipal 
government 
Particular 
secretary 
of the 
Municipa
l 
President 
  
Mexicali BA Carlos 
Córdova 
CDI (Industrial 
Development 
Commission of 
Mexicali) 
Executive 
Director 
Is a business organisation founded in 1977 as a result from business 
community and government efforts, with the purpose to attract, 
grow, and retain business for Mexicali on the industrial and 
manufacturing activities.  
Mexicali Dr. Noé Aarón 
Fuentes 
COLEF   
(College of the 
Northern 
Border) chapter 
Tijuana 
Full time 
researche
r and 
lecturer 
The COLEF is an institution of scientific research and high-level 
teaching, specialised in the study of the problems of the Mexican 
region bordering the United States, which seeks to transform the 
knowledge generated inputs for planning and decisions that 
contribute to the improvement and development of the region. Dr. 
Fuentes have actively participated in regional planning in the state. 
His team has helped with firms consulting as well as government 
advisory. 
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A.3 Boxes 
Box 1 Major actions identified in each city 
City Mexicali   
Problem Solution Results/ Improvement 
Planning practices 
Uncertainty in local planning. 
Lack of continuity with the plans. 
Every three years, new public 
servants come to the municipal 
administration and make a new 
plan. 
Creation of a council for economic 
development that is public-private, and has a 
defined plan to follow until 2020.  
Instead of a new plan every three years, in 
2001 it was formulated a plan for 20 years, 
which was ordered law, thus local authorities 
have to comply to it. 
 The same director remains in charge 
regardless the political term. 
The effects of political cycle are much smaller, 
since public officers and Stakeholders do not 
have to learn about the new policies every 
term.  
 Previous directors are among the presidency 
board. 
Also the public officers remain for longer in 
planning areas, which diminish the training 
costs. 
 The Presidency board also have public 
officers from other levels of government as 
well as representatives from the private 
sectors.  
 
The plans usually do not 
correspond with the municipality 
needs 
In 2001 there were created different 
committees to assess the city in every matter 
and propose a number of actions to be 
completed by 2020. 
The plan is purely based on what has been 
identified as a problem, not only by public 
servants, but also by entrepreneurs 
representatives and other local entrepreneurs.  
Labour force 
High rotation of labour force and 
high emigration rates. 
CDEM created a program to run TV adverts 
and foster values in working people 
These actions, together with the better living 
conditions and low insecurity levels, have 
helped to diminish the emigration levels.   CDEM promotes achievements by the city to 
foster pride and attachment. They also run 
different adverts to emphasize the good 
living conditions and low insecurity levels.  
 The programs have been running for 10 
years now. 
  Also, there has been an increment in 
immigrants with higher qualification level. In 
1990 only 10% of immigrants had a 
professional degree, while by 2010, the share 
was 20%. 
Low labour force qualifications. CDEM has worked their program "Linking 
firms and schools" in order to foster 
employees to continue higher education 
levels. The firms have also showed their 
support to employees and in many cases they 
might have better wages.  
All interviewees asserted that entrepreneurs 
qualify local labour as highly competitive. 
Especially foreign firms are happy with the 
commitment of workers. This cannot be found 
in books, but they stated that Honeywell 
director appointed the labour force as the most 
competitive among its branches around the 
world 
Low ratios of matriculate in 
engineer and technological careers. 
CDEM has promoted such careers among 
young people. 
By 2001, when the evaluation was made about 
15-18% of the matriculate in superior studies 
was in engineering and technological careers, 
while it increased to 31% by 2009. 
  There have been created new careers on 
aerospace and bioengineering themes.  
Investment 
Lack of investment promotion There was created an institute CDI at the 
local level to increase promotion. In this 
institute there is participation from 
businessmen who provide funding.  
Given the presence of entrepreneurs, the 
efficiency in promotion is high, according to 
the interviewees. And as seen in the respective 
section, Mexicali has significant 
manufacturing production by foreign firms and 
joint-ventures 
 Targeted promotion by CDI working in 
coordination with CDEM 
Consolidation of Aerospace industry, 
completing its supply chain by attracting 
specific firms 
Infrastructure   
Need of better equipped industrial 
parks 
The industrial parks are built in co-
participation of private-public actor who 
actively promote the city  
The foreign investors assert that Mexicali 
industrial parks are well equipped for high 
technology.  
  Also its infrastructure index is considerably 
high and well ranked by the IMCO 
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  The aerospace cluster is high technology, and 
the most consolidated around the country. 
City Hermosillo  
Problem Solution Results/ Improvement 
Planning 
Municipalities plan for shorter 
periods and they have few 
monetary resources available 
COPRESON is aimed to do planning for 
longer periods and attend firm’s needs, while 
lobbying for federal incentives. 
There have been identified firms to complete 
clusters and increase competitiveness of 
foreign firms 
Business environment   
Difficult paperwork. Which is a 
general problem in Mexico 
The Municipal Bureau for Economic 
Promotion is intended to ease paperwork for 
all firms, especially for domestic ones. 
They received an award in 2009 from the 
Doing Business project; section Mexico, for 
being the fastest to concede a construction 
permit.  
  The Bureau helps firms to access loans from 
municipal, state or federal funds.  
 The municipal Bureau also retains some 
employees to ensure continuity in the whole 
project, which is aimed to develop the "one 
stop shop" to every service required to open 
a new firm 
There is less cost of training. Although the 
president of the Bureau is changed every 3 
years 
 The Secretariat of Economy helps firms to 
develop their trade mark and to certify 
processes. Especially in the agro alimentary 
industry 
They have helped some firms to extend their 
markets, as well as to contact with universities 
to get some help on sanitary restrictions and 
improvements in shelf life 
Need of resources to comply with 
certifications 
COPRESON provides funds to firms that 
need to pay certifications to supply the 
automotive industry. 
 
Infrastructure 
Lack of infrastructure There is also a commission to develop 
industrial parks, who also undertake 
promotion of the city. 
 
Accessibility difficulties COPRESON provides consultancy on 
logistics to foreign investors in order to 
increase the number of firms landed. 
 
Investment    
Less investment from foreign 
firms. Ford plant willing to close 
and move to another state in the 
centre-region 
COPRESON identified that Ford plant was 
moving. Since it is the main support of the 
economy, they offered a series of incentives 
and infrastructure to help it to stay 
The firm stayed and invested to renew the 
whole plant, such that it is now among the 
most competitive within Ford Motor Company 
 ProMexico and COPRESON  have worked 
hard to increase incentives to firms within 
the automotive, but especially the aerospace 
The cluster is developing in Guaymas, but 
some investment is expected to land also in 
Hermosillo 
Need of continuity when 
bargaining for firms landing. 
The work of COPRESON is fully oriented to 
firm’s needs. Each advisor is designated with 
some firms and they must strive to provide 
what they need to be landed. 
Less training costs.  
Waite of resources when the 
promotion is not specialised.  
COPRESON works only with targeted 
investments and firms 
 
Labour force   
Gap between technical training in 
universities and the skills required 
by private firms 
There are training courses with the support 
of CANACINTRA. The costs are covered by 
COPRESON  
They have helped firms in different times to 
increase labour force skills. 
 Among the incentives offered to foreign 
firms are the training costs when opening a 
new plant, up to a month of wages. 
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Box 2 Questionnaire applied to the interviewees*. 
The questions are listed according to the type of organism interviewed. This is, municipal 
or state economic development and promotion; Business Coordinating Committee (CCE); 
Maquiladoras association; National industry associations, (CANACINTRA); State level 
departments for economic development and investment promotion; and academic 
researchers. 
Municipal bureau for economic development 
 Questions 
1.       How would you describe the role that this centre has plaid in promoting the economic development of 
Mexicali/Hermosillo since it was created? 
2.       Which have been the most important challenges to face? 
3.       How do you coordinate with other economics department at the national and state levels? In 
institutional terms, but also about lobbying for grants and incentives to the firms. 
4.       Have you been participating in the international cooperation with US for the Economic Zone? How? 
5.       Are there some actions to coordinate investment attraction with Tijuana and other cities in the state? 
6.       Is there any kind of cooperation/coordination with other cities in the region to promote joint economic 
development? 
7.       Which are the main competitors for Mexicali/Hermosillo in the regional, national and international 
scale? 
8.       Do you have any strategic economic activity to foster? 
9.       Do you participate in marketing fairs? National or international? Which ones? 
10.   Which kind of support do you offer? 
11.   Do you offer any kind of cash grants? or just tax exemptions and reductions? 
12.   Which are the most common support/services requested by the entrepreneurs to the centre? Financing, 
paperwork?  
13.   Do you offer support for innovative enterprises?  
14.   Are national/foreign originally those firms with innovative departments? 
15.   Have the universities played an active participation to foster economic growth or innovation processes? 
16.   Which enterprises are more likely to require the support from the Centre? SME’s or big ones; national 
or foreign.  
17.   In which economic activities? 
18.   Which are the strategic sectors and activities that the city would like to develop? And therefore you may 
focus your support 
19.   Do you participate in marketing fairs? National or international? Which ones? 
20.   How is undertaken the institutional support you offer? 
21.   The financing you offer is a credit or a grant? Where does it come from? How much have you spent 
every year in this kind of support? 
22.   Do you offer any kind of cash stimulus? or just tax exemptions and reductions? 
23.   How is your relationship/coordination with the entrepreneurs organisations such as CANACINTRA, 
COPARMEX or CCE? Do you have regular meetings? 
24.   Do you offer support for innovative enterprises?  
25.   Are national/foreign originally those firms with innovative departments? 
26.   How does the centre promote interaction between universities and knowledge centres with the firms?  
27.   Do you undertake any kind of after care for those enterprises you have been supporting? 
28.   Which are the most common support/services requested by the entrepreneurs to the centre? Financing, 
paperwork?  
Note: This includes CDEM  and CDI in Mexicali , as well as the  Municipal bureau for economic development in 
Hermosillo. 
 
Business coordinating committee (CCE) 
Questions 
1.       Which kind of support do the firms receive from CCE? 
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2.       Is there any active participation from the members? 
3.       How big are the members firms in average (number of employees)? Could they be foreigners? 
4.       How is the relationship (coordination/cooperation) from CCE Mexicali with the CEDEM? 
5.       Do you consider the role of local and state institutions for economic development have been significant 
in terms of investment attraction? 
6.       How do you evaluate the support and services given? 
7.       Do you think these are dealing with the main needs from firms? 
8.        Which are the most important demands from the members to deal with and take it to the government 
table? 
9.       Do you consider that the monetary incentives given (tax reductions and exemptions) influence on the 
investment decisions? yes 
10.   Do you think the coordination government/enterprises have changed in the last 10 years? 
11.   From your point of view, which are the best places to invest in Mexico, and hence, Mexicali would be 
competing with? 
12.   Economic activities in Mexicali are competing with national or international firms? 
13.   Which are the main strengths from Mexicali as a place to invest? 
 
Maquiladoras association 
Questions 
1.       Which kind of support do the firms actually receive from AMMAC? Do you have personalised 
assistance, courses, conferences? 
2.       Is there any active participation from the members? 
3.       How big are the firms members in average in terms of employees number? Could they be foreigners? 
4.       Does the AMMAC undertake some lobbying to get financing? 
5.       How is the relationship from AMMAC with the CEDEM? 
6.       Which kind of support/benefits your members have received from local and state government? Under 
what conditions? 
7.       How do you evaluate the support and services given? 
8.       Do you think those cover the main demands from entrepreneurs? 
9.       Which are the most important demands from the members to deal with and take it to the government 
table? 
10.   What are the main challenges for maquiladoras? Final markets, financing, labour force, supply chain? 
11.   Do you consider that the monetary incentives given by government (tax reductions and exemptions) 
influence on the investment decisions? 
12.   Do you think the coordination government/maquiladoras have changed in the last 10 years? 
13.   On your perspective, which are the best places to invest in Mexico, and hence, Mexicali would be 
competing with? Is your economic activity competing with other cities in Mexico or with others countries? 
14. Which do you think are the main strengths from Mexicali as a place to invest?  
Note: This includes both representatives; from Mexicali and Hermosillo 
 
National chamber of the transformation industry. In Hermosillo (CANACINTRA) 
Questions 
1.       Which kind of support do the firms receive from CANACINTRA? 
2.       Is there any active participation from the members? 
3.       How big are the members firms in average (number of employees)? Could they be foreigners? 
4.       How is the relationship (coordination/cooperation) from CANACINTRA Hermosillo/Mexicali with the 
Business Developing Centre and COPRESON? 
5.       Do you consider the role of local and state institutions for economic development has been significant 
in terms of investment attraction? 
6.       How do you evaluate the support and services given? 
7.       Do you think these are dealing with the main needs from firms? 
8.        Which are the most important demands from the members to deal with and take it to the government 
table? 
9.       Do you consider that the monetary incentives given (tax reductions and exemptions) influence on the 
investment decisions? 
10.   Do you think the coordination government/enterprises have changed in the last 10 years? 
11.   From your point of view, which are the best places to invest in Mexico, and hence, Hermosillo/Mexicali 
would be competing with? 
12.   Industrial activities in Hermosillo/Mexicali are competing with national or international firms? 
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13.   Which are the main strengths from Hermosillo/Mexicali as a place to invest? 
Note: This includes both representatives; from Mexicali and Hermosillo. As well as CANACOPE for being similar 
organisms to support its members. 
 
 
State level departments for economic development and investment promotion 
Questions 
1.       How would you describe the role that COPRESON have plaid in the economic development of Sonora 
since it was created? 
2.       Which have been the most important challenges to face? 
3.       How do you coordinate with other economics department at the national and municipal levels? In 
institutional terms, but also about lobbying for grants and incentives to the firms. 
4.       Have you been participating in the international cooperation with US? How? 
5.       Which are the main competitors for Sonora in the national and international scale? 
6.       Which kind of enterprises is more common require the support from COPRESON? SME’s or big ones; 
national or foreign.  
7.       In which economic activities? 
8.       Do you have regional marketing planning in order to promote some cities or areas more than others? 
Or some economic activities more than others? 
9.       Do you participate in marketing fairs? National or international? Which ones? 
10.   Which kind of institutional support do you offer? 
11.   How operates the “softlanding” program? 
12.   Do you offer any kind of cash grants? or just tax exemptions and reductions? 
13.   Which are the most common support/services requested by the entrepreneurs to the centre? Financing, 
paperwork?  
14.   How is your relationship with the entrepreneurs organisations such as CANACINTRA or CCE? 
15.   Do you offer support for innovative enterprises?  
16.   Are national/foreign originally those firms with innovative departments? 
17.   Is there any coordination with research centres/ universities and the firms by means of COPRESON? 
Have they played an active participation to foster economic growth or innovation processes? 
18.   How do you undertake the after care to the enterprises? 
Note: This includes Promexico, Secretariat of Economy and COPRESON  in Hermosillo 
 
Academic researchers 
Dr. Pablo Wong González 
Questions 
1.       Which had been the main economic shocks faced by Hermosillo? From 1993 to 2008. 
2.       Why did it showed negative gdp growth during the periods 1998-2003? 
3.       How do you evaluate the money spent by the local and state government in investment promotion? is it 
being spent on bureaucracy, or in actual incentives? 
4.       Are the national firms benefiting from them? 
5.       How do you evaluate the role from local governments in the period 1993-2008? Considering the 
gained spending powers, and the increment in local responsibilities. 
6.       Which are the main competitors for Hermosillo? 
7.       Do other cities, within the state, benefit from the new investment in Hermosillo? 
8.       Are there some complementary roles? 
9.       Which has been the role plaid by universities and research centres? 
10.   Has Hermosillo gotten any benefit from border cooperation/coordination? 
 
Dr. Noe Aarón Fuentes 
Questions 
1.       Which do you consider are the main drivers for economic growth in Mexicali, apart from its 
geographical location, if there is any? 
2.       Which had been the main economic shocks faced by Mexicali? From 1993 to 2008. 
3.       Why this region have maintained economic dynamism differently to the whole country?  Have the 
public policies driven this? Or the international economy? 
4.       How do you evaluate the money spent by the local and state government in investment promotion? is it 
being spent on bureaucracy, or in actual incentives? 
5.       Are the national firms benefiting from them? 
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6.       How do you evaluate the role from local governments in the period 1993-2008? Considering the 
gained spending powers, and the increment in local responsibilities. 
7.       Which are the main competitors for Mexicali as a place to invest? 
8.       Do other cities, within the state, benefit from the new investment towards Mexicali or Tijuana and vice 
versa? Would you describe it as competitive or complementary relations? 
9.       Which has been the role plaid by universities and research centres? 
10.   How do you find the coordination between the three government levels? 
11.   How has changed the role of the municipalities in economic planning in the last 15 years? 
12.   To what extent would you assert that the municipality is empowered to attract and retain investment? 
 
Secretary of finances in Sonora 
1.       Could you please talk about the real capacity from local governments to foster economic growth and 
investment attraction? 
2.       Is there any difference now from 10 or 15 year ago, that is from 2002 or 1998? 
3.       How are incentives allocated to firms? National, foreign? 
4.       Would you say local government is defining investment attraction strategies, or only at the state level? 
5.       What could you say about the role of the state and the municipality as promoters for economic growth? 
6.       Do you participate in any planning activity in the state/municipality? 
7.       Where do the ideas, plans and vision come from? 
Note: Similar questions were made to the municipal secretary in Mexicali. 
 
*All questionnaires are just a guide, the representatives talked about specific issues, relationships, and most of times 
delivered more information than what was requested with the aim to provide a bigger picture of the reality in each place. 
 
 
 
